Brian Chesky - AI Founder Mode

频道: Invest Like the Best with Patrick O'Shaughnessy
视频: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/brian-chesky-ai-founder-mode/id1154105909?i=1000766196703
原文语言: en
统计: 共 97 轮 · Patrick 12 · Brian Chesky 85

[0:00] Patrick

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Ramp 是唯一一个专门为让财务团队更精简、更快、更强而打造的平台，平均每年帮企业省下 5% 的开支，让你能专心把生意做大。用 Ramp 的客户，收入增速是美国企业平均水平的 3.2 倍。Visa、Vercel、Cursor、Stripe、Notion、Eleven Labs、Shopify，还有另外 7 万家企业，全都跑在 Ramp 上。我自己也在用，你也该用。到 ramp.com/invest 了解更多。 OpenAI、Cursor、Anthropic、Perplexity、Vercel，这几家有个共同点：它们都在用 WorkOS。想让企业客户大规模采用你的产品，你就得把 SSO、SCIM、RBAC、审计日志这些核心能力做出来。与其自己花好几个月去造这些关键基础设施，不如直接用 WorkOS 的 API，第 0 天就全都有了。这就是为什么你听说过的那些顶尖 AI 团队，大多早就跑在 WorkOS 上。WorkOS 是让你最快具备 enterprise-ready 能力的方式，让你能专注在最重要的事情上——你的产品。访问 WorkOS.com 即可开始。 Rogo 出品的 Felix 是一个私人金融 agent，它能把一句 prompt 变成可以直接交给客户的成品，而且用的是你们公司自己的模板、上下文和标准。你给 Felix 发封邮件就行，比如「把这些批注意见帮我改进文件里」，或者「按这几封邮件的内容更新一下我的 tracker」。

[1:13] Patrick

And Felix sends back finished PowerPoint decks, Excel models, and sourced research.Felix works the way your team already does, delivering work quickly and accurately around the clock.Learn more at rogo.ai slash Felix.Hello and welcome, everyone.

然后 Felix 就会把做好的 PowerPoint 演示文稿、Excel 模型和标明出处的研究材料发回给你。Felix 的工作方式跟你团队现有的习惯完全一致，7×24 小时、又快又准地交活。到 rogo.ai/felix 了解更多。大家好，欢迎收听。

[1:30] Patrick

I'm Patrick O'Shaughnessy, and this is Invest Like the Best.This show is an open-ended exploration of markets, ideas, stories, and strategies that will help you better invest both your time and your money.If you enjoy these conversations and want to go deeper, check out Colossus, our quarterly publication with in-depth profiles of the people shaping business and investing.You can find Colossus along with all of our podcasts at Colossus.com.Patrick O'Shaughnessy is the CEO of Positive Sum.All opinions expressed by Patrick and podcast guests are solely their own opinions and do not reflect the opinion of Positive Sum.This podcast is for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon as a basis for investment decisions.Clients of Positive Sum may maintain positions in the securities discussed in this podcast.To learn more, visit PSUM.VC.My guest today is Brian Chesky, the co-founder and CEO of Airbnb.Our conversation traces the path from his early training as an industrial designer at RISD through the pandemic moment that forced him into founder mode.He explains what he calls AI founder mode and why it will demand even more attention to the details.He walks through his 11-star exercise, which I've used personally many times over the years,

我是 Patrick O'Shaughnessy，这里是 Invest Like the Best。这档节目是一场开放式的探索，聊市场、想法、故事和策略，帮你把时间和金钱都投得更好。如果你喜欢这些对话、还想聊得更深，可以看看 Colossus——我们的季刊，里面是对那些正在塑造商业与投资的人的深度特写。Colossus 和我们所有播客都能在 Colossus.com 上找到。 Patrick O'Shaughnessy 是 Positive Sum 的 CEO。Patrick 和节目嘉宾表达的所有观点都仅代表他们个人，不代表 Positive Sum 的立场。本播客仅供参考，不应作为投资决策的依据。Positive Sum 的客户可能持有本节目中讨论的证券。想了解更多，请访问 PSUM.VC。 今天的嘉宾是 Brian Chesky，Airbnb 的联合创始人兼 CEO。这场对话会顺着他的轨迹走一遍：从他早年在 RISD 受的工业设计训练，一直到疫情那个把他逼进 founder mode（创始人模式）的时刻。他解释了他所谓的 AI founder mode，以及为什么这种模式会要求你在细节上投入更多的注意力。他还完整讲了他那套「11 星体验」练习——这个方法我自己这些年用过很多次，

[2:40] Patrick

which is his way of imagining the most absurd version of a customer experience as a path to product market fit.We talk about why founders are rarely good early CEOs and what changed him when he stopped chasing adulation and started making things for the love of making them.Please enjoy this great conversation with Brian Chesky.Before we hit go here, we were talking about industrial design, which you studied at RISD.And I have this weird affinity for the history of this topic just because Raymond Lowy, one of the famous industrial designers, helped me a lot in my career indirectly.I'd love to hear you just riff on the influence that guys like him had in your early studies and why you studied that in the first place.Such an interesting background.I was an artist growing up, but I didn't know what to do with my life.And I went to the Rhode Island School of Design.And at RISD, when you're a freshman, you have to pick a major.I'm 17 years old.And I'm like, OK, in three months, I've decided what I'm going to do the rest of my life.And I remember the department head for industrial design came.I never even heard of the term industrial design.I didn't know what it was.And they said industrial design is designed for everything from a toothbrush to a spaceship and everything in between.

它的做法是去想象一个荒谬到极点的客户体验版本，把这当成通往 product market fit 的路径。我们还聊了为什么创始人很少能在早期当好 CEO，以及当他不再追逐外界的掌声、开始纯粹因为热爱而做东西时，他身上发生了什么变化。希望你喜欢这场跟 Brian Chesky 的精彩对话。 在正式开始之前，我们刚才在聊工业设计，就是你在 RISD 学的那个专业。我对这个话题的历史有种奇怪的偏爱，因为 Raymond Loewy——那位著名的工业设计师——间接地在我的职业生涯里帮了我很大的忙。我特别想听你随便聊聊，像他这样的人对你早年的学习有过什么影响，还有你当初为什么会去学这个。你的背景太有意思了。 我从小就是个搞艺术的孩子，但完全不知道自己这辈子要干什么。后来我去了 Rhode Island School of Design（罗德岛设计学院）。在 RISD，大一就得选专业。我那年 17 岁，心里想：行吧，三个月之内我就得决定这辈子要做什么。我记得工业设计系的系主任来做介绍。我连「工业设计」这个词都没听过，根本不知道那是什么。他们说，工业设计就是设计从牙刷到宇宙飞船之间的一切东西。

[3:42] Brian Chesky

I immediately said, that's what I want to do with my life.Because I was thinking of maybe being an architect or something like that.So I started learning about industrial design.And I learned about Charles Raim's, Raymond Lowy.Raymond Lowy, probably the most important industrial designer of the 20th century, designed so many incredible products.This first designer, Air Force One.He designed a lot of beautiful consumer products.He designed a lot of cars.And he had a profound impact, I think, on society.And as I was studying the history of industrial design, it was so incredible.Because industrial design field is a deeply technical field.The thing about architecture is fairly technical.But it's a more known boundary.Like there's buildings.And there's commercial.There's residential.There's retail.There's only so much variation.It's a multi-thousand-year-old field.Industrial design, for the most part, really started with Josiah Wedgwood.It was like, it's really the mass industrial product.So industrial design is really new from the industrial revolution.And it used to be analog things.The first industrial design was chairs and tabletop dishes and bowls.But as technology grows, suddenly industrial design becomes cars and airplanes.

我当场就说：这就是我这辈子要干的事。因为我原本还在想，要不要去当个建筑师之类的。于是我开始了解工业设计，了解到 Charles and Ray Eames（伊姆斯夫妇）、Raymond Loewy。Raymond Loewy 大概是 20 世纪最重要的工业设计师，设计过太多了不起的产品。空军一号（Air Force One）就是他第一个设计的。他设计过很多漂亮的消费品，也设计过不少汽车。我觉得他对整个社会都产生了深远的影响。 而我在研究工业设计史的时候，觉得这个领域实在太不可思议了。因为工业设计是一个技术含量非常高的领域。建筑当然也挺技术，但它的边界比较确定——就是楼嘛，商业的、住宅的、零售的，变化就那么多，而且是一个几千年的老行当。工业设计基本上是从 Josiah Wedgwood 才真正开始的，说白了就是大规模工业化产品带来的东西。所以工业设计其实很新，是工业革命的产物。一开始做的都是模拟世界里的东西——最早的工业设计是椅子、餐桌上的盘子和碗。但随着技术往前走，工业设计突然就变成了汽车、飞机。

[4:44] Brian Chesky

And now you have microwaves and refrigerators.And you have all these things in the 20th century, radios.And then eventually it becomes like medical equipment, like ventilators.And then, you know, with computers.I mean, a lot of people, the most famous industrial design product in the world is the iPhone.And the vastness of industrial design is unbelievable.The intimate relationship you have with a product is incredible.I remember when I grew up in the 1980s, I loved video games.I played with a Game Boy, a Game Gear, Super Nintendo.Or remember Nike in the 80s and 90s, those sneakers.They were the Reebok pumps.Like these products captured kids' imaginations.And they had a very intimate relationship with you.They really had a sense of personality.And computers in particular were something I was really, really interested in.And then, of course, you get to the golden age of Apple,starting probably in 1998 with the iMac.And to Johnny Ive, who was my hero.So I went to RISD.And when I was at RISD, Apple was the golden age of industrial design.They really educated the public about design.Once they were educated, they couldn't unseek great products.And that captured my imagination.What I loved about industrial design was, A, it was very technical.

再往后是微波炉、冰箱，20 世纪这一堆东西，还有收音机。再后来变成医疗设备，比如呼吸机。然后当然就是计算机。在很多人心里，世界上最有名的工业设计产品就是 iPhone。工业设计的疆域大到难以想象。而你跟一件产品之间那种亲密关系，也很不可思议。 我记得我 1980 年代长大的时候特别爱打游戏，玩 Game Boy、Game Gear、Super Nintendo。还有八九十年代的 Nike，那些球鞋；还有 Reebok 的充气鞋 pumps。这些产品抓住了小孩的想象力，跟你之间是一种非常亲密的关系，它们真的有性格。而这里头我最最感兴趣的是计算机。 然后当然就迎来了 Apple 的黄金时代，大概从 1998 年的 iMac 开始，还有 Jony Ive——他是我的偶像。所以我去了 RISD。我在 RISD 的那几年，正好是 Apple 工业设计的黄金时代。他们真的把大众教育了一遍，让所有人懂了什么叫设计。而一旦被教育过，你就回不去了，再也没法对好产品视而不见。这件事彻底抓住了我的想象力。 我喜欢工业设计的地方，第一，它非常技术。

[5:52] Brian Chesky

You work with mechanical engineers.You work with electrical engineers.B, here's the thing about industrial design.It's almost different than any other design.This is also true of fashion design.A design is only successful if it sells.So if we design an office building,architect can win awards in their office building,and it can never get leased.We could design a house, but no one looks at,well, what was the retail value of the house?

你得跟机械工程师打交道，跟电气工程师打交道。第二，工业设计有一点很特别，跟几乎所有别的设计门类都不一样——时装设计也是这样：设计只有卖得出去才算成功。你要是设计一栋写字楼，建筑师可以靠这栋楼拿一堆奖，但楼可能一间都租不出去。我们可以设计一栋房子，但没人会去问：这房子最后到底卖了多少钱？

[6:13] Brian Chesky

So the awards are detached from the commercial success.If you design a product and no one buys it,it's considered a failure.And so because the commercial success matters,you have to think about marketing, manufacturing, distribution, solving problems.It's not just about winning awards.It's about being viable to a customer.The other thing is, it's very much a problem-solving field.It's got so many different boundaries.And it's very much about empathy, about user journeys.More than I think any other design field,I think industrial design always seemed like it was the kind of fieldwhere you put yourself in the shoes of the user.You design these user journeys.And I think they really teach industrial design through user journeys.There's a very specific type of field.And I think that really prepared me for designing.I'll just give you one example.One of the projects I designed when I graduated university was a child's ventilator.And so instead of just thinking about a child's breathing machine,instead of just thinking about the design of the ventilator,one of the projects I had to do was imagine being the child in a hospital.And so I imagine being a child, it's hard to do, but you're six years old.

也就是说，奖项跟商业成功是脱钩的。可你设计一个产品，如果没人买，那就是失败。正因为商业成功是要算数的，你就必须去想市场营销、想制造、想分销、想怎么解决问题。它不只是为了拿奖，而是要在用户那儿真的成立。 另一点是，它非常是一个「解决问题」的领域，边界特别多。而且它极其看重同理心，看重 user journey（用户旅程）。我觉得比其他任何设计门类都更甚，工业设计一直给我的感觉就是：你得钻进用户的鞋子里去。你要设计这些用户旅程。我觉得工业设计的教学方式本质上就是靠用户旅程来教的。这是一个非常特别的领域，我觉得它真的为我后来做设计打下了底子。 我给你举个例子。我大学毕业时做的项目之一，是一台儿童呼吸机。你不能只想着「一台给小孩用的呼吸机」，不能只想这台机器长什么样。那个项目里我必须做的一件事，是想象自己就是那个躺在医院里的孩子。想象自己是个孩子——这挺难的——但你才六岁。

[7:15] Brian Chesky

Imagine you're being six and you're scared and you're looking up at a breathing machine.And imagine the parents.The parents go in and the parents are like, is my child going to be okay?If this breathing machine seems like ominous and like it's keeping you alive,the parents are going to freak out.Like, what's wrong with my child?

想象你六岁，你很害怕，你抬头看着一台呼吸机。再想象一下家长。家长走进病房，心里想的是：我的孩子会没事吗？如果这台呼吸机看上去阴森吓人，像是在吊着孩子一条命，家长立刻就会崩溃：我孩子到底怎么了？

[7:32] Brian Chesky

The other thing is I learned that one of the interesting things that happened wasthe nurse technicians, the really technical nurses,it's a weird thing.They had no problem that these things were complicated.But the hospital wanted a breathing machine that was so simplethat everyone can learn how to use it.Except the nurse technicians had pride that only they knew how to use it.So you had to like weigh the stakeholders.How do you design something for the vantage point of a child?

还有一件我学到的事挺有意思：那些护士技师，就是技术很强的那类护士——这事有点怪——他们一点都不介意这些机器很复杂。医院想要的是一台简单到人人都能学会用的呼吸机；可护士技师恰恰以「只有我们会用」为荣。所以你得去权衡这些不同的利益相关方。你要怎么从一个孩子的视角去设计一样东西？

[7:55] Brian Chesky

Consider how would it imbues to the parents?How could it be universally useful for everyone without threatening people's jobs?You see, there's so many dimensions.That just, I think, really prepared me for this field.There's no product managers in industrial design.You are the PM.There's industrial designers and there's engineers.And there's program managers.So the designer is the product manager.So a design product is one function.Do you think the world's going to go that way now?

同时还得想：家长看到它会是什么感受？怎么让它对所有人都好用，又不威胁到某些人的饭碗？你看，这里头有太多维度了。我觉得正是这些，真的为我进入后来这个行业做好了准备。 工业设计里是没有产品经理的。你自己就是 PM。只有工业设计师和工程师，再加上项目经理（program manager）。所以设计师就是产品经理，设计和产品是同一个职能。——你觉得现在整个世界会往这个方向走吗？

[8:22] Patrick

You're obviously famous for helping usher in this founder mode idea.That was kind of pre-Opus 4.6 or whatever.There's like another layer to that now.I'm curious what we would call it.But it seems like for the first time again,someone, even like you running a very large company with lots of people,can disintermediate lots of the steps between idea and outcome.And this design stuff may be even more applicable than ever.What is the new mode like?

你显然是因为把 founder mode（创始人模式）这个说法推出来而出名的。但那大概还是 Opus 4.6 之前的事了吧，反正差不多那个意思。现在这上面又多了一层。我很好奇这一层该叫什么。但感觉像是时隔多年又出现了这么一次：一个人——哪怕是像你这样管着一家非常大、人非常多的公司的人——也能把「想法」到「结果」之间的一大堆环节直接跳过去。而设计这套本事，可能比过去任何时候都更派得上用场。这个新模式，究竟是什么样的？

[8:46] Brian Chesky

Because everyone's trying to figure out, how do I run a company in this era?So how would you describe the new capabilities and the mode through the lens of this?You know, founder mode was something that Paul Graham coined,but based on an experience I had.I think people are basically born good founders or said differently, it's innate.You don't have to learn how to be a good founder.It's like you jump in the pool, you learn how to swim.No one is born a good CEO.And the job of CEO is completely counterintuitive.And almost all of your intuition about what to do is wrong.And so the problem is we founders never were really prepared to be great CEOs.We founders were taught to learn by doing.And that's great for a founder.It's not good as a CEO.You do not want to learn on the job how to be a CEO.In other words, trial and error is bad for a CEO.You know why trial and error is really bad?

因为现在所有人都在琢磨：在这个时代，一家公司到底该怎么管？所以从这个角度看，你会怎么描述这些新能力、以及这种新的模式？ founder mode 这个词是 Paul Graham 造的，但起因是我的一段亲身经历。我的看法是，好的创始人基本上是天生的——换个说法，那是与生俱来的东西。你不需要去学怎么当一个好创始人。就像你跳进泳池，自然就学会游泳了。但没有人天生就是个好 CEO。CEO 这份工作是彻底反直觉的，你关于「该怎么做」的那些直觉，几乎全是错的。 问题就在于，我们这些创始人从来没被真正训练过怎么去当一个优秀的 CEO。创始人被教的是「在做中学」。这对当创始人来说很好，但当 CEO 就不行了。你绝对不想在 CEO 这个位子上边干边学。换句话说，试错这件事对 CEO 是有害的。你知道为什么试错对 CEO 特别糟糕吗？

[9:33] Brian Chesky

Because you hire somebody, they build an empire, they leave,and now you've got to unwind their empire.And it takes like four years.So you've wasted years.So actually learning how to be CEO is something you should learn.And so I learned the hard way.And I basically learned that what happened was founders were over-delegating their companiesto these professional managers.I'm not disparaging them, but they were detaching themselves.And they were being managed rather than managing the company.And it was really about not apologizing about how you run around the company,being in the details.That was founder mode.Was there a moment that that like clicked for you that you had to change the mode?

因为你招了一个人，他在公司里建起一个自己的小王国，然后他走了，你还得花力气去把这个王国拆掉。这一拆就是四年。等于你白白浪费了好几年。 所以「怎么当 CEO」这件事，其实是应该好好去学的。而我是用最难受的方式学会的。我基本上是这么想明白的：当时的情况是，创始人们把自己的公司过度授权给了那些职业经理人。我不是在贬低他们，但创始人就这样把自己从公司里抽离出去了。他们变成了「被管理」的那个人，而不是在管理这家公司。 所以这件事的核心，就是不再为「你在公司里到处插手、一头扎进细节」这件事道歉。这就是 founder mode。——有没有某个瞬间，让你一下子想通：自己必须换一种模式了？

[10:08] Brian Chesky

Yes.The pandemic.Two things happened.Actually, speaking of Johnny Ivan, Apple, and another person named Hiroki here,I spent the 2010s riding a rocket ship, Airbnb, Uber, a few of us.We went on these crazy rocket ships that like Open Anthropoc are doing now.It was awesome.It was amazing.But by the end of the last decade, around 2019,I remember waking up one day and it was like completely unrecognizable,the company I was running.I had like 7,000 employees.I didn't know what anyone was doing.I felt like I was in a car without a steering wheel.And I just could not turn the company.I was like, turn left.And the company would go right.And actually, not only did I feel like I was not in control,I don't think anyone felt like they were in control.It was just a free for all.Thousands of decisions being made for me.Me overly deferring.Not listening to my intuition.And I got to this point where I remember having this dream.And I told my co-founders, I had a dream in late 2019,where I felt like I left the company for 10 years.And I come back and I was like, somebody had been running the company for 10 years.And they like turned it into this like giant political bureaucracy.And I didn't even recognize the company.

对。疫情。当时有两件事同时发生了。其实说到 Jony Ive、Apple，还有一个叫 Hiroki Asai 的人——我整个 2010 年代都在坐火箭：Airbnb、Uber，还有那么几家。我们几个人就是坐上了那种疯狂的火箭，跟现在 OpenAI、Anthropic 在坐的是一回事。那感觉太爽了，简直不可思议。但到了上一个十年的尾巴，2019 年前后，我记得有一天早上醒来，发现我在管的这家公司，我完全认不出来了。手底下有 7000 号人，我根本不知道谁在干什么。我感觉自己坐在一辆没有方向盘的车里，怎么都没法让这家公司转向。我说往左拐，公司偏偏往右开。而且事实上，不只是我觉得自己失控了，我觉得没有任何一个人觉得自己是掌控局面的。就是一片混乱，成千上万个决定在替我做主，而我又过度地迁就别人，不听自己的直觉。到后来，我记得我做了一个梦。我跟联合创始人讲，那是 2019 年底，我梦见自己离开公司十年，回来一看，好像这十年里一直有另外一个人在替我管这家公司，把它搞成了一个庞大的政治化官僚机构，我连这家公司都认不出来了。

[11:11] Brian Chesky

And then I realized, oh my God, it was me the whole time.And so it was my fault.Like I had actually enabled all this to happen.And then I started talking to people and they all had the same experience.And all these founders felt like we were all made to feel crazy because we had this instinct.So around the same time as a pandemic, I hired a guy named Hiroki Asai.He was from Apple.And he told me about how Steve Jobs ran Apple.And Steve Jobs, when he came back to Apple in 1997, in July of 1997,there were nine days from bankruptcy.And he basically just like went into founder mode, what you call founder mode.He got into the details of every little detail.And I wanted to do that.But initially, the company braced against it.It was almost like it repelled against it.And then the pandemic happened.And we lost 80% of our business in eight weeks.We were in total crisis mode.At that moment, I went from peacetime to wartime.And then I just totally took control of the entire company.And I just never let go.Over time, basically what I did is I reviewed every single thing for two, three years.I worked like 100 hours a week, reviewed every little detail of the company.My vision wasn't do this forever.

然后我突然反应过来——天啊，那十年一直都是我自己在管。所以这是我的错，这一切其实都是我自己一手纵容出来的。后来我开始跟别人聊，发现大家的经历一模一样。所有这些创始人都觉得，我们明明有那个直觉，却被搞得像是自己疯了一样。差不多在疫情前后，我招了一个人，叫 Hiroki Asai，从 Apple 出来的。他跟我讲 Steve Jobs 当年是怎么管 Apple 的。Steve Jobs 1997 年回到 Apple，1997 年 7 月，那时候公司离破产只剩九天。他基本上就是直接切进了 founder mode，也就是你说的创始人模式，每一个细枝末节都亲自过。我也想这么干。但一开始，整个公司是绷着的，几乎是本能地在排斥这件事。然后疫情来了。八周之内我们丢掉了 80% 的业务，彻底进入危机状态。就在那一刻，我从和平时期切到了战时状态，然后我就把整个公司彻底接管了过来，而且再也没有松手。这些年下来，我基本上就是把每一件事都亲自审一遍，审了两三年。我一周工作 100 个小时，公司里每一个小细节都过一遍。但我的构想并不是要永远这么干下去。

[12:14] Brian Chesky

My vision wasn't to micromanage forever.My vision was, before I empower people, I need to know what's going on.This notion that great leadership is hiring great people and trust them to know what to do.Well, how do you know they're great if you're not auditing what they're doing?

我的构想不是要一辈子微观管理。我的想法是：在我放权给别人之前，我得先搞清楚到底在发生什么。现在有一种说法，说好的领导力就是招最优秀的人，然后信任他们知道该怎么做。可问题是，如果你从来不去检视他们在做什么，你凭什么知道他们优秀？

[12:26] Brian Chesky

And you actually want to start hands-on under control and give ground grudgingly.Everyone does the opposite.They let go.They hire someone.They go in the wrong direction.And by the way, that's bad for the leader.You're not training them.So to bring it back to your question, that's founder mode.We need AI founder mode.AI founder mode is going to be even more intense than founder mode.What are the principles that you're thinking about as you go into it?

你其实应该一上来就把事情抓在手里、亲力亲为，然后一点一点、很不情愿地往外放权。所有人都反着来：一上来就撒手，招个人进来，结果方向跑偏了。而且顺便说一句，这对领导者自己也不好——你根本没有在带他。所以回到你的问题，这就是 founder mode。而我们现在需要的是 AI founder mode。AI founder mode 会比 founder mode 还要更极致。——那你往这个方向走的时候，脑子里在想的原则是什么？

[12:48] Brian Chesky

I think AI founder mode, you're even in significantly more details because you have almost everything on demand.The mechanism of founder mode was I had a lot of meetings because that was the only way I gained information.So I would probably do 35 hours of meetings, which is very similar to the way Steve ran Apple.I wouldn't do one-on-ones.I'd only do group meetings.I'd do a recurring thing where I review every single family company, either on a weekly basis, by a week, month, or year.Live in person.Live in person, group meeting, and I'd have the full chain of command.A lot of companies, you have to get your boss to approve it and your boss's boss to approve it and your boss's boss's boss to approve it.I'd have the full chain of command in the room, and anyone can give their opinion.I would make all the final decisions.I would not speak first.I'd usually speak last.And I'd usually agree with the team, but 10% of the time I'd disagree, but I'd ratify every decision.It was a very clear chain of command.But this was a meeting-based culture.I think in AI, I think we're going to move away from meeting-based to asynchronous.And we're fairly remote, and so I think that will benefit us.I think we're going to have a lot fewer layers of management.

我觉得在 AI founder mode 下，你会扎进多得多的细节里，因为几乎所有东西都是随取随得的。以前 founder mode 的运作机制是：我开非常多的会，因为那是我获取信息的唯一途径。我一周大概开 35 小时的会，这跟 Steve 管 Apple 的方式很像。我不做一对一，只开集体会议。我有一套固定节奏，把公司的每一块业务都轮着过一遍——按周、按双周、按月或者按年。——都是现场面对面？——现场面对面，集体开会，而且我会把整条汇报链上的人全叫齐。很多公司是这样：你得让你老板批，再让你老板的老板批，再让你老板的老板的老板批。我是把整条汇报链的人都放进同一个房间，谁都可以发表意见。所有最终决定由我来做。我不会第一个发言，通常最后才说。而且大多数时候我会认同团队的判断，大概 10% 的情况我会不同意，但每一个决定都要经我拍板确认。汇报链非常清楚。不过这是一种以会议为中心的文化。我觉得到了 AI 时代，我们会从以会议为中心转向异步。我们本来就相当远程办公，所以我觉得这一点对我们有利。我觉得管理层级会少很多。

[13:49] Brian Chesky

You know, I think there was an old famous saying, the Catholic Church has been going on for 2,000 years and only have four layers of management.Why do every other company have like seven, eight, nine layers of management?

你知道有句很有名的老话——天主教会都存续 2000 年了，也只有四层管理。凭什么别的公司个个都要搞七层、八层、九层管理？

[13:58] Brian Chesky

I know there's this like general idea, like as a thought experiment, what if I could theoretically manage all 7,000 people flat?I don't think that's a good idea.I think that's an extreme.But I do think going to a few layers of management would make a lot of sense.I'm in the middle of trying to think about how to redesign the company.I think every single person in this company's job will change.I don't know how.I've not wanted to make any rash changes.What I'm basically doing now is trying to get people to adopt AI tools.And I want to see how everyone's job changes in the world of AI tooling.And then I want to basically embark on like a fundamental redesign.I don't think people managers will have any value in the future.When I think people managers, people that only manage people.I think everyone's going to have to be a hybrid people manager or manager IC.Meaning they have to have contact with reality in some sense.They have to be.A thing a customer ends up seeing or touching.An engineer would call they have to be technical.In other words, every engineer needs a code.Even the managers need a code.Whatever the version of that is for your field, you need a code.So if you're a lawyer, you're just not managing people.

我知道有那么一种常见的想法，当成思想实验来玩：如果理论上我能扁平地直管 7000 个人会怎么样？我不觉得那是个好主意，那太极端了。但我确实觉得，把层级压到只剩几层是很有道理的。我现在正在琢磨怎么重新设计这家公司。我认为公司里每一个人的岗位都会变。我还不知道会怎么变，所以我一直不想做任何仓促的改动。我现在做的事情，基本上就是推动大家把 AI 工具用起来。我想看看在 AI 工具的世界里，每个人的工作到底会变成什么样，然后我再着手做一次根本性的重新设计。我不认为纯粹的 people manager 在未来还有任何价值——我说的 people manager，是指那种只管人的人。我觉得以后每个人都得是混合体：既管人，又是 IC（一线做事的人）。意思是他们必须以某种方式跟真实世界保持接触，得亲手做出某种客户最终能看到、能碰到的东西。放到工程师身上，就叫必须懂技术：换句话说，每个工程师都得写代码，连管理者也得写代码。在你那个领域里对应的版本是什么，你就得亲手去做那件事。所以你要是个律师，你就不能只是管人。

[14:57] Brian Chesky

You have to actually read the case law and you have to get involved.And that makes sense, right?You can't just be these managers where you're kind of people's therapist.And you're just doing meetings.You're doing one-on-ones.People who have lots of recurring one-on-ones are not going to survive.Because what they're doing is like that, oh, you come with me with whatever problem is.I'm here to help you like a mentor or professor.That kind of leadership style is not going to work.You need to have context.And I think a lot of people will survive this age of AI.The two types of people that will not survive the age of AI are two types of people.Pure people managers who think it's all about just leadership.No, it's about content and leadership.I hear about design leaders that like the heads of design, they don't actually manage the design.Johnny Ive manages the design.He designs and he leads people.A design leader who only manages the people, that's crazy to me.The way Frank Lloyd managed his design team is through the work.I say you manage people through the work.You don't manage the people.You manage the work.Otherwise, what are you doing?

你得真的去读判例，你得亲自下场。这很合理吧？你不能只当那种管理者，成天像员工的心理咨询师，天天就是开会、做一对一。那些日程上排满周期性一对一的人是活不下来的。因为他们干的事情就是：哦，你有什么问题都来找我，我像导师、像教授一样帮你。这种领导风格以后行不通了。你必须要有 context（对具体事情的掌握）。我觉得大多数人是能挺过 AI 这个时代的。挺不过去的只有两类人。第一类是纯 people manager，那种以为一切都只关乎领导力的人。不对，这件事是内容加领导力。我老听说有些设计负责人，头衔是 head of design，但他们其实并不管设计本身。Jony Ive 是真的在管设计——他自己做设计，同时带人。一个只管人的设计负责人，在我看来简直荒唐。Frank Lloyd Wright 管他的设计团队，靠的就是作品本身。我常说，你是通过工作来管人的。你管的不是人，你管的是活儿。不然你到底在干什么？

[15:55] Brian Chesky

I mean, yeah, like maybe a couple times a year you should have like a check-in, have a heart-to-heart, ask about their family, build relationships.You should do that.You should have relationships.That's not a day-to-day thing.You're not their therapist.You're managing people through the work.So the two types of people who will not make the shift to AI are pure people managers and people that are rigid and don't want to change and evolve.As long as you're like got a growth mindset, I think the tools are going to be very easy.There's an economic setup for the tools to be so easy everyone can figure them out.So I don't think the AI tools are going to be complicated.Right now there's a lot of command line.I think CloudBot and Cowork are not the most intuitive to an average person, but I think economic incentives will be for this to become incredibly intuitive.And I think AI is really an enterprise thing right now.If you take out ChatGPT and people screwing around image generation, it's pretty much just an enterprise phenomenon.I'm on the board of Y Commodore, 175 companies last batch, 159 were enterprise.There are no consumer companies.Because there's no consumer companies, the incentive to make the interfaces really simple is not there because it's their job to figure out the interface.

我是说，一年也许有那么几次，你应该跟他们坐下来聊聊近况，掏心窝子谈一次，问问家里怎么样，建立关系。这个是该做的，人和人之间是该有关系的。但那不是日常该干的事。你不是他们的心理咨询师，你是通过工作来带人的。所以说，转不过弯来的就两类人：纯 people manager，还有那种很僵化、不愿意改变和进化的人。只要你有 growth mindset（成长型心态），我觉得这些工具会非常容易上手。从经济逻辑上讲，这些工具注定会被做到人人都能搞明白的程度，所以我不觉得 AI 工具会一直复杂下去。现在还有很多命令行的东西，我觉得 Claude Code 和 Cowork 对普通人来说算不上最直观，但经济激励会推着这些东西变得极其直观。另外我觉得，现在的 AI 基本上还是一件 to B 的事。你把 ChatGPT 和大家瞎玩图像生成刨掉，剩下的几乎就是纯粹的企业级现象。我在 Y Combinator 的董事会，上一批 175 家公司里，159 家是做企业服务的，基本没有消费级公司。正因为没有消费级公司，把界面做到极简的动力就不存在——因为搞懂界面被默认成了用户自己的分内事。

[17:01] Brian Chesky

The next wave of AI is going to be consumer AI.Consumer AI is going to be the big prize.Can you think of a consumer AI company?You know, maybe open AI, but most of their energy is now going to Codex.Google, yeah, with Gemini, but most of it's still going to search.They don't want to cannibalize your business.So I think that's where it's all going to go.And I'm trying to start thinking about AI as a consumer play and how do we make tools so simple that everyone here can figure out how to use them.Vanta automates security and compliance for over 16,000 fast-moving companies like Ramp, Cursor, and Harvey, keeping them audit-ready around the clock.

AI 的下一波浪潮会是消费级 AI。消费级 AI 才是那块最大的蛋糕。你能想出一家消费级 AI 公司吗？可能 OpenAI 算吧，但他们现在大部分精力都投到 Codex 上去了。Google 算，有 Gemini，但大头还是在搜索上，他们不想蚕食自己的主业。所以我觉得，最后一定会往这个方向走。我也在试着开始把 AI 当成一门消费级生意来想：我们要怎么把工具做得足够简单，简单到这里的每个人都会用。｜Vanta 为超过 16000 家高速成长的公司自动化安全与合规，客户包括 Ramp、Cursor 和 Harvey，让它们全天候保持随时可审计的状态。

[17:36] Patrick

It's the number one agentic trust platform, and it now helps companies like yours watch for the risks that show up between audits across your vendors, your AI tools, and your whole environment.Every new tool your team signs up for, every vendor that turns on AI features, is an opportunity for something to go wrong.And most security programs weren't built for AI's pace of growth.The Vanta agent works like a 24-7 GRC engineer in the background, finding issues, drafting fixes for you, and cutting vendor assessment time by up to 50%.Whether you're a fast-growing startup or a global enterprise, Vanta helps you earn and prove trust.Invest like the best listeners get a special offer for $1,000 off at vanta.com slash invest.Ridgeline is the first end-to-end system of record with embedded AI for investment management firms, running portfolio accounting, reconciliation, reporting, trading, and compliance on one unified platform.Firms are moving off legacy technology and onto Ridgeline because of how far ahead Ridgeline's AI features are compared to anything else in investment management software.Which is why I believe that firms that come out ahead in the AI era will be the ones running on Ridgeline's unified platform.

它是排名第一的 agentic 信任平台，现在还能帮你这样的公司盯住两次审计之间冒出来的风险——覆盖你的供应商、你用的 AI 工具，以及你的整个环境。你团队每新开通一个工具、每一个供应商打开 AI 功能，都是一次出事的机会。而大多数安全合规体系当初根本不是按 AI 这种增长速度设计的。Vanta agent 就像一个 7×24 小时守在后台的 GRC 工程师，帮你发现问题、替你起草修复方案，把供应商评估时间最多缩短 50%。不管你是高速成长的初创公司还是全球化大企业，Vanta 都能帮你赢得信任、并且证明这份信任。Invest Like the Best 的听众可以在 vanta.com/invest 领取 1000 美元的专属优惠。｜Ridgeline 是第一个面向投资管理机构、内嵌 AI 的端到端 system of record，把组合会计、对账、报告、交易和合规全都跑在一个统一平台上。很多机构正在从老旧系统迁到 Ridgeline，就是因为 Ridgeline 的 AI 能力比投资管理软件领域里的任何东西都领先太多。所以我相信，在 AI 时代能跑出来的机构，会是那些跑在 Ridgeline 统一平台上的机构。

[18:44] Patrick

If you're serious about your firm's AI strategy, Ridgeline should be part of that conversation.You can request a demo at ridgeline.ai.It's surprising that so few have tackled consumer, so many of the biggest companies in history are consumer companies.You built one of the great consumer companies of the last generation of companies.What advice would you give to people that do want to build consumer businesses using this technology?

如果你真的认真对待自家机构的 AI 战略，那 Ridgeline 就该出现在这场讨论里。可以去 ridgeline.ai 申请演示。｜挺让人意外的，居然这么少有人去做消费级——历史上体量最大的那些公司里，有那么多都是消费级公司。你自己就打造了上一代公司里最出色的消费级公司之一。对那些真想用这项技术做消费级生意的人，你会给什么建议？

[19:11] Brian Chesky

Like if the next batch of WIC startups were to invert because of your advice, what would you tell them?How would you guide them?So curious why you think there aren't more.Here are the three or four reasons I think it's happening.Number one, I think a lot of people when ChatGPT came out were afraid.They were afraid ChatGPT was going to kill their business.And I think a lot of investors, they want to invest in something where they thought ChatGPT was going to kill it.Number two, the business model is tricky.There is no yet consumer business model for AI that I've seen.For example, ChatGPT, there's three ways it can monetize.Subscriptions, unfortunately, they're probably going to hit a local maximum percentage of users subscribingbecause Claude and Gemini are given away for free.Ads, again, they're hitting a local maximum because Claude and Gemini are not going to do ads.And then e-commerce, they shut down the third-party apps.And the inference costs are expensive enough that they're burning a lot of money.And so I think the first thing is you need to have a business model around consumer AI.You can't just be in the business of information because people are not trained to pay for information.

比如说，如果因为你的一番话，YC 下一批创业公司整个掉头去做消费级了，你会跟他们说什么？你会怎么引导他们？也挺好奇你觉得为什么现在做消费级的这么少。——我觉得有三四个原因。第一，ChatGPT 刚出来的时候，很多人是害怕的，怕 ChatGPT 会把自己的生意干掉。而很多投资人也不愿意去投那种他们觉得会被 ChatGPT 干掉的东西。第二，商业模式很棘手。到今天为止，我还没见过一个真正成立的消费级 AI 商业模式。比如 ChatGPT，它有三条变现路径。订阅——很遗憾，付费用户的比例大概率会撞到一个局部最高点，因为 Claude 和 Gemini 都在免费送。广告——同样会撞到局部最高点，因为 Claude 和 Gemini 不会做广告。再就是电商——但他们把第三方应用给关掉了。而推理成本又贵到让他们在大把烧钱。所以我觉得，第一件事是你得先想清楚消费级 AI 的商业模式。你不能只做「卖信息」这门生意，因为大众从来就没有被训练成愿意为信息付费。

[20:08] Brian Chesky

The second problem is distribution is mature.Now, again, top three apps in App Store are AI.So it does prove you have something revolutionary.You'll find your way to the top.The third thing is while I think Silicon Valley, we like to describe ourselves as rebels,I think, and maybe it's a little bit like the always-on nature of Twitter,I think it's very trend-based and vibe-based.I think there's a sense that everyone kind of does what everyone kind of does.That makes sense.I think the trend is enterprise.The other thing is with Y Combinator, we tell entrepreneurs,get other YC startups to be your first users.It's a really great distribution strategy, right?

第二个问题是，分发渠道已经很成熟、很饱和了。不过话说回来，现在 App Store 排前三的应用都是 AI 应用，所以这也证明了：只要你做出的东西真的具有革命性，你照样能杀到最前面。第三点是，虽然我们硅谷特别喜欢把自己描述成叛逆者，但我觉得——可能有点像 Twitter 那种永远在线的属性——这个圈子其实非常看趋势、非常看氛围。有一种感觉是，大家基本上都在做大家都在做的事。这也说得通。而眼下的趋势就是企业服务。还有一点跟 Y Combinator 有关：我们会告诉创业者，去让其他 YC 公司成为你的第一批用户。这确实是个非常好的分发策略，对吧？

[20:43] Brian Chesky

Like the way we got our first users is you do things that don't scale.Now, what happened was that has taken the logical extensionthat everyone just keeps making enterprise companies.Maybe finally the reason people aren't doing consumer companies is they're just harder.They're more hits-driven.The prize is bigger, but the risk is higher.It's more all or nothing.You can pick a narrow vertical, build a good medium to large-sized business.It's pretty straightforward.You can get other YC companies to adopt it,and you can grow into a larger and larger enterprise.It is much more hits-driven business.You have to be good at a lot more things.You generally have to be better at design, marketing, culture, press.It's not purely technology and sales, which is what I'd say enterprise is.You make a product.It can be a technology-based product.Oftentimes in enterprise, the person using the product is not the person buying the product.And so sales becomes really important.But you can start sales really small with smart in companies.It's really hard to figure out how do you start small consumer?

我们最早那批用户，就是靠「做不可规模化的事」一个个拉来的。但后来的结果是，这套逻辑被推到极致，大家就全都跑去做企业级公司了。可能说到底，大家不做消费级的原因，就是消费级更难——它更靠爆款驱动，回报更大，但风险也更高，更接近全有或全无。做企业级，你可以挑一个很窄的垂直领域，做出一门中等到大型的生意，路径也挺清楚：先让其他 YC 公司用起来，再一步步做到越来越大的企业客户。消费级完全是另一回事，它是个非常靠爆款的生意，你必须在更多方面都做得好——设计、营销、文化、公关，通常样样都得比别人强。而企业级我觉得基本上就是技术加销售这两件事：你做一个产品，可以是纯技术型的产品；企业级里很多时候，用产品的人和买产品的人不是同一个人，所以销售就变得特别关键。但好处是，你可以从很小的公司开始，一点点把销售做起来。消费级最难的恰恰就是——你怎么「从小开始」？

[21:33] Brian Chesky

Who do you start with on the street?So I think these are the reasons why.But it might also just be that everyone's doing enterprise because everyone's doing enterprise.And it's a trend.My prediction is that we're living in the age of enterprise AI.And I think in the next 12 to 24 months, you're going to see the beginning of a consumer AI renaissance.Almost every app on my home screen has not changed fundamentally since AI, including Airbnb.I think that's going to change in two years.On your most recent earning call, you referenced this thing, Project Hawaii, I think it was called,which is like the on-the-ground direct application of the soon-to-be-defined founder AI mode or whatever.Maybe just describe what that is and how you as an incumbent consumer company are trying to make yourself into one of these AI companies.And sort of like what's possible with a project like this?

你上街去找谁当第一个用户？我觉得这些就是原因所在。不过也可能仅仅是因为——大家都在做企业级，所以大家就都做企业级，这是个潮流。我的预测是：我们现在身处企业级 AI 的时代，而未来 12 到 24 个月，你会看到一场消费级 AI 复兴的开端。我手机主屏上几乎每一个 App，在 AI 出现之后都没有发生根本性的改变，包括 Airbnb。我认为两年之内这一定会变。 你在最近一次财报电话会上提到过一个叫 Project Hawaii 的东西，它算是那个还没被清晰定义的「AI founder mode」在地面上的直接落地。要不你讲讲那到底是什么？你作为一家已经成型的消费级公司，是怎么把自己改造成一家 AI 公司的？这样一个项目又能带来什么？

[22:19] Brian Chesky

This is such a great story.So I had this conundrum.We had like 7,000 people.We were down to 5,000.I wanted to like basically take the magic of the founding of the company, the early stages.We were in this little apartment working together.And I wanted to work with like a team of 10 people.And I wanted to like have that team work in one problem.And so we ended up focusing on one problem.We said, let's put a team together to focus on improving the guest experience, improving conversion rate.Conversion rate is basically search to book.The conversion rate of people typing in a location and dates and booking.And there's a funnel.And you can basically measure the funnel and you can do A-B test.But more than A-B testing, I wanted to do something where the north star was let's make the experience better and increase conversion.We're going to start with a better user experience.And so we put together a team, 10 or 12 people, designers, engineers, product people, data scientists.It was mostly just a pure software team.And we treated it like a little startup.And we said, we're going to just focus.And we're going to do a system of crawl, walk, run, then fly.Crawl.Fix the bugs.Fix the problems of conversion rate.

这个故事特别精彩。我当时面临一个难题：公司原来有大概 7000 人，后来减到 5000 人。我特别想把公司创立初期那种魔力找回来——那时候我们几个人挤在一间小公寓里一起干活。我想带一个 10 个人的小团队，让这个团队只盯着一个问题。所以我们最后就锁定了一个问题：组一支队伍专门去改善房客体验、提升转化率。转化率说白了就是从搜索到下单——用户输入目的地和日期，最后真的完成预订的比例。这中间是一个漏斗，你可以量化它，可以做 A/B 测试。但我想做的不只是 A/B 测试，我要的北极星是：把体验做得更好，从而把转化率提上去，起点是更好的用户体验。于是我们组了个 10 到 12 人的团队，有设计师、工程师、产品、数据科学家，基本上就是一支纯软件团队。我们把它当成一家小创业公司来对待，我们说：我们就专注干这一件事。方法是四步走——爬、走、跑，然后飞。先「爬」：修 bug，把转化率上那些明摆着的问题解决掉。

[23:25] Brian Chesky

Just the easy things.Once you build a little bit more confidence, walk.Start to develop features.Really start to reframe the journey.Then run.Rethink the entire flow.Big features.Fly.Like completely reinvent yourself.And everything is going to be measured.Everything is going to be operationalized.The team's results were phenomenal.They ended up delivering the equivalent of, I think, in year one, $200,000,000 in kind of revenue for the company.The following year was like $400,000,000,000.Now we're at a run rate of like over 600 basis points.600 basis points of $13,000,000,000,000.You get the sense of how much of a lever that is.It was just one team.I mean, it grew into dozens and dozens of people, maybe 50 or 60 people.But it was this really lean team.We took that team.We said, what if we apply to the next problem?

就是先挑容易的做。等信心攒起来一点，就开始「走」——开始做功能，真正去重新梳理整段用户旅程。然后是「跑」——把整个流程重新想一遍，做大功能。再往后是「飞」——彻底把自己重新发明一遍。而且每一步都要有度量，每一步都要沉淀成能持续运转的机制。这个团队的成果好得惊人。我记得第一年，他们大概给公司多带来了相当于 2 亿美元的收入；第二年大概是 4 亿美元。现在这些改进的年化效果已经超过 600 个基点——600 个基点，对应的是 130 亿美元的盘子，你就能感觉到这个杠杆有多大。而这只是一个团队。当然它后来长到了几十号人，可能五六十人吧，但一直是支非常精干的队伍。后来我们把这支团队拿过来问：如果把同一套打法用到下一个问题上会怎样？

[24:12] Brian Chesky

Pricing.Totally different team.Same model.Then another model.Then another model.And I really tried to work with a team.And initially, I would meet with them every week.And then it became every other week.And then every month.And my general philosophy is start really hands-on and let go over time.I'm not a golfer, but like I took a couple golf lessons.Here's an analogy for management.If you learn golf, you want to learn with a golf instructor before you build any habits.Because if you learn on your own, you're going to like have a weird swing.And then when you get a golf instructor, they got to change your muscle memory.So the golf instructor has got to watch you swing like thousands of times.Eventually, they don't need to see you.You let go over time.What most founders do is the opposite.They bring these people in.They let them figure it out.And then they intervene later.But they already have the wrong muscle memory.So I decided I'm going to be totally hands-on.I'm going to do everything with the team.Teach them everything I know.And let go.Then do it with the next team.And then I had teams learn from other teams.Then when we launched Services Experiences, we basically found this other way of innovating.

下一个问题是定价。换一批人，同样的模式。然后再来一个，再来一个。我是真的跟着团队一起干。一开始我每周都跟他们碰一次，后来变成两周一次，再后来一个月一次。我的基本理念是：一开始极度亲力亲为，然后随着时间慢慢放手。我不打高尔夫，但我上过几节高尔夫课，这里有个管理上的类比：学高尔夫，最好在你养成任何习惯之前就先跟教练学。因为你自己瞎练，挥杆姿势一定很怪；等你再请教练，他就得先帮你把肌肉记忆改掉。所以教练必须盯着你挥杆成千上万次，到某个阶段，他就不需要再盯着你了——这就是随时间放手。大多数创始人的做法恰恰相反：先把人招进来，让他们自己摸索，过一阵子再来干预。可那时候错误的肌肉记忆早就长成了。所以我决定：我要百分之百亲力亲为，所有事都跟团队一起做，把我知道的全教给他们，然后再放手。然后带下一支团队。再往后，我让团队之间互相学。等到我们上线 Services 和 Experiences 的时候，我们其实又摸索出了另一种做创新的方式。

[25:14] Brian Chesky

So here's a riddle.Or it was a riddle to me.Airbnb, we had this core business that was really successful.It did nearly $100 billion a year in gross sales.For every $1,000 spent in the world, $1 was spent on Airbnb.Except we had the problem of we're like a one-hit wonder.And for 18 years, I couldn't get a second hit out.And I kept wondering, like, why is this not working?

说个谜题吧——起码它曾经把我难住了。Airbnb 的核心业务非常成功，一年做到接近 1000 亿美元的总成交额。全世界每花出去 1000 美元，就有 1 美元花在 Airbnb 上。可我们有个问题：我们像个「一曲成名」的歌手。整整 18 年，我都没能做出第二个爆款。我一直在想，这到底为什么就是做不成？

[25:38] Brian Chesky

And the answer is like too obvious.It was staring us in the face.But we kept having the burden of trying to scale these businesses at a global scale from the beginning.When we started Airbnb, we started one city, New York City.We had 100 users.I was in Y Combinator.Paul Graham goes, where are your users?

答案其实太明显了，一直就摆在我们眼前。我们始终背着一个包袱：新业务从第一天起就想在全球范围内铺开。可当年做 Airbnb 的时候，我们只从一个城市开始——纽约，只有 100 个用户。我那时候在 Y Combinator，Paul Graham 问我：你的用户在哪儿？

[25:55] Brian Chesky

I'm like, they're in New York.We have like not many, but they're in New York.He goes, you're in Mountain View.You're in New York.What are you doing here?We went door-to-door meeting users.The basic philosophy is make the problem as small as possible.Get to product market fit, then scale.So we launched service experiences last year.And it didn't work right away.And I'm like, oh shit.And we launched service experiences in 100 cities.And I went back and I thought to myself, wait a second.Airbnb launched in New York.Uber launched in San Francisco.DoorDash launched in Palo Alto.Let's make the problem small and just perfect a city.And so we started doing this with new businesses.We basically get any new business, we're going to do one to 10 to many.We'll pilot in one market, any idea.If we get the market to work, we'll go to 10.You get a 10 that works, we'll industrialize.It took us 16 years to get to our second and third business.We started getting those two working.Now we have like 10 to 20 pilots.Eventually we'll have 50 to 70 new verticals.This is like the Hawaii system.It's basically taking this giant company, making it a really small elite team.It's like the Navy SEALs.I work with the teams really leanly.

我说：在纽约。人不多，但都在纽约。他说：你人在 Mountain View，用户在纽约，那你待在这儿干什么？于是我们就跑去纽约挨家挨户见用户。基本原则就是：把问题缩到尽可能小，先跑通产品市场契合，然后再谈规模化。去年我们上线了 Services 和 Experiences，一开始没能立刻跑通，我心想：完蛋。而我们当时是一口气在 100 个城市上线的。我回过头一想，等一下——Airbnb 是从纽约起步的，Uber 是从旧金山起步的，DoorDash 是从 Palo Alto 起步的。那就把问题缩小，先把一个城市做到极致。所以现在我们做新业务都是这一套：一个 → 十个 → 很多个。任何一个想法，先在一个市场做试点；一个市场跑通了，就扩到 10 个；10 个都跑通了，就工业化铺开。我们花了 16 年才做出第二个和第三个业务；这两个刚开始跑起来，现在我们手上已经有 10 到 20 个试点了，最终可能会有 50 到 70 个新的垂直业务。这就是 Hawaii 那套体系——把一家巨型公司，重新变回一支非常小的精锐队伍，有点像海豹突击队。我跟这些团队一起干，人少而精。

[26:58] Brian Chesky

Make the problem as small as possible.I think that's a key thing.Make the problem as small as possible.Dominic and niche.Peter Thiel used to say this.He was one of our first investors.He said it's better to have a monopoly of a tiny market than a small share of a big market.This is counterintuitive.Every investor wants to go into big markets.I don't like big markets.Big markets have a lot of competition.Go into a small market and make it big.Is the reason for both of these things, the idea that it works in Toronto but not at 100city scale and the reason a 10-person team can outperform a 100-person team, is the sharedreason some sort of like better contact with reality and like somehow reality starts gettingdistorted as you get bigger or something?

把问题缩到尽可能小，我觉得这是关键。把问题缩到尽可能小，然后在一个细分市场里做到主导。Peter Thiel 以前就这么说——他是我们最早的投资人之一。他说：与其在一个大市场里占很小的份额，不如在一个很小的市场里做垄断。这挺反直觉的，每个投资人都想进大市场，可我不喜欢大市场——大市场里竞争太多。进一个小市场，然后把它做大。 那这两件事——一个业务在多伦多能跑通、放到 100 个城市就不行，以及一支 10 人团队能干过 100 人团队——它们背后是不是同一个原因？就是你跟现实的接触更直接，而公司一旦变大，现实就开始被扭曲了？

[27:36] Brian Chesky

This comes back to the most important piece of advice I ever got.The first day Y Combinator, Paul Graham, said, it's better to have 100 people love youthan a million people sort of like you.And that came from Paul Buchheit.Paul Buchheit was a partner Y Combinator.He created Gmail.The old famous story was he created Gmail and it took him two years.And they said, you can't ship it until 100 people inside of Google love it.And it actually took two years to get 100 people to actually like the product.But once 100 people like something, 100 million people like it.It's like the sample size is enough.The problem is you try to make something a million people like, you can't talk to a million people.And so you end up with this shallow swimming pool.It's like you're trying to heat up an ocean.And the ocean just, it takes too long to heat up and you can't tell.Instead of heating up an ocean, heat up a bathtub.Make the problem as small as possible.And you're close to the customer.In fact, if you only are focused on one city or even a subset of city, you can talk to everyperson.You can put all of these resources on a tiny problem.And I guarantee you take a ton of resources.You put on a tiny problem.

这就要说回我这辈子收到过的最重要的一条建议。Y Combinator 的第一天，Paul Graham 说：让 100 个人爱你，好过让 100 万人觉得你还行。这句话其实来自 Paul Buchheit——他是 Y Combinator 的合伙人，也是 Gmail 的创造者。有个老掉牙但很有名的故事：他做 Gmail 做了两年，条件是 Google 内部得有 100 个人真心喜欢它，才允许发布。结果真的花了两年，才让 100 个人是真的喜欢这个产品。可一旦有 100 个人喜欢，就会有 1 亿人喜欢——样本量已经够了。问题在于，如果你一上来就想做一个 100 万人会喜欢的东西，你根本没法跟 100 万人聊天，最后你得到的是一个又大又浅的泳池。这就像你想把一整片海洋烧热——海洋太大，热得太慢，你根本判断不出有没有起效。别去烧海洋，去烧一浴缸的水。把问题缩到尽可能小，你就离用户很近。事实上，如果你只盯一个城市，甚至只盯一个城市里的一小块，你可以跟每一个人都聊上话，你可以把所有资源都压在这么一个小问题上。我跟你保证，把一大堆资源压到一个很小的问题上——

[28:32] Brian Chesky

The smaller the problem, the more you'll change the numbers, the trajectory.And that will teach you lessons.And there's you do things that don't scale.Then you scale.And the scaling is industrialization.The product market fit is a distinct problem from industrialization.So you want to basically make the problem as small as possible.Understand the user.Put yourself in their shoes.Blow their mind.Do things you've never thought before.Do them by hand.Make them unscalable.Don't worry how much it costs.Just prove the model.It's like R&D.That is a lot like industrial design.This is what we call prototyping.Before you manufacture something, you prototype.And you make prototype after prototype after prototype.And until you make something that you love for yourself or someone loves.So yes, the smaller the problem, the more there's fewer abstraction layers.You're actually on the ground.You're talking to people.That's how you prove it.Hawaii to these pilots.It's all the same thing.By the way, same thing with AI.You're removing abstraction layers.You're making the problem as small as possible.And you're going directly to the source.I think that's a principle that all these things have in common.

——问题越小，你越能把数字、把整条曲线的走向真正改变。而这个过程会教给你东西。这就是先做不可规模化的事，然后再规模化，而规模化就是工业化。找到产品市场契合和工业化，是两个完全不同的问题。所以你要做的是：把问题缩到尽可能小，理解用户，站到他们的处境里，给他们一个惊喜，做些以前想都没想过的事。用纯手工的方式去做，做那些完全不可规模化的事，别管成本多少，先把模式验证出来。这有点像研发，也非常像工业设计——我们管这个叫做原型。量产之前你要先做原型，一个接一个地做，一直做到你自己爱上它，或者有人爱上它为止。所以是的，问题越小，中间的抽象层就越少，你是真的踩在地面上，真的在跟人对话——这才是验证的方式。Hawaii 也好，这些试点也好，本质上都是同一件事。顺便说一句，AI 也是同一件事：你在移除抽象层，你在把问题缩到尽可能小，你在直接接触源头。我觉得这就是所有这些事情共同的原则。

[29:35] Brian Chesky

It's like we're playing this game of telephone if we don't do it that way.And you just lose information.And this is why founders don't like running large companies.They end up in a game of telephone.They say something and then it goes down like five layers.And then it goes back up five layers.And they're in these like meetings.And the meetings become like system reviews.And literally like the lowest point for me when I was having meetings about meetings.You've gotten into this new mode.It's called founder mode.It's not called CEO mode.Do you think you're now a good CEO?

不这么做的话，我们就等于在玩传话游戏，信息一路上不断损耗。这也是为什么创始人不喜欢管大公司——他们最后陷在传话游戏里：说一句话，往下传五层，再从下往上传五层，然后人就整天泡在各种会里，会开着开着就变成了「系统评审」。我最低谷的时候，字面意义上在开「关于开会的会」。 你现在进入了一种新状态，它叫 founder mode，而不叫 CEO mode。那你觉得，你现在是个好 CEO 吗？

[30:02] Brian Chesky

I think I am.I think I was naturally a good founder.Although I would say I also got really lucky.Because I had two great co-founders.And damn did I luck out on that.I think I was a very good early stage CEO.And I think the moment I had to have like an executive team.I really struggled to make the shift from a founder to CEO.I really struggled.And I think in the 2010s.I do not think I was a great CEO.And I think we paid the price for my learning curve.And I think the pandemic was a rude awakening for me.I think I was conflict averse.By the way, somebody once said a pitcher never takes himself off the mound.As a manager, you got to go take them off the mound.I didn't want to hurt people's feelings.I wanted them to take them off the mound.And the longer you leave a pitcher on the mound, the more home runs they give up.Like the more upsetting they're getting.And they're still going to be angry at you no matter when you take off the mound.So I don't think I was naturally a good CEO.And I remember up to the pandemic, at one point I wonder, I wonder if I'm just not meant to be a CEO.Maybe I'm not meant to do it.And then the pandemic happened.We had a near-death experience.And I said, well, screw all the rumination.

我觉得是。我觉得我天生就是个不错的创始人，不过我也得说我运气特别好——我有两个非常棒的联合创始人，这一点上我真是撞了大运。我觉得我早期阶段的 CEO 当得很好。但从需要有一支高管团队的那一刻起，我就非常吃力，很难完成从 founder 到 CEO 的转变，真的很难。整个 2010 年代，我不认为自己是个好 CEO，而且我觉得公司为我的学习曲线付出了代价。疫情对我来说是一记当头棒喝。我以前很回避冲突。顺便说，有人讲过一句话：投手是不会自己走下投手丘的，得由经理走过去把他换下来。我不想伤别人的感情，我总希望他们自己主动下来。可你把一个投手在丘上留得越久，他被打出的全垒打就越多，场面只会越难看。而且不管你什么时候把他换下来，他都一样会生你的气。所以我不觉得自己天生是个好 CEO。我记得疫情之前有一阵子，我甚至在想：会不会我根本就不是当 CEO 的料？也许我就不该干这个。然后疫情来了，我们经历了一次濒死体验，我说：去他的那些纠结吧。

[31:02] Brian Chesky

Like, it's do or die.And I feel like I learned how to do the job.There's really a few phases as a CEO.Have an idea.Get to product-market fit.Product-market fit to hyper-growth.Hyper-growth scale to become a real company.Real company as in profitable public.And I did all that.We have like 40% free cash flow margin.We're very profitable.We do $100 billion in sales.The last phase of a CEO is reinventing the company.Product extension.And the reason our stock has been flat is because we only do one thing.And we've started to saturate a little bit of the core idea.So we've had to reinvent ourselves.We had to do product extension.So I've still got to prove myself.And then there's another proof point.Can I navigate this transformation of AI?

那时候就是要么活、要么死。我感觉我是在那时候真正学会了怎么干这份工作。当 CEO 大概分几个阶段：想出一个点子；把它做到产品市场契合；从产品市场契合走到高速增长；再从高速增长扩张成一家真正的公司——所谓真正的公司，就是能盈利、能上市。这些我都做完了。我们的自由现金流利润率有 40% 左右，非常赚钱，一年 1000 亿美元的成交额。CEO 的最后一个阶段，是把公司重新发明一遍，也就是做产品延展。我们股价一直不涨的原因，就是我们只做一件事，而核心那个点子已经开始有点饱和了。所以我们必须重新发明自己，必须做产品延展。所以我还得继续证明自己。而且后面还有一道考验：我能不能带着公司走完 AI 这场转型？

[31:44] Brian Chesky

I think founder mode is going to be the only way to operate in the age of AI.If you're a giant professional CEO, I think you can operate in a founder mode.But if you're like risk-averse, you want to be incremental, those types of people are not going to survive the age of AI.So I think there was an old Albert Einstein quote.He said, the best way to keep your balance on a bicycle is to keep moving.You're going to have to keep moving.Founders are going to be really well primed or set up for this age of AI.Because we kind of have to redesign our whole company from scratch again.Was there anything else that Hiroki taught you?

我觉得在 AI 时代，founder mode 会是唯一行得通的运作方式。你要是一位职业经理人出身的大公司 CEO，我认为你同样可以用 founder mode 来干活。但如果你是那种规避风险、只想做渐进式改良的人，这类人在 AI 时代活不下来。Albert Einstein 有句老话，他说：想在自行车上保持平衡，就得一直往前骑。你必须一直往前骑。创始人在 AI 时代天然占优、准备得更充分，因为我们本来就得把整家公司从零再设计一遍。——Hiroki 还教过你别的什么吗？

[32:16] Brian Chesky

Because Steve was perhaps the literal ultimate example of everything you just said.Focused on the details, in the weeds forever, reinvention of the company.And before I say, just to say who Hiroki is, everyone knows Johnny Ive.Hiroki is a bit of an unsung hero.I always heard about him.He's like this legendary mythical figure that like was elusive.There's like almost no photos of him online.There's like no videos of him.He was never out in front.But he was Steve Jobs' creative director.It was a function under marketing.He did the ads.He did the graphic design.He was really responsible for, you know, when he was like that black type with the grayfont and like the product in front of white.That was really his aesthetic.He taught me two principles of Apple that I brought.One was simplicity.I think startups are like, when you start a company, because you have no money and you'reso constrained, you are naturally simple.Lack of abundance creates natural constraints.And so simplicity is thrust upon you.And that is good for you.And then once you raise a bunch of money and hire a bunch of people, you go to a lot ofdirections.Then you lose your sense of focus.How many startups can we think of today who have struggled from lack of focus?

因为 Steve 大概就是你刚说的这一切最极致的那个例子：死盯细节、永远扎在活儿里、不停地重新发明这家公司。——在往下说之前，我先介绍一下 Hiroki 是谁。Jony Ive 大家都知道，Hiroki 则算是个被埋没的英雄。我很早就听说过他，他就像个传说中的神秘人物，很难接触到：网上几乎找不到他的照片，也没有视频，他从来不站到台前。但他是 Steve Jobs 的创意总监，这个职能是挂在 marketing 下面的。广告是他做的，平面设计也是他做的。你知道 Apple 那种画面吧——白色背景、黑色标题字配灰色字体、产品摆在最前面，那套美学真的就是出自他手。他教了我两条 Apple 的原则，我把它们带进了公司。第一条是简单（simplicity）。创业公司刚起步的时候，因为没钱、处处受限，你天然就是简单的——匮乏本身就制造了约束，简单是被硬塞给你的，而这对你其实是好事。可一旦你融了一大笔钱、招了一大堆人，你就会朝很多个方向铺开，然后就丢掉了专注。今天有多少家创业公司，是栽在不专注上的？

[33:22] Brian Chesky

Probably name a few.So you start to lose your muscle for simplicity.Hiroki taught me simplicity.And he taught me simplicity is not removing things.Simplicity is distilling something so fundamentally that you understand its essence.I know Steve just say, design is the fundamental soul of a man-made creation that revealsitself through subsequent layers.In other words, great design is about distilling something to its essence.It's kind of what Elon does with SpaceX, where he talks about first principles.And first principles is kind of like a physics term, but it's also a design term.It's about understanding.If I'm going to reinvent this product, I have to understand the properties of glass.I have to understand everything about it to distill it to its essence.So I got obsessed with simplicity.Simplicity of our products, simplicity of our organization, simplicity of everything.The other one was a sense of craft and details.How you do anything is how you do everything.And I said, everything must be perfect.It comes from, there's a book that a lot of people in Silicon Valley recommend,The Score Takes Care of Itself.Bill Walsh, the coach of the San Francisco 49ers.John Wooden, winning his coach in college basketball history, UCLA.

大概能数出好几家。所以你会慢慢失去『做简单』的那块肌肉。Hiroki 教会了我什么是简单。而且他教我的是：简单不是把东西拿掉；简单是把一样东西提炼到足够根本，让你真正理解它的本质。我记得 Steve 说过，设计是人造物的根本灵魂，它会通过一层层外在的形态显现出来。换句话说，好设计就是把一样东西提炼到它的本质。这有点像 Elon 在 SpaceX 干的事，他老讲 first principles。first principles 算是个物理学词，但它同样是个设计词——它讲的是『理解』。如果我要重新发明这个产品，我就必须理解玻璃的物理属性，必须把关于它的一切都搞明白，才能把它提炼到本质。所以我变得痴迷于简单：产品要简单，组织要简单，所有东西都要简单。第二条是手艺感和对细节的执着。你做任何一件事的方式，就是你做所有事的方式。我说过，一切都必须做到完美。这想法是有出处的——硅谷很多人都推荐的一本书《The Score Takes Care of Itself》（比分会自己照顾好自己），作者是 San Francisco 49ers 的教练 Bill Walsh。还有 John Wooden，美国大学篮球史上战绩最辉煌的教练，UCLA 那位。

[34:28] Brian Chesky

Same principle.First day UCLA.So John Wooden, won 10 NCAA champions over 12 years.First day, first hour on his team, he spends an hour teaching how to put your socks on.One hour, and he said, put your socks on this way.Mr. Miyagi.Yeah.One hour teaching you how to put your socks on.It's a metaphor.Everything was that rigorous.Bill Walsh said the way you tuck your jersey into your pants was one of 10,000 details thatdepend on whether you won or not.Basically, don't focus on winning.Focus on getting all the inputs perfect.And you get everything perfect.Then you will win.And you don't focus on the scorecard.We do focus on growth, but we kind of stop focusing on growth.We started focusing on making everything perfect.And if everything is perfect and you don't grow, then you focus on the wrong input.But if you have the right inputs and you make them perfect, then you'll grow really fast.And so that's really what I learned from him.He really taught me, I think, founder mode.Because I never met Steve.So I only knew through Hiroki.And I said, well, I love this.I'm an artist.I'm a designer.I could have more control of the product.I get to make everything perfect.The initial attempt at founder mode created giant revolts.

同一个道理。UCLA 报到的第一天。John Wooden 在 12 年里拿了 10 个 NCAA 冠军。新队员进队的第一天、第一个小时，他花整整一个小时教你怎么穿袜子。一个小时，他说：袜子要这么穿。——Mr. Miyagi 那一套。——对。花一个小时教你穿袜子。这是个隐喻：所有事情都严苛到这个程度。Bill Walsh 说过，你把球衣掖进裤子的方式，是决定你赢不赢的一万个细节之一。说白了就是：别盯着『赢』，盯着把每一个输入项都做到完美。你把所有环节都做完美了，你自然就会赢。别去盯记分牌。我们当然也关心增长，但后来我们某种程度上不再盯着增长了，而是开始盯着把每件事做到完美。如果所有事都做到了完美、你却没增长，那说明你打磨错了输入项；但如果你抓的输入项是对的、又把它们做到了完美，你就会长得非常快。这些真的是我从他那儿学来的。我觉得真正教会我 founder mode 的就是他——因为我从没见过 Steve，我是通过 Hiroki 才认识那一套的。我当时想：我太喜欢这个了。我是搞艺术的，我是设计师，我可以对产品有更多掌控，我可以把每样东西都做到完美。结果，第一次尝试 founder mode，引发了巨大的反弹。

[35:35] Brian Chesky

Everyone hated it.Because everyone thought I was micromanaging.And I learned something fundamental.Initially, everyone hated it.And by the end, everyone loved it.The people hated it left.So maybe there's like selection bias.The people liked it stayed.But even the people that thought they wanted autonomy and independence and empowerment,what they didn't realize was control and power is not zero sum.It's not like if I have all the power, you don't.There's a scenario where we're all powerless.And there's all scenario where if I have power, I can therefore give you power.It's not zero sum.This is the problem people don't understand.If I have more power and control, I can give you more power control.And I can hand it off to you.It's about the idea that the car has a steering wheel.You turn it left and it actually goes left.I do think it's all about the company rowing in one direction.That's it.The thing that you've said historically that had the largest impact on mewas this notion of the 11-star experience, the exercise of going from not a five-star,but a six-star and actually forcing yourself to write it.And I have this idea in mind because of this idea of simplicity and distillation.And it's a beautiful thing, right?

所有人都恨它，因为所有人都觉得我在微观管理。但我学到了一件很根本的事：一开始所有人都恨它，到最后所有人都爱它。恨它的人走了——所以这里可能存在选择性偏差，喜欢它的人留了下来。但即便是那些以为自己想要自主、独立、被赋权的人，他们没意识到的是：控制权和权力不是零和的。并不是我把权力全拿走了、你就没有了。存在一种局面是我们所有人都没有权力；也存在另一种局面是，正因为我有权力，我才能把权力给你。它不是零和的。这就是大家没想明白的地方：我手里的权力和掌控越多，我能给你的权力和掌控就越多，我可以把它交到你手上。这就好比一辆车得有方向盘——你往左打，它是真的会往左走。我确实认为，这一切归根到底就是让整家公司朝同一个方向划桨。就这么简单。——你过去讲过的东西里，对我影响最大的是『十一星体验』（eleven-star experience）这个概念：不是停在五星，而是硬逼自己往六星、往上一级一级写下去的那个练习。我脑子里一直挂着它，也正是因为你刚说的简单和提炼。这个方法太漂亮了，对吧？

[36:37] Brian Chesky

It's ultimately empathetic with the customer.But why is that idea in practice so powerful?What happens as you go up the star count to 11 stars?So let me do like a one minute on what it is.Basically, when you book an Airbnb, most people leave a five-star.And if you leave a four-star, it's a bad experience.Five-star, everything went as planned.So it's called review compression, similar to Uber.You always leave a five-star.And if you leave anything other than a five-star, something really went wrong.But what if the driver was really amazing?

它本质上是一种对客户的共情。但为什么这个方法在实践中这么有威力？当你把星级一路往上推到十一星的时候，到底发生了什么？——我先用一分钟讲讲它是什么。基本上，你订一次 Airbnb，大多数人给的都是五星；给四星就意味着体验很糟。五星的意思是：一切都照计划走了。这叫评价压缩（review compression），Uber 也一样——你永远给五星，一旦给了五星以外的分，就说明真出岔子了。可如果那位司机真的特别棒呢？

[37:03] Brian Chesky

You can only leave a five-star.So I started imagining, what if we could give a six-star?And I did this exercise from six to like 10 or 11 stars.So a five-star, let's say take one moment, checking into Airbnb.Five-star check-in is you get there and the host greets you or there's a door code and it works.In other words, nothing went wrong and you give a five-star.Anything went wrong, you give a four-star or less.That's review compression.Like what if you went above and beyond?

你也还是只能给五星。于是我开始想象：如果我们能给六星呢？我就把这个练习从六星一路做到了十星、十一星。拿五星来说，我们只取其中一个瞬间——入住 Airbnb。五星的入住是：你到了，房东出来迎接你，或者门锁有密码、而且密码是好使的。换句话说，什么岔子都没出，你就给五星；只要出了任何岔子，你就给四星或更低。这就是评价压缩。那如果你做得远远超出预期呢？

[37:28] Brian Chesky

So what would a six-star look like?A six-star would look like you basically get to the Airbnb and there's your favorite wine on the table.And there's like fruit and there's snacks there.And there's a handwritten card.Okay, that's better than just letting me in the house.So what's a seven-star experience?

六星会是什么样？六星大概是：你到了那间 Airbnb，桌上摆着你最爱的那款酒，还有水果、有零食，外加一张手写卡片。行，这确实比单纯放我进屋要强。那七星体验又是什么样？

[37:41] Brian Chesky

Seven-star experience, there's like a limousine or something waiting for me at the airport.They know I like surfing.There's a surfboard waiting for me.And they're like showing me around the city.There's all this stuff.So what's an eight-star experience?

七星体验是：机场有一辆加长轿车之类的在等我。他们知道我喜欢冲浪，所以给我备好了一块冲浪板，还带我在城里逛一圈，全是这类安排。那八星体验呢？

[37:51] Brian Chesky

An eight-star experience, I get to the airport.There's an elephant.I go on the elephant.I go on a parade in my honor.I'm like, wow, I feel really special.What's a nine-star experience?I call it the Beatles check-in.I get off the plane and like 1964 Beatles.There's 5,000 teenage girls screaming my name with cards making me feel like I'm a pop star.I get to the front lawn of the Airbnb and there's a press conference in my name.So it's a 10-star experience.10-star experience.Elon Musk greets me and takes me to space.It's an exercise.It's an exercise in the absurd.You keep pushing to go so absurd to 10 stars that suddenly six or seven stars doesn't seem crazy at all.And the way to get to product market fit is to just create a six or seven-star experience.But you can't create a six or seven-star experience without going beyond.In other words, go beyond the edge of reality and work backwards.And so it's kind of a fun exercise.What would the craziest possible way to blow someone's mind?

八星体验是：我到了机场，那儿站着一头大象，我骑上大象，还有一支为我而办的游行队伍。我心想，哇，我可太特别了。那九星体验呢？我管它叫『Beatles 式入住』：我一下飞机，就像 1964 年的 Beatles 一样，五千个少女举着牌子尖叫着我的名字，让我觉得自己是个流行巨星。我走到那间 Airbnb 的前草坪，那里正在为我开一场新闻发布会。那十星体验呢？十星体验就是：Elon Musk 亲自来接我，然后带我上太空。这只是个练习，一个把荒诞推到极致的练习。你一路往上推，推到十星那种荒唐的地步，突然之间，六星、七星听上去就一点都不疯狂了。而拿到 product market fit 的办法，其实就是做出一个六星或七星的体验。可你不先越过边界，是造不出六星、七星体验的。换句话说：先冲到现实的边界之外，再往回倒推。所以这是个挺好玩的练习——能把一个人震撼到失语的最疯狂的做法，会是什么？

[38:46] Brian Chesky

One person's mind.One customer.And maybe try that.And maybe you can't scale that because that's like an eight-star experience.But you can probably scale a six-star.And that difference between the five and six-star is probably the difference between you and a competitor.And if you can find a way to industrialize it and scale it, you might have product market fit in something special.One of the things that I think about when you give the absurd examples at the high end of the range is this feeling that I've experienced with AI that my imagination had almost atrophied.That by using these tools, I realized how hard it was.Like, oh, I can make anything.And I sit down and I'm like, I have no fucking idea what to make.And that as I started making little things, like all of a sudden my imagination got rebooted.And it feels like this exercise is like an imagination exercise.It is.One of the sayings is great writing is great thinking.But I find that, I don't know about you, some people have ideas and they think of ideas and they write them down.Sometimes I figure out the ideas through the act of writing.The act of writing is the act of coming up ideas.The act of designing is the act of coming up with ideas.

震撼一个人的脑子，就一个客户。然后你真的去试试看。也许你没法把它规模化，因为那是八星体验；但六星大概率是能规模化的。而五星和六星之间的那点差距，很可能就是你和竞争对手之间的差距。如果你能找到办法把它工业化、规模化，你也许就在某件很特别的事上拿到了 product market fit。——你举那些区间最高端的荒诞例子时，我想到的是自己用 AI 时的一种感受：我发现我的想象力几乎已经萎缩了。用这些工具的时候我才意识到有多难——就是那种『哦，我现在什么都能做了』，然后我坐下来，心想：我他妈完全不知道该做什么。可当我开始动手做一些小东西，忽然之间，我的想象力就被重启了。感觉你这个练习本质上就是一种想象力训练。——确实是。有句话说，好文章就是好思考。但我发现——不知道你是不是这样——有些人是先有想法，脑子里想清楚了再写下来；而我常常是通过『写』这个动作才把想法弄明白的。写作的过程就是产生想法的过程，设计的过程也是产生想法的过程。

[39:46] Brian Chesky

It's really hard to just sit in a room and abstractly think of ideas.You need to, like, do something.And so I think what was happening was we didn't have enough tools to express ourselves.I think a lot of the tools were very passive tools.I think increasingly we were spending more and more time on a sit-back experience like social media.What I like about AI is I think AI shifts our attention from consumption to creation.Social media, a lot of us spend our time on and the only type of creation is giving your opinion.But you're mostly consuming.What I love about AI is it's not about opinions.It's about testing the hypothesis we're making.I love what's happening right now.Suddenly all of us have a paintbrush and a canvas to make stuff.I think that AI is going to lead to a renaissance in creativity.And I was an artist growing up.I was a pretty good artist.So I had the ability to express ideas.Here's an analogy.You ever meet a person, like you probably think of musicians, like Prince, name a musician,that probably in words couldn't express themselves.Like, you know, but then through music, there's like this dimension you never knew.An artist, they seem really reserved, but their art is like really emotional.

光是坐在一个房间里抽象地想点子，真的非常难。你得动手做点什么。所以我觉得，过去发生的情况是：我们缺少足够多能表达自己的工具。很多工具都是很被动的工具，我们越来越多的时间花在社交媒体那种『往后一靠』的体验上。我喜欢 AI 的地方在于，我认为 AI 把我们的注意力从消费转向了创造。社交媒体上大家投入了大量时间，但唯一算得上创造的就是发表看法，其余基本都是在消费。我特别喜欢 AI 的一点是：它不关乎观点，它关乎去检验我们提出的假设。我很喜欢现在正在发生的事——突然之间，我们每个人手里都有了画笔和画布，可以动手做东西。我认为 AI 会带来一场创造力的文艺复兴。我从小是搞艺术的，画得还算不错，所以我一直有把想法表达出来的能力。打个比方：你有没有遇到过那种人——你大概会想到音乐人，比如 Prince，随便说一个——他们用语言可能表达不了自己，可一旦通过音乐，就会显露出一个你从来不知道的维度。有些艺术家看上去特别内敛，但他们的作品情绪极其饱满。

[40:53] Brian Chesky

So many of us have this creativity inside of us, but we don't have the craftsmanship ortools to express it.And suddenly what AI is going to do is going to give us the ability to express it.We're going to realize there are a lot more creative people than we thought.Because we typically think of creative people as people that know how to express their creativity.It turns out, what if everyone can express it?

我们中有太多人，心里其实装着创造力，只是没有那份手艺、也没有那套工具把它表达出来。而 AI 突然要做的事，就是给我们表达它的能力。我们会发现，有创造力的人远比我们以为的多。因为我们通常所说的『有创造力的人』，其实指的是那些懂得如何表达自己创造力的人。可结果呢——如果每个人都能表达出来会怎样？

[41:15] Brian Chesky

Pablo Picasso once said, all children are born artists.So problems remain artists as one grows up.Every child's creative.If every child's creative, that means every adult could be creative.I think that every human on this planet is creative.You ask the average person, you're creative.About one in two says they're not.That's my experience.That's not true.It's just that they haven't exercised the muscle.And I think that the magic of AI is what's in our head can manifest.But also, as you said, we can develop new ideas in our head because it's a relationship.We maybe have a small idea.We try something, it gives another idea, and you go on this journey.A lot of people call founders visionaries.We're more expeditionaries.We're on these expeditions.We only call it visions later.We're really just one foot in front of the other.Can you talk about the difference between the act of creation in pursuit of, you said people-pleasing earlier, achievement, notches on the belt, versus just for the raw, pure joy of it, which seems to be more the way the mode you're in now?

Pablo Picasso 说过，每个孩子生来都是艺术家，难就难在长大之后依然是个艺术家。每个孩子都有创造力。如果每个孩子都有创造力，那就意味着每个成年人也可能有创造力。我认为这个星球上的每一个人都有创造力。你去问普通人『你有创造力吗』，大概每两个人里就有一个说自己没有——这是我的亲身经验。可这不是真的，他们只是没有练过这块肌肉而已。我觉得 AI 的魔力在于，我们脑子里的东西可以被显形出来；而且正如你说的，我们还能在脑子里长出新的想法，因为这是一种互动关系：先有一个很小的念头，动手试一下，它又带出另一个念头，然后你就踏上了这段旅程。很多人把创始人叫作有远见的人（visionaries），我们其实更像是远征者（expeditionaries）——我们是在一场场远征途中，只是事后才把它叫作『远见』。我们真的只是一只脚接着一只脚往前迈而已。——能不能聊聊这两种创造之间的差别：一种是为了追求你刚才说的那些东西——取悦别人、成就、在腰带上多刻一道功勋；另一种是纯粹为了那份原始的、单纯的快乐去做，后者看起来更接近你现在所处的状态？

[42:12] Brian Chesky

I think when I started Airbnb, I don't think we were totally trying to be successful.And I like to joke that if I was trying to make money, I would have come up with a better idea than Airbed and Breakfast.I truly did it for the love and the fun.And somewhere along the way, I got really successful.And that almost became a curse because the success became a scorecard.And then I wanted to get even more successful.It stopped being intrinsic.And it started being a version of status and people-pleasing.It took me a little while to realize what I was doing.What I really wanted was love.I think that I learned growing up as a child, the way to get love is to be special.The way to be special is to do special things.And if I do special things, I get praise and I feel love.I think that translated into if I'm really successful, I will get adulation.And if I get adulation, I'll feel that feeling that I'm always seeking.And I didn't do this consciously.I'm not like saying this.It took me many years to realize this is what I was doing.By the way, adulation is kind of like seeking status.So many people seek status.Anyone who's on social media and posting all the time is probably someone seeking status.

我觉得当初做 Airbnb 的时候，我们其实并不是奔着成功去的。我常开玩笑说，我要真是想赚钱，肯定能想出比 Airbed and Breakfast 更好的点子。我做这件事纯粹是出于热爱和好玩。可不知不觉中，我就真的成功了。而这几乎变成了一种诅咒——因为成功变成了一块记分牌。然后我就想要更成功。它不再是发自内心的了，而变成了某种关于地位、关于讨好别人的东西。我花了好一阵子才意识到自己在干什么。我真正想要的其实是爱。我想我从小学到的一课是：想被爱，就得成为特别的人；想成为特别的人，就得做出特别的事。做了特别的事，我就能得到夸奖，我就感觉自己被爱。这套逻辑后来就变成了：只要我足够成功，我就能得到追捧；得到追捧，我就能感受到那种我一直在找的感觉。我不是有意识地这么做的，不是说我当时就想明白了。我花了很多年才意识到，原来我一直在干这件事。顺便说一句，追捧其实就是一种对地位的追逐。太多人在追地位了。任何一个天天在社交媒体上发东西的人，多半都是在追地位。

[43:15] Brian Chesky

There's nothing wrong with it.But the problem is that's not where great products and great companies come from.See, adulation is like a cup with a hole at the bottom.And you keep filling it in, thinking it's love, except it just keeps coming out the bottom.And at some point, you have to confront, who am I doing this for?

这本身没什么错。问题在于，伟大的产品、伟大的公司不是从这儿长出来的。你看，追捧就像一个底上有个洞的杯子。你不停地往里倒，以为倒进去的是爱，结果它全从底下漏光了。到某个时刻，你必须直面这个问题：我到底是在为谁做这件事？

[43:32] Brian Chesky

Am I doing it for other people?For them to briefly love me and commend me to then move on?And either way, that's a drug.And it's a drug that's like real drugs.You need a greater hit to get the high.And eventually, it stops working.And eventually, you reach a peak.And it gets really meaningless and empty.And that happened to me.And at some point around the pandemic, we go public.We have $100 billion valuation.It's like one of the best days of my life.And the next day, I wake up.I put on sweatpants.I go on a Zoom meeting.It was like it never happened.And it became like the saddest day of my life because I realized, OK, what now?

我是在为别人做吗？为了让他们短暂地爱我一下、夸我一句，然后转身就走？不管怎么说，这就是一种毒品。而且跟真正的毒品一样：你得不断加大剂量才能爽到。到最后它就不管用了。到最后你会触顶。然后就变得特别没意义、特别空。这就是我经历过的。大概在疫情那阵子，我们上市了，估值 1000 亿美元，那是我这辈子最好的日子之一。结果第二天早上我醒过来，套上运动裤，打开 Zoom 开会——就好像那事从来没发生过一样。那天反而成了我人生中最难过的一天，因为我意识到：好吧，那接下来呢？

[44:07] Brian Chesky

I got all this adulation.And I don't feel any different.And that made me like reevaluate like what I'm doing this for.I had to like just come to terms with I want to do things for pure intrinsic reasons.And so I had to basically detach myself from people's approval, from status, from worryingabout like how hot Airbnb is or how successful I am, which I never gave a shit about when westarted.You know, you start getting accolades and you want more of them.And you got to like let go of that because this is a losing game.And I just really started focusing on being heads down.Do the work like you used to do.Like when you're a kid, there was light.Just make stuff.Make it for yourself.That great book, Rick Rubin, he says an artist is an artist when they make it for themselvesand they don't try to make something successful.And I stopped trying to be successful.And I just went back to the basics.And I realized like a person doesn't know you will never love you.That's OK.The people love you and the people that know you.The most important person to love you is yourself.And we should love is the thing you're doing.So this became like a whole thing.It became about doing it because you love it.Putting your heart and soul in it.

我得到了这么多追捧，可我一点感觉都没变。这让我重新去掂量：我到底为什么在做这件事。我最后不得不接受一件事——我想纯粹出于内在的理由去做事。所以我基本上是把自己从别人的认可里、从地位里、从「Airbnb 现在有多火」「我有多成功」这些焦虑里剥离出来——而这些东西在我们刚起步的时候我根本不在乎。你知道的，你开始拿到各种赞誉，就想要更多。你必须把这个东西放下，因为这是一场注定要输的游戏。于是我就真的开始埋头干活。像以前那样做事。像小时候那样，那时候心里是亮的，就只是做东西，为自己做。Rick Rubin 那本很棒的书里说，一个艺术家之所以是艺术家，是因为他为自己创作，而不是想做出一个成功的作品。我不再试图成功了，我就回到了最基本的东西。我也想明白了：不认识你的人永远不会爱你，这没关系。真正爱你的，是那些了解你的人。而最重要的、必须爱你的那个人，是你自己。至于我们该爱的，是你正在做的那件事。所以这后来变成了一整套东西：做这件事是因为你爱它，把心和魂都放进去。

[45:10] Brian Chesky

It's like the score takes care of itself.It goes back to that.Don't try to be successful.Try to do something wonderful that you love for yourself.Maybe you'll be successful.Maybe you don't.But don't focus on who you want to be.Focus on what you want to do.That was advice President Obama once told me.He said if I focus on who I want to be and I focus on being president of the United Statesand I wasn't, my life would have been a failure.But I focus on what I want to do.I want to help people.I want to be a community organizer.Then I don't need to be president.And so I think so many entrepreneurs focus on what they want to be.I want to be a giant tech founder.I want to run a billion dollar company.I want to do this.I want to do that.Instead of focusing on what do I want to make.And then suddenly there's no way to fail if you're making what you love.It's an incredible set of ideas.I'm curious what most fell away in your life in this recent period as a result of this shiftin mindset.Like what do you do less of that you used to do a lot of when you stopped chasing adulation?

就像那句话说的，比分会自己照顾好自己。又回到这一点上：别想着去成功，去做一件你自己真心热爱的、了不起的事。也许你会成功，也许不会。但别盯着你想成为什么样的人，盯着你想做什么事。这是 Obama 总统有一次给我的建议。他说，如果我盯着「我想成为什么人」，盯着「我要当美国总统」，而我最后没当上，那我这辈子就是失败的。但我盯的是「我想做什么」：我想帮助别人，我想做一个社区组织者。那我就不非得当总统不可。所以我觉得，太多创业者都在盯着「我想成为什么」——我要当一个巨头级的科技创始人，我要经营一家十亿美元的公司，我要这样、我要那样——而不是盯着「我想做出什么东西」。可一旦你做的是你热爱的东西，你突然就没有失败的可能了。（Patrick）这套想法太精彩了。我很好奇，最近这段时间随着你心态转变，生活里最先掉落的是什么？不再追逐追捧之后，哪些以前做得很多的事，你现在做得少了？

[45:59] Brian Chesky

Mostly ruminating.You ruminate less.Yeah.Just like worrying about people's opinions of me.By the way, somebody kept saying like there's something mildly narcissistic about like worryingabout everyone's opinions as if they're all thinking about you.The reality is like even people watching this like I'm going to be self-conscious exceptfor a moment they're going to think about me but then they're going to be mostly thinkingabout themselves and that's okay.And all of us are thinking everyone's thinking about us and they're thinking about themselvesor the people in their life.They're not thinking about some guy on a podcast except for like maybe an hour and then it'sover.Letting go of what people think about you because that's a prison.Suddenly you're making things for approval and then you lose your courage.That's the main thing.It's just like the mental energy.But I really try to do things that are meaningful.Meaningful things are really two buckets.It's making.It's spending time with people I care about.That's just those are two things.There are two very different ideas I'm curious for you to react to.The first was made famous by Warren Buffett who said you want to buy as an investor businesses

主要是反刍式的胡思乱想。你会少纠结很多。对，就是不再老想着别人怎么看我。顺便说，有人一直讲，老是担心所有人怎么看你，其实带点轻微的自恋——好像所有人都在惦记着你似的。现实是，就算是看这期节目的人——我这么说的时候还是会有点不好意思——他们可能会想到我一小会儿，但接下来想的主要还是他们自己，这也很正常。我们所有人都以为别人在想我们，其实人家想的是自己，或者是自己生活里的人。没人会一直惦记播客上的某个家伙，顶多想一个小时，然后就过去了。放下别人怎么看你，因为那是一座监狱。一旦被困住，你做东西就是为了求认可，然后你就没胆量了。这是最主要的一点，省下来的就是那份心力。我现在是真的努力去做有意义的事。而有意义的事其实就两类：一类是「做东西」，一类是「跟我在乎的人待在一起」。就这两样。（Patrick）有两个截然不同的观点，我很想听听你的反应。第一个是 Warren Buffett 讲红的，他说作为投资人，你想买的生意是——

[46:59] Patrick

that a ham sandwich could run because eventually one will.Not to pick on anyone but think about like the card payment processors like Visa or MasterCardlike just extremely elegant business models.Actually a network effect businesses like Airbnb tend to be in this category.And then you've got this opposite end of the spectrum which is one of my favorite investors,early stage investors said he tells every founder that they should think about the company asa platform or a vehicle for their own personal growth and that their ability to grow will setthe ceiling for the company.This is sort of like opposite ideas.And we've been talking a lot more about leadership in this like second bucket.I'm curious how you think about whether or not you care if eventually a ham sandwich ranAirbnb like the business model would be so perfected that it wouldn't matter in the WarrenBuffett sense.And just like in general how you think about if that's true that your ceiling is the company'sceiling as its leader.I think they're both true.Let me try to square those with one example.I agree with both sentiments.Okay.Here's an example.Walt Disney.People watching, I want them to try to name a Paramount Pictures film.

——那种连一个火腿三明治都能当 CEO 经营的生意，因为迟早真会有个火腿三明治来经营它。不是要针对谁，但你想想那些卡组织，比如 Visa 或者 MasterCard，商业模式实在是太优雅了。其实像 Airbnb 这种有网络效应的生意，往往也属于这一类。然后是光谱的另一端：我最欣赏的投资人之一，一位早期投资人，他跟每个创始人都说，你应该把公司看成你个人成长的平台或者载体，而你成长的能力，决定了公司的天花板。这基本上是两个相反的想法。而我们刚才聊领导力，聊的其实更多是第二类。我很好奇，你在不在乎有一天 Airbnb 真被一个火腿三明治经营起来——就是 Warren Buffett 那个意思，商业模式打磨到那么完美，谁来管都无所谓了。另外更广义地说，「你作为领导者的天花板就是公司的天花板」这个说法，你怎么看？（Brian）我觉得两个都成立。我用一个例子试着把它们统一起来。这两种说法我都同意。好，例子是这样：Walt Disney。我想请正在看这期节目的人试着说出一部 Paramount Pictures 的电影。

[48:02] Brian Chesky

I want you to name a Warner Brothers film.Maybe you'll think of like Batman.I want you to name a Universal Pictures film.I want you to name something from the MGM library.Pretty hard, right?But you can name a lot of Disney films and probably Pixar during their golden age.There's a big difference to those two.One is that Disney was very founder led and that Disney was all about a personal expressionof one man.The irony is the longer a company is run by founders in the founder mode, the more I thinkit can let go and anyone can run it.I think Disney, not to take away from the CEO of Disney, the new guy Josh is really great.I've met him.He's great.And I think they've had a lot of good CEOs.But I generally think the CEO of Disney has the bases loaded.You've got this incredible theme park that people are going to visit no matter how wellit's run.It's like a city that as many people visit Disneyland every year as San Francisco, it'scrazy.They've got this incredible IP.It's not that it's an easy job, but Walt left so much.I remember I was speaking to the former CFO at Disney once.This was like 10 years ago.And he said, Disney hasn't really done anything new since Walt died.Walt died in 1966.

再说出一部 Warner Brothers 的电影——你可能会想到 Batman。再说一部 Universal Pictures 的电影。再从 MGM 的片库里说出一部。挺难的对吧？但 Disney 的电影你能一口气说出一堆，还有黄金时期的 Pixar。这两者差别很大。差别之一在于，Disney 非常创始人主导，整个 Disney 就是一个人的个人表达。讽刺的是，一家公司被创始人以 founder mode 经营得越久，我反而觉得它越能放手、越是谁来都能管。我觉得 Disney 就是这样——不是要贬低 Disney 现在的 CEO，新上任的 Josh 真的很不错，我见过他，人很好。他们历史上也出过不少优秀的 CEO。但我总体觉得，Disney 的 CEO 上任就是「满垒开局」。你手里有那么牛的主题公园，不管经营得多好，人们照样会去。那简直像一座城市——每年去 Disneyland 的人跟去 San Francisco 的人一样多，太疯狂了。他们还有那么强的 IP。这活儿当然不算轻松，但 Walt 留下的东西实在太多了。我记得大概十年前跟 Disney 的前 CFO 聊过一次，他说，自从 Walt 去世之后，Disney 其实没做出过什么真正新的东西。Walt 是 1966 年去世的。

[49:08] Brian Chesky

Since 1966, we still make feature and make films, TV and Magic Kingdoms.And of course, yeah, they do new things.But fundamentally, that's the same playbook.So I do think that that's an example where the founder reinventing the company and theirexpression created such a reservoir of IP, of momentum.He died 50 years ago.50 years later, Walt Disney's spirit seems very omnipresent.Whereas Louis B. Meyer, I don't know if most people can tell you which studio he was.See what I'm saying?

从 1966 年到现在，我们做的还是长片、还是电影、电视和 Magic Kingdom。当然，他们也确实做了新东西。但从根本上说，还是同一套打法。所以我觉得这就是一个例子：创始人重新发明了公司，他的个人表达攒下了那么深的一池 IP、那么大的惯性。他都去世 50 年了，50 年后 Walt Disney 的精神看上去依然无处不在。反过来看 Louis B. Mayer，我估计大多数人都说不出他是哪家片厂的。你懂我意思吧？

[49:39] Brian Chesky

There's a huge difference.So I generally think this is a paradox.The ham sandwich, you have a business so good and you can run it because sooner or laterthey will.The best businesses are ones that founders run and they reinvent and they create so muchequity in such a great moat that then when they hand it off, they will endure and growafter them.I think Apple is very similar.They've not had to invent new products for the most part.They're still running the iPhone.I mean, what a gift Steve left them.They were a few hundred billion dollar company when he died.They're like a multi-trillion dollar company now.I think the one caveat is I think tech companies are different.Warren Buffett generally didn't invest in tech companies with the exception of Apple.Coca-Cola was a big investment of his or like Seize Candy.These are things that don't get disrupted.I think technology is a cinema for change.If we're in the change industry, you kind of need to be more in founder mode more time.But I think that's how I square it.The company is the upper bound of the founder's potential.The longer you're in founder mode, the more it will endure.I remember one founder told me, I want this company to last 100 years.

差别是巨大的。所以我总体认为这是一个悖论。火腿三明治那个说法——生意好到谁都能经营，因为迟早真会有那么个人来经营它。而最好的生意，恰恰是创始人自己在经营、不断自我重塑、攒下巨大的资产和极深的护城河的那种；等他们交棒的时候，公司才能在他们之后继续活下去、继续增长。我觉得 Apple 也很像。他们大体上没必要再发明什么新产品，靠 iPhone 就还能一直跑。Steve 留给他们的是多大一份礼物啊。他去世的时候 Apple 是几千亿美元的公司，现在是好几万亿。唯一要加一条注脚的是，我觉得科技公司不一样。Warren Buffett 基本不投科技公司，Apple 是例外。他重仓的是 Coca-Cola，或者 See's Candy 这类东西——这些是不太会被颠覆的。而技术本身就是「变化」的同义词。如果你干的是变化这一行，那你可能就得更长时间待在 founder mode 里。我大概就是这么把两者统一起来的：创始人的潜力，就是公司的上限；你在 founder mode 里待得越久，公司越能长久。我记得有位创始人跟我说，我希望这家公司能活 100 年——

[50:42] Brian Chesky

So therefore, I can't be in all the details.And so therefore, I need to empower people.And I remember saying, if you want to send me around for 100 years, you want to control itas long as possible and keep it in founder mode as long as possible, like Disney.I think that's counterintuitive.And I think people say, oh, but like the company is going to get very dependent on you.Well, yeah, but the alternative is you're going to have so institutionalized this magicthat it can't endure after you.Edwin Land, the founder of Polaroid, was very famous for using Ansel Adams as his ultimatetester of his equipment.And so he cared about the most important, maybe best photographer of all time, what hethought of his device.Comes to mind when you talk about Disney, because I have this visual of Walt just like continuingto drill down to some sort of bedrock or something.And that's the mission that you're on as a founder is like bedrock.What is that for you from this point forward?

——所以我不能什么细节都陷进去，所以我得授权给别人。我当时就说，如果你想让这家公司活 100 年，那你恰恰应该尽可能长时间地掌控它，尽可能长时间地把它保持在 founder mode 里，就像 Disney 那样。我知道这很反直觉。有人会说，可这样公司不就变得非常依赖你了吗。是啊，但另一种结局是：你把这份「魔法」制度化得太彻底，反而让它在你走后活不下去。（Patrick）Polaroid 的创始人 Edwin Land 有个很有名的做法，他把 Ansel Adams 当成自己设备的终极测试者。他在意的是，那位可能是史上最重要、最伟大的摄影师，对他的产品怎么看。你讲 Disney 的时候我就想到这个，因为我脑子里有个画面：Walt 一直往下钻，一直钻到某种基岩上。而作为创始人，你的使命就是找到那块基岩。从现在往后看，那块基岩对你来说是什么？

[51:34] Brian Chesky

Like as you keep drilling, what do you think you're still after?Where is there still room for your ceiling to raise so that the businesses can?A few things come to mind.When people think of Airbnb, if you close your eyes and say, I want you to think of a pictureof Airbnb, you probably think of a house.We're a noun and a verb like Kleenex, which is amazing and not amazing.It's amazing in that like we're kind of the category leader.It's also tough because when you're Kleenex, you want to sell shampoo.They're like, wait a second, I'm not putting Kleenex on my head.It's a double-edged sword, our brand.The bedrock for me is how do I change the atomic unit of Airbnb from a home to a person?

（Patrick）你继续往下钻的话，你觉得自己还在追什么？你的天花板还有哪些抬升的空间，好让公司的天花板也跟着抬起来？（Brian）我想到几点。人们一想到 Airbnb——你闭上眼睛，我让你脑子里浮现一张 Airbnb 的画面，你大概会想到一栋房子。我们既是名词又是动词，跟 Kleenex 一样，这既很棒又很不妙。棒在于我们差不多就是这个品类的代名词。麻烦在于，当你是 Kleenex 的时候，你想卖洗发水，人家会说，等一下，我可不会把 Kleenex 抹头上。我们的品牌是一把双刃剑。对我来说，那块基岩就是：怎么把 Airbnb 的原子单位从「房子」换成「人」。

[52:10] Brian Chesky

I do not want Airbnb to be about homes.I want it to be about people and I want the people to be atomic unit.And on Airbnb, you get a home, you get an experience, you get a service, eventually a flight.I want, imagine like a person in the center with a ring with like 50 things around.These are the things you can get.That is the thing.The bedrock of Airbnb is going to be identity, profile, the person's preferences.I want to develop the most authenticated identity on the internet.Proof of personhood is going to be really, really important in the age of AI, artificial.I want to develop the most robust profile on the internet.I mean, it used to be Facebook.They've kind of abandoned that strategy.I want to build one of the richest preference libraries of you as a person because that wouldbe useful to have.I want to build a social graph, but in the real world.And I want to eventually have a membership program where you get all these different benefits.So the bedrock is the person.I want to basically figure out how we can launch like Amazon, Amazon from books to like 100 things.I don't want us to just have homes.I want us to have 100 things.So we need to develop this industrialized machine of understanding what are the like atomic units or the primitives that are consistent across all these different businesses.

我不希望 Airbnb 是关于房子的。我希望它是关于人的，我希望「人」成为那个原子单位。在 Airbnb 上，你能订到房子，能订到体验，能订到服务，将来还能订机票。你想象一下：中间站着一个人，外面围着一圈大概 50 样东西，这些都是你能拿到的。这才是那个东西。Airbnb 的基岩将会是身份、档案、这个人的偏好。我想做出互联网上认证程度最高的身份体系。在 AI 时代，「证明你是个真人」会变得非常非常重要。我想做出互联网上最完整的个人档案。以前这本来是 Facebook 在做的，但他们基本上放弃了这条路线。我想建立一个最丰富的偏好库，关于「你这个人」的偏好，因为这东西太有用了。我还想建一张社交图谱，但是是现实世界里的社交图谱。最终我想做一个会员计划，让你能拿到各种各样的权益。所以基岩就是「人」。我想搞清楚的是，我们怎么才能像 Amazon 那样铺开——Amazon 从卖书扩到卖一百样东西。我不想我们只有房子，我想我们有一百样东西。所以我们得打造出一台工业化的机器，去搞明白：在这些不同的业务之间，一以贯之的原子单位、或者说底层原语，到底是什么。

[53:23] Brian Chesky

And then the last one is AI.AI, we have a bit of the innovator's dilemma.Plus or minus $100 billion goes through our app.I have all these visions that will totally change it.But you're a public company, you know, and you're like giving guidance.And the difference between missing and hitting earnings is not just being public company.People's livelihood depends on Airbnb.If we mess with something, somebody could go from like making a living, not making a living.So you got to be very careful.That is not an environment for mass innovation when you're being really careful.So I'm also exploring little sandboxes, like almost like a separate app.Like what is a radically, radically different Airbnbs?

最后一点是 AI。在 AI 这件事上，我们多少有点「创新者的窘境」。上下浮动一千亿美元的交易额要从我们的 app 里过。我脑子里有一堆能把它彻底改掉的设想。可你是一家上市公司，你得给业绩指引。而财报是达标还是没达标，影响的还不只是「上市公司」这一层——很多人的生计是靠 Airbnb 的。我们要是乱动什么东西，可能有人本来能养家糊口，一下就不行了。所以你必须非常小心。可当你非常小心的时候，那就不是一个能搞大规模创新的环境。所以我也在试一些小沙盒，几乎就是做一个单独的 app：一个彻彻底底不一样的 Airbnb，会长什么样？

[54:01] Brian Chesky

What's after Airbnb?Airbnb C.What's that?What's the next?Think about it.So those are the three things I'm thinking about.Number one, how do we take the atomic unit from a home to a person?Number two, how do we basically industrialize what Airbnb offers to do like 50 things, not three things?

Airbnb 之后是什么？Airbnb C。那又是什么？下一步是什么？你得去想这个问题。所以我现在脑子里就装着这三件事。第一，怎么把最小单元从「房子」变成「人」？第二，怎么把 Airbnb 提供的东西工业化，让它能做五十件事，而不是只做三件事？

[54:17] Brian Chesky

And then how do we disrupt ourselves before someone else does with AI without screwing over our investors and our hosts who depend on us?And so those are the kind of things I'm doing.Maybe the last thing I'm thinking just as a CEO is I think I've reached a certain level of mastery.I've reached the mastery of like product market fit, hyper growth, profitability.I'm beginning level four.Level four is reinvent yourself product extension.I think there's something potentially even beyond that in the age of AI, which is like one of my strengths is all my experience.And that's also my weakness now.Like I'm 44.I'm not old, but I'm not young.I'm not AI native in the same way a 22-year-old is.Here's a bad example.When I started with me, I was 25, 26, and we were competing against Expedia.They were on like Outlook and we used Google Docs and we were like iPhone.It all seems anachronistic now, but back then that was innovative and we were on the coolest new tools and we just moved faster.And so also just staying young.Pablo Picasso, another quote, he said, the older you get, the stronger the wing gets and it's always in your face.You've got to stay light on your feet.You've got to stay young.You've got to keep reinventing yourself.

第三，怎么在别人用 AI 把我们颠覆掉之前先自己颠覆自己——而且还不能坑了我们的投资人和那些靠我们吃饭的房东。这就是我现在在忙的事。作为一个 CEO，我最近还在想最后一件事：我觉得自己已经到了某种「精通」的程度。product-market fit、超高速增长、盈利，这几关我都打通了。现在我在打第四关。第四关是自我重塑、做产品延伸。而我觉得在 AI 时代，可能还有比这更靠后的一关。我的一大优势是我的全部经验，但这现在同时也是我的弱点。我 44 岁了，不算老，但也不年轻了。我不像一个 22 岁的人那样是 AI 原生的。举个不太恰当的例子：我做 Airbnb 的时候才 25、26 岁，我们的对手是 Expedia。他们还在用 Outlook，我们用 Google Docs，我们用 iPhone。今天听起来全是老古董，但在当年那就是创新，我们用的是最酷的新工具，所以我们跑得就是比人家快。所以还有一件事就是保持年轻。再引一句毕加索的话，他说：年纪越大，风越大，而且永远是迎面吹来。你得让自己脚步轻盈，得保持年轻，得不停地重塑自己。

[55:26] Patrick

You've got to have curiosity.And so I don't want to become like this old school person in the groove.I've got to reinvent myself.One of the things that as I've been building stuff myself, really for the first time, like I'm not an engineer.I used to build stuff, but I'd tell people and it would come.The feedback loop was like painfully slow and lossy.Now it's like five to 15 minutes and pretty high fidelity.And soon it'll be five seconds and perfect fidelity.I always love Brett Victor's idea of wanting the input and the output being as linked as possible.And we're getting to that stage.Like the anxiety I have having this experience is that it feels like just nothing will last.Historically, there's been these ways to have enduring moats.People would always call them.You have 200 million people that you know a lot about already.You've got hundreds of millions of reviews that lots of information on places.Like you have these embedded things that I can't just get that from you.But it just seems as I build this stuff like, oh, it's going to be really hard to have something enduring and lasting.Do you share that anxiety?

得保持好奇心。我不想变成那种守着老一套、卡在惯性里的人，我必须重塑自己。说到这个——我最近头一回真正开始自己动手做东西。我不是工程师，以前我也「做」东西，但我是说给别人听，然后东西才做出来。那个反馈回路慢得让人痛苦，而且信息损耗很大。现在是五到十五分钟就有结果，而且还原度相当高。用不了多久就会是五秒钟、百分之百还原。我一直很喜欢 Bret Victor 那个理念：让输入和输出尽可能紧密地连在一起。我们正在走到那一步。而我有这种体验之后产生的焦虑是——好像什么东西都留不下来了。历史上是有一些办法能建起持久护城河的，大家总喜欢这么讲：你手上有两亿你已经很了解的用户，你有几亿条评论、有大量关于各个地方的信息。这些东西是嵌进去的，我没法直接从你这儿拿走。可是我自己动手做这些东西的时候就觉得，天哪，以后想做出一个能持久、能留存的东西会非常难。你也有这种焦虑吗？

[56:24] Brian Chesky

How does that make you feel that as the frictions fall, it also feels like the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow is like disappearing into the distance or something?Here's an analogy.Take a fashion brand like Hermes.I think the most valuable single fashion brand in the world.The Birkin bag and the Kelly bag.It's like they have a new product every like decade or something.Like these really multi-decade old things.And they appreciate and they resale.And then you've got like Zara fast fashion.And I feel like we all want to make these things that endure.But we're living in like hyper fast fashion of software.If you look at software from 10 years ago, no matter how great it was at the time, it looks really old and dated.You look at hardware from 10 years ago, it looks pretty decent.You look at interior design, it looks pretty good.Or better.Or better.You look at buildings, after a certain period of time, they've got this patina and they're wonderful.You go to Paris and old endures.Environments and physical worlds have got huge endurance.Hardware and physical things have medium endurance.Software is extremely ephemeral.Opinions are like that.But some ideas permeate.This is something I'm wrestling with myself because I want to make things that endure.

当摩擦一层层消失，那个彩虹尽头的金罐子好像也在往远处消失——这让你什么感觉？我打个比方。拿一个时尚品牌来说，比如爱马仕，大概是全世界单品牌价值最高的时尚品牌。铂金包、凯莉包，它差不多十年才出一个新产品，都是几十年生命周期的东西，而且会升值、有二手转售市场。另一头是 Zara 那种快时尚。我们都想做出能留存的东西，可我们身处的软件行业是「超级快时尚」。你去看十年前的软件，不管它当年多惊艳，今天看都显得又旧又土。你看十年前的硬件，还挺像样。你看室内设计，也还挺好。甚至更好了。对，甚至更好。你看建筑，过了一定年头之后它有了包浆，反而更美了。你去巴黎，老的东西才是留得住的。环境和物理世界的耐久性极强，硬件和实体的东西中等，软件极其短命。观点也是这样。但有些想法是能渗透、能留下来的。这件事我自己也一直在纠结，因为我想做出能留存下来的东西。

[57:36] Brian Chesky

I don't know how I've reconciled it except to say this.I obsess over our app, Airbnb's app.It's designed.It's interface.And yet, no matter how great it is, 10 years from now, I'm going to look at it and think it looks like crap.Because I look at the interface from 10 years ago and think it looks like crap, no matter how good it was.Gated software never looks good, even if it was good back then.So then you've got to ask, what endures?

除了下面这句话，我还没想出别的和解方式。我对我们的 App、对 Airbnb 的 App 是有强迫症的——它的设计、它的界面。但不管它现在多好，十年后我再看它，一定会觉得是坨垃圾。因为我回头看十年前的界面就觉得是坨垃圾，不管它当年做得多好。过时的软件永远不好看，哪怕它当年确实很好。所以你就得问：那到底什么才是能留下来的？

[57:56] Brian Chesky

I do think there are things that endure.Airbnb, the community endures.I started realizing the software won't endure.And the network effect will decently endure.But the ideas of Airbnb, its principles, its mission, the organization, the company, the brand, the identity, the logo, the voice, the community, what it stands for, those things will endure.Most importantly, the community.I realized at some point I told the company, we're not building an app.We're not building a service.We're building a community.Because that's the only thing that will last.I don't think there will be apps in the future.I think there'll be agents.So if we're attached to apps, I don't think there will be apps.So we better let go of that.So many of the themes that we've talked about is this steady progress and learning through time applied in service of others.What did bodybuilding when you were young teach you about steady progress over time?

我确实认为有些东西是能留下来的。Airbnb 这个社区能留下来。我开始意识到，软件留不下来，网络效应能留下相当一部分，但真正会留下来的是 Airbnb 的理念、原则、使命，是这个组织、这家公司、这个品牌、这个身份、这个 logo、这种语气、这个社区，以及它所代表的东西。最重要的是社区。我某个时刻跟全公司说：我们不是在做一个 App，也不是在做一个服务，我们是在建一个社区。因为只有这个东西能长存。我不觉得未来还会有 App，我觉得未来是 agent。所以如果我们死抱着 App 不放——我不认为 App 还会存在，那我们最好早点放下。我们聊到的很多主题，都是这种「随时间稳步推进、不断学习，并且用在别人身上」。你年轻时练健美，教会了你什么关于长期稳步积累的道理？

[58:44] Brian Chesky

Weirdly, bodybuilding taught me so much that I could apply to Silicon Valley.It taught me two important principles.My dad was really into ice hockey, wanted me to be an ice hockey player.Unfortunately, I was very skinny.I hit puberty really late.And I went to a sports academy for hockey.When I was 13, I thought I could be a really good hockey player.But by the time I was 14, I didn't hit puberty until I was like 15 or 16.And that's a death sentence in hockey.Because suddenly, I went from like first or second line to third or fourth line.And I went from thinking I'd be a Division I athlete to Division III athlete.I'm like, okay, it's not really going to work out for me.And so I started weightlifting.I was 135 pounds.And I told my friends I'm going to be like one of the top out of both the country by the time I'm 19.And they thought it was like out of my mind.I ended up by 19 competing at the national level.I competed at teenage nationals.The first lesson I learned from bodybuilding was if you can change your body, you can change your life.It was actually the most fundamental thing to change.Like everyone wants to change things around them.But what if you change you first physically?

说来奇怪，健美教给我的东西，很多都能直接搬到硅谷来用。它教了我两条重要原则。我爸特别迷冰球，想让我去打冰球。可惜我特别瘦，青春期来得非常晚。13 岁的时候我进了一所冰球体育学校，那会儿我觉得自己能成为很不错的冰球运动员。可到了 14 岁——我一直到 15、16 岁才发育——在冰球里这基本等于判死刑。我一下子从一线、二线阵容掉到三线、四线，从以为自己能打 NCAA 一级联赛，变成顶多打三级。我心想，行吧，这条路走不通了。于是我开始练举重。当时我 135 磅（约 61 公斤）。我跟朋友说，我 19 岁之前要成为全国顶尖的健美选手之一。他们都觉得我疯了。结果我 19 岁真的打到了全国级别，参加了青少年全国锦标赛。健美教我的第一课是：如果你能改变自己的身体，你就能改变自己的人生。它其实是最根本的那个可改变项。人人都想改变身边的一切，但如果你先从身体上改变你自己呢？

[59:43] Brian Chesky

And I even think like if you could start somewhere, a lot of people say like change your thoughts.I would change your body first.Change your physical biology.If you can change your body, you can change your life.It was the ultimate expression of empowerment.Okay, now I changed my body.What else can I change?

我甚至觉得，如果你要找个地方开始——很多人说「先改变你的想法」，我会说先改变你的身体，改变你的生理层面。你能改变身体，你就能改变人生。那是一种终极的「我能行」的体验。好，我改变了自己的身体，那我还能改变什么？

[59:57] Brian Chesky

It's a metaphor for eventually you can design the world around you.I can change your body.I can change my environment.Eventually I can change the world.It's like you just go inside out.But the other thing it taught me, which might be even more helpful, is that you can't get in shape in one day.And if you go to the gym and work out for like 20 hours, you're not going to get in better shape.In fact, you're going to overtrain.And the way you get stronger is an adaptation from progressive overload that you basically, you stress the body.The body doesn't get stronger during exercise.It actually breaks the muscles down.And it's an adaptive response.Like an immune system, it gets stronger.You just keep doing it.The basic idea is that you can't get in shape in one day.And it's about 1% better every single day.And if you compound 1% a day, you can actually have massive gains.And so it's really about discipline.And it's also very analytical.Bodybuilding is this wonderful thing where it's judged.It's a subjective sport that you judge visually, but you measure it scientifically.You weigh your food.You have to put yourself in the right caloric deficit.You have to write down your training.You have to write down your weights.

它是一个隐喻——最终你是可以设计你周围这个世界的。我能改变我的身体，我就能改变我的环境，最终我就能改变世界。就是由内向外一层层推出去。但它教给我的另一件事可能更有用：你没法在一天之内练出好身材。你去健身房连练 20 个小时，身材不会因此更好，反而会过度训练。变强的机制是渐进超负荷（progressive overload）带来的适应——你给身体施加压力。身体不是在训练当中变强的，训练其实是在破坏肌肉，变强是之后的适应性反应。就像免疫系统一样，它会因此变强。你只要一直坚持做下去。核心思路就是：你没法一天练成，而是每天进步 1%。每天复利 1%，最后能积累出巨大的成果。所以它真正考的是纪律。而且它还非常讲分析。健美这项运动很妙：它是被评判的，是一项靠肉眼主观打分、但要用科学方式去量化的运动。你要称食物的重量，要把自己放在正确的热量缺口里，要记录训练，要记录每次用的重量。

[1:00:57] Brian Chesky

It's like extremely analytical.It taught me to be very analytical, metrics-driven, and that it's really about discipline and consistency.And I think that's important because I think a lot of founders just give up too early.It's about discipline.And it's about if you train for a month, you take a month off, you're starting over.And that's the key.You never quit.You just keep going.One of the nice things about it is the visual feedback.Like you judge visually.You can literally see it.You can look in the mirror.Other people can look at you and say you've been working out.Probably some of the skills that you would want to apply the same progressive overloadthing to as a leader are very invisible.How do you figure out the objective function?

它极度依赖分析。它把我训练成了一个非常讲分析、看指标的人，也让我明白关键在于纪律和持续性。我觉得这点很重要，因为很多创始人就是放弃得太早了。核心是纪律。而且是这样：你练一个月、歇一个月，等于从头再来。这是关键——你永远不能退出，就是一直练下去。健美有个好处是视觉反馈。它是靠肉眼评判的，你能真真切切看见变化，你能照镜子，别人看到你也会说你最近在练。但作为一个领导者，你想用同样的「渐进超负荷」去打磨的那些能力，很多是完全看不见的。你怎么找到那个目标函数？

[1:01:31] Brian Chesky

Like how do you apply that same thing to something else that other people can't see?I start trying to focus on like how good of a company I take it to like projects.So I'll give you one example of a project I focus on.One is I want to build the best team possible.So twice a year, we do this like giant thing we call roadmap review.And there's the top 100 people in the room.And I see the quality of people in the room.And we did one in the last two days.And then one of my most important jobs, the most important job I do at Airbnb is hiring.That's a whole separate topic.And the visual feedback is every twice a year, I get the top 100 people in the room.And I can see the quality of the people in the conversation.So in other words, there's many metrics that you use.And I obsess over it.Maybe it's the app.And I just look at the design of the app.Maybe it's like how well the company operates.And I look at decision making.So I try to break the problem down to something that's observable.That I can observe.Either measure with data or even subjectively look at and observe.So it's always out breaking the problem down to something that's observable and measurable.By the way, just on this, because this is a really important point.

怎么把这一套用到那些别人看不见的东西上？我一般会从「这家公司做得有多好」出发，再落到一个个具体项目上。举个我关注的项目的例子：我想搭出一支尽可能强的团队。所以我们一年做两次一个叫「roadmap review」的大活动，公司最顶尖的 100 个人全在那个屋子里。我就能看到屋子里这批人的质量。我们前两天刚开完一次。我在 Airbnb 最重要的一项工作、也可以说是唯一最重要的工作，就是招人——这是另一个完整的话题了。而视觉反馈就是：每半年我把最顶尖的 100 个人聚到一个屋子里，从他们的对话里我就能看出这批人的水准。所以换句话说，你会用到很多种指标，而我对它们有强迫症。可能是 App，我就死盯着 App 的设计。可能是公司运转得好不好，我就去看决策质量。所以我会把问题拆解到某个「可观察」的东西上——我能观察到的东西，要么能用数据衡量，要么哪怕是主观地去看、去感知。永远是把问题拆到可观察、可衡量的层面。顺便说一句，就着这个话题多讲一点，因为这一点真的很重要。

[1:02:28] Brian Chesky

Basically, as a leader, you can choose if you want to spend time hiring or managing.One or the other.The better the people, the less thing you can be managed.The more time you spend on recruiting, the less time you have to spend on management.It's one-to-one.I remember when I was starting Airbnb, Sam Altman, who obviously everyone knows now is OpenAI.I was like one of the first Sequoia-funded companies.Before me, we were two people that had ever been funded by Sequoia from Wycom or Drew Houston from Dropbox.But the first one, Sam Altman, is a company called Looped.It was like a way to see your friends on a phone before the iPhone.I remember him telling me, I was like 27 or 28.Sequoia just funded us $600,000.A $3 million post-money valuation.Highest valuation of Wycombinator.Now the average valuation is $30 million.And he said, you're going to spend 50% of your time on hiring.I never did, by the way.It was my death blow.Not spending more time on hiring.The less time I spent on hiring, the more time I spent managing.And I started learning my number one job was hiring.Every day I wake up, the first person I call is my recruiter.I think people should think about their first employee being a recruiter, not an engineer.

本质上，作为领导者，你可以选择把时间花在招人上，还是花在管人上，二选一。人越好，需要被管的地方就越少。你在招聘上花的时间越多，需要花在管理上的时间就越少，这是一比一的关系。我记得刚创办 Airbnb 的时候，Sam Altman——今天当然人人都知道他是 OpenAI 的——我们是最早一批拿到 Sequoia 投资的公司之一。在我们之前，从 Y Combinator 出来又拿到 Sequoia 投资的只有两个人：Sam Altman，还有 Dropbox 的 Drew Houston。而第一个就是 Sam Altman，他那家公司叫 Loopt，在 iPhone 出现之前，用手机看你朋友在哪儿的那种产品。我记得他跟我说这话的时候我才 27、28 岁。Sequoia 刚给我们投了 60 万美元，投后估值 300 万美元——那是 Y Combinator 当时的最高估值。现在平均估值都 3000 万美元了。他跟我说：你会把 50% 的时间花在招聘上。顺便说，我当时根本没这么做。这差点成了我的致命伤——没有在招聘上花更多时间。我在招聘上花的时间越少，花在管理上的时间就越多。后来我才慢慢学明白，我的头号工作就是招人。现在我每天早上醒来，第一个打电话的人就是我的招聘负责人。我觉得大家应该考虑把第一个员工招成 recruiter，而不是工程师。

[1:03:32] Brian Chesky

They are the most important person because they are the ones that get you every other person.I mean, a company is as good as its people.And the difference between the good companies, the great companies, or the people.And I think AI kind of makes that clear now that what's all about the people.But I obsess.I obsess over recruiting.I spend hours a day.And I don't recruit executives.I recruit two, three layers deep.Here's how you hire good people.Do not do searches, generally.What you want to do is build pipelines.So here's the mistake people make when they hire.They do, I need to hire a blank.So they do a search.They hire a search firm.And the search firm scans.They give you like 50 profiles.You like call it down to 10 people.You contact 10.And you pick the best one you hire.And a year later, you realize like they're good or bad.And if they're bad, uh-oh, they've already hired their own team.That is the wrong way to do it.So the best way to do it is pipeline recruiting.You're constantly recruiting.You're constantly meeting people.So this is what you do.Try to map out all the best people in the valley.So let's say I need to hire really good engineers.I don't do searches.I just informationally meet the best engineers in the world.

他们是最重要的人，因为其他所有人都是他们帮你带来的。一家公司的上限就是它的人。好公司和伟大公司之间的差别，就是人。而且我觉得 AI 现在把这一点摆得更明白了——一切都取决于人。我对招聘是有强迫症的，一天要花好几个小时在这上面。而且我招的不只是高管，我会往下招两三层。我告诉你怎么招到好人：一般情况下，不要做「搜寻」（search），你要做的是建「管道」（pipeline）。大家招人时常犯的错误是这样的：我需要招一个某某岗位，于是去做一次搜寻，请一家猎头公司，猎头扫一遍市场，给你 50 份简历，你筛到 10 个人，把这 10 个人都聊一遍，挑出最好的那个录用。一年后你才发现这人到底行不行。如果不行，糟了——他已经把自己那一队人也招进来了。这是完全错误的做法。最好的做法是管道式招聘：你要一直在招人，一直在见人。具体怎么做？试着把整个硅谷最好的人都梳理成一张图。比如说我要招非常厉害的工程师，我不做搜寻，我就是去跟全世界最好的工程师做信息性的交流。

[1:04:36] Brian Chesky

Every meeting, the job is to get the next meeting.Meet someone else.So if I were to meet you and I say, hey, who's the best people you know?Can you introduce me to two or three people?So what you're doing is you're constantly meeting people in advance of searches.And you're just building your pipeline.You just need to know lots of talent.And all of it's referral-based.The two ways to find out if people are good.I mean, one way is you're just good at assessing talent.But the two best ways is start with the results, work backwards to people.So a lot of people say like, I want like a really good marketer.I'm going to go to Nike.They do really good marketing.No, no, no.Find an ad you like and figure out who made the ad.Start with the results.Work backwards to people.Don't start with the resume.The other thing to do is keep asking people to build your Rolodex.And so I'm constantly building a Rolodex.And the moment I find somebody that's really good, I ask them who all the best people theyknow are.And I basically build these little mafias.Every company's got like a little mafia of talent.So like Uber's got like an ops mafia.Apple's got like a design mafia.And then like build these little ecosystems.

每一次见面，任务都是约到下一次见面，去见下一个人。所以如果我见到你，我会问：嘿，你认识的最厉害的人是谁？能不能给我引荐两三个？你做的事情就是在真正开始招聘之前，就已经持续不断地在见人，在搭你自己的人才管道。你只需要认识大量的人才，而且全都是靠转介绍来的。判断一个人行不行有两个办法——当然有一种是你天生就擅长识人。但最好的两个办法，第一是从结果倒推到人。很多人会说，我想要一个特别好的市场营销负责人，那我去 Nike 挖，Nike 的营销做得特别好。不不不。你应该去找一支你真正喜欢的广告，然后查出来这支广告是谁做的。从结果出发，反推到人，别从简历出发。第二件事是不停地问别人，把你的通讯录（Rolodex）建起来。我就是在持续不断地建这个通讯录。一旦我发现某个人特别厉害，我就问他：你认识的最厉害的人都有谁？我基本上是在搭建一个个小「帮派」。每家公司都有自己的一小撮人才帮派，比如 Uber 有一个 ops 帮，Apple 有一个设计帮。然后你就去搭起这些小生态。

[1:05:37] Brian Chesky

And they tell you who the other good people are.And you're classifying more people, more people.And what I do is I'm the co-hiring manager for the top 200 people in the company.This is very radical.A lot of CEOs think it's their job to hire their executive.If their executive team hires their team.I think that is fatal.I mean, theoretically, yes.Theoretically, you should live in a world where you have such good people, they can allhire their own people.Most entrepreneurs, if they have 10 executives, would be lucky if two or three are able todo that without any support or help.In other words, you always want to be like marrying up, hiring people to the future.I sometimes used to say like, my executives should hire people so good they would neverwork for them without my help.In other words, it should be like we're reaching.If you can hire them on my help, we're not reaching far enough.You want to like hire the very best person you can.So I'm constantly meeting people, constantly interviewing.The first and last call I make every day is the recruiting team.Still, I probably spend two, three hours a day on it.Every day, every year, I spend more time on recruiting, the less.By the way, in the 2000s, I didn't.

而且他们还会告诉你，还有谁是厉害的人。你就这么一层层往外筛，认识的人越来越多。我自己的做法是——公司里排前 200 的岗位，我都是“联合招聘经理”（co-hiring manager）。这挺激进的。很多 CEO 觉得自己的活儿就是招高管，高管再去招他们自己的团队。我觉得那是致命的。理论上当然没错，理论上你应该活在一个所有人都足够优秀、都能自己把人招好的世界里。但现实是，大多数创业者手下如果有 10 个高管，能有两三个不需要任何支持和帮忙就把人招对，就算走运了。换句话说，你永远要往上够，招的是面向未来的那种人。我以前常说：我的高管招进来的人，要好到——如果没有我出手帮忙，那些人根本不会来给他们打工。意思是我们得踮着脚够。如果这个人不用我帮忙就能招进来，那说明我们够得还不够远。你要招的是你能招到的最好的人。所以我一直在见人、一直在面试。我每天打的第一个电话和最后一个电话，都是给招聘团队的。到现在，我一天大概还得花两三个小时在这上面。每一天、每一年，我花在招聘上的时间都在变多，花在别处的就越少……顺便说一句，2000 年代那会儿我完全不是这样。

[1:06:39] Brian Chesky

I thought it was all about like having a good idea, having a recruiting machine, managingpeople.The great thing is I don't manage this much anymore.The more time you spend on recruiting, the less time you spend on management becausereally good people are self-managing.This is amazing.And if you have to manage people, then maybe you should think about like upgrading the talent.You said before that founders are born, you think, and CEOs can be more shaped?

我那时候以为，关键就是有个好点子、有一台招聘机器、会管人。但好处是，我现在几乎不用怎么管人了。你在招聘上花的时间越多，花在管理上的时间就越少——因为真正优秀的人是自我管理的。这太爽了。反过来，如果你还得去管人，那也许该想想是不是该升级一下人才了。（Patrick）你刚才说，创始人是天生的，而 CEO 更多是被塑造出来的？

[1:07:03] Patrick

For the most part.And maybe the caveat to that is just like maybe founders aren't born, but we spent ourwhole life tinkering and building.But you can't simulate being a CEO.I was going to ask whether or not you think they're activated in some way, like maybe there'sthe raw material, but then some event happens.Sean from Palantir would call this the Bruce Banner, you know, gamma rays thing or something.What have you learned about activating talent?

（Brian）大体上是。真要说有什么补充，也许创始人也不是天生的，只是我们一辈子都在瞎捣鼓、在做东西。但当 CEO 这件事，你没法提前模拟。（Patrick）我正想问，你觉不觉得这里面有个“被激活”的过程——原材料本来就在，但得有某个事件把它点燃。Palantir 的 Shyam 会管这个叫布鲁斯·班纳被伽马射线照到的那一下。关于激活人才，你都学到了什么？

[1:07:25] Brian Chesky

I think the activation is giving someone a challenge.Our founding stories, we couldn't afford to pay rent.But of course, I have 50 stories before that of challenges I had.It's just Airbnb, that story activated something on a scale I'd never done before, but it wasn'tthe first thing I made.I was making things my whole life.I think the way to activate somebody is to give them a problem or opportunity and seeif they can do it.I think the people that have a high level of agency are going to do it.I don't know how to teach motivation.I don't know if it can be taught, by the way.I don't know if you can teach.I think you can motivate people.I don't think you can make a person who's not motivated motivated.But I think entrepreneurs have the trait of their self-motivated.And so it's really about giving them a challenge.And then it's up to them to step in and activate.Having plugged the leaky bucket of motivation, of adulation, what's your motivation now asyou attack this next chapter?

我觉得所谓激活，就是给一个人一个挑战。我们的创业故事是——我们付不起房租。但当然，在那之前我还有 50 个大大小小的挑战故事。只是 Airbnb 这一次激活的量级，是我此前从没经历过的，但它绝不是我做的第一件东西。我这辈子一直在做东西。我觉得激活一个人的方式，就是给他一个问题、或者一个机会，看他能不能做成。那种主观能动性（agency）很强的人，就会做成。动力这个东西我不知道怎么教。顺便说，我甚至不确定它能不能被教会。我觉得你可以去激励一个人，但你没办法把一个本身没有动力的人变得有动力。而创业者的特质就是自驱。所以关键还是给他一个挑战，接下来就看他愿不愿意接住、能不能自己被点亮。（Patrick）你已经把“渴望被追捧”那只漏水的桶补上了，那在你进入下一个篇章的时候，你现在的动力是什么？

[1:08:20] Brian Chesky

Most of my heroes are artists.I'll pick four people.Two I've mentioned repeatedly.Leonardo da Vinci, Vincent Van Gogh, Walt Disney, Steve Jobs.There's many things they had in common, but what is something they all had in common?

我的偶像大多是艺术家。我挑四个人，其中两个我反复提过：Leonardo da Vinci、Vincent Van Gogh、Walt Disney、Steve Jobs。他们的共同点有很多，但有一点是什么呢？

[1:08:32] Brian Chesky

The last day of their life or the last week of their life,they were working.Leonardo da Vinci carried the Mona Lisa with them until he died.And he definitely didn't pay the Mona Lisa for adulation because he never showed it toanyone.Vincent Van Gogh sold one painting in his life.He died an obscure artist in the cornfield, maybe shot, maybe not.Unclear what happened, but did it because he loved it.Walt Disney, last day of his life, he was laying in a hospital bed.His brother Roy was rubbing his cold feet, dying of lung cancer, looking at the ceilingtiles, which were a grid imagining Disney World.Steve Jobs, Hiroki said the last couple weeks of his life, he showed him marketing.He was still looking at products.Some people can look at that and interpretations, oh, that's sad.They weren't spending time with family.By the way, I'm sure those that had families, Vincent Van Gogh and Leonardo da Vinci didn'thave families.My understanding is Steve and Walt spent time with their family at the end of their life.But I don't see that as a sad story they're working in the end because I think they didwhat they loved.You know, the great artist in history did what they love.My motivation is the motivation of an artist.

他们生命的最后一天、或者最后一周，都还在工作。Leonardo da Vinci 一直把《蒙娜丽莎》带在身边，直到去世。而他画《蒙娜丽莎》肯定不是为了博取别人的追捧，因为他从来没给任何人看过。Vincent Van Gogh 一辈子只卖出过一幅画，他去世时是个默默无闻的画家，倒在麦田里，可能是中了枪，也可能不是，到底发生了什么没人说得清，但他画画就是因为他热爱。Walt Disney，生命最后一天躺在病床上，他哥哥 Roy 在给他搓冰凉的脚，他肺癌快撑不住了，眼睛盯着天花板——那种一格一格的吊顶——脑子里在构想 Disney World。Steve Jobs，有人回忆说，他生命的最后几周还在看营销方案，还在看产品。有人看到这些会解读成：哦，好惨啊，他们都没陪家人。顺便说一句，我相信有家庭的人是陪了的——Vincent Van Gogh 和 Leonardo da Vinci 没有家庭；据我了解，Steve 和 Walt 在生命最后是有陪家人的。但我不觉得到最后还在工作是个悲伤的故事，因为我觉得他们做的是自己热爱的事。历史上那些伟大的艺术家，做的都是自己热爱的事。我的动力，就是一个艺术家的动力。

[1:09:40] Brian Chesky

My motivation is to create something great.That is my motivation.I would like to be successful.I want our shareholders to get a return.I would like employees to feel that they're at a great company.I would love to make a huge impact in the world.But mostly, I just want to make something.I feel like I'm a designer more than I am a CEO.And I might be afforded one of the great biggest canvases of any designer in human history.Because usually, designers are just not given this many resources.It's almost like a glitch in the system.It was almost like accidental.Some airbeds allowed me to crack this glitch and get all these resources I wasn't supposedto get.But I'm not letting go.And so, my motivation is that of an artist.I just want to make incredible things.It's a beautiful, almost closing thought, given the tools now at our disposal, that everyonecan do that if they want.And we should encourage them to do so.All children are born artists.The problems remain one as you grow up.AI is the opportunity for all of us to become artists and scientists and creators.We don't have to be consumers anymore.We can be creators.True creators.And we hear the word creator, you think social media performer.

我的动力是做出伟大的东西。这就是我的动力。我当然希望成功，希望股东有回报，希望员工觉得自己待在一家很棒的公司，也很想对这个世界产生巨大的影响。但归根到底，我就是想做点东西出来。我觉得自己是个设计师，多过是个 CEO。而我可能拿到了人类历史上所有设计师里最大的画布之一。因为一般来说，设计师根本不会被给到这么多资源。这几乎像是系统里的一个 bug，像是个意外——几张气垫床让我钻到了这个 bug，拿到了一堆本来轮不到我的资源。但我不会松手。所以，我的动力就是艺术家的动力，我就是想做出了不起的东西。（Patrick）这几乎是个很美的收尾——尤其是考虑到我们现在手上有这些工具，任何人只要愿意都能这么做，而我们应该鼓励他们去做。（Brian）所有小孩生来都是艺术家，难的是长大之后还能继续做艺术家。AI 给了我们所有人一个机会：去成为艺术家、科学家、创造者。我们不必再只当消费者了，我们可以当创造者，真正的创造者。可现在一听到 creator 这个词，大家想到的是社交媒体上的表演者。

[1:10:41] Brian Chesky

That's one way to create.You can perform.The problem is, I think, creator has been performance.Now, creator can be create, make.Everyone can make now.It's amazing.The last question I ask, everyone's the same.What is the kindest thing that anyone's ever done for you?

那也是一种创造，你可以去表演。问题在于，我觉得 creator 这个词一直被等同于表演。而现在，creator 可以回到它本来的意思——创造、动手做。现在每个人都能动手做东西了，这太了不起了。（Patrick）我问每个人的最后一个问题都一样：别人为你做过的最善良的一件事是什么？

[1:10:56] Brian Chesky

The biggest gift anyone's given me is believe in me.And I think the biggest gift you can give somebody or one of the biggest gifts is believein you.A couple examples.When I was 16 years old, I transferred to a public high school.I was really into art.I was a pretty good artist.I didn't know how good I was.And I had a teacher named Miss Williams.She believed in me.I remember her telling my parents, he's going to be a famous artist.I never became a famous artist.But it gave me confidence that I was actually good at something.Because I wasn't that good at hockey.I wish I was.And I wish I could make my dad proud of ice hockey.I just didn't get very far.And suddenly, that belief set me on a path.That moment, I said, I'm going to go to art school.And that moment, I realized I can decide to be happy the rest of my life.I came to Silicon Valley.I met Michael Seibel and the guys at JustNateTV.And they believed in me.They were early YC people.Paul Graham made an exception to let me in early YCometer.He believed in me.I was an engineer.And he almost never funded non-engineers.He thought the idea was not a good idea, actually.He said, people are actually doing this?

别人给我的最大的礼物，是相信我。我觉得你能给一个人最大的礼物之一，就是相信他。举几个例子。我 16 岁的时候转学去了一所公立高中，我特别喜欢艺术，画得还不错，但我自己并不知道自己有多好。当时有位老师叫 Miss Williams，她相信我。我记得她跟我爸妈说：这孩子以后会成为一个有名的艺术家。我后来并没有成为有名的艺术家，但那句话让我第一次有了底气，觉得原来我真的有一件事是擅长的。因为我冰球打得不怎么样。我倒是希望自己打得好，希望能靠冰球让我爸为我骄傲，可我确实没走多远。突然之间，那份相信把我推上了一条路。就在那一刻我说，我要去读艺术学院。也是在那一刻我意识到，我可以自己决定这辈子过得快乐。后来我来到硅谷，认识了 Michael Seibel 和 Justin.tv 那帮人，他们相信我，他们是最早那批 YC 的人。Paul Graham 破例让我进了 YC，他也相信我。我不是工程师，而他几乎从来不投非工程师背景的人。他其实觉得这个点子不咋样，他说：真的有人在干这种事？

[1:11:56] Brian Chesky

I go, yes.He goes, what's wrong with them?But he believed in me.My investors, I can go down the list of investors, they believed in me.Joe and Nate, I had no business being a CEO.Joe somehow believed in me.I wouldn't be here if it wasn't for the generosity of people believing in me, in helping me.But I think the greatest gift I can give back in believing in others and help them,and not pull the ladder up behind me, but to really show them.I had the great privilege to eventually join the Giving Pledge.And you have to write a letter.I remember my letter was, if you could ask my high school teachers who would join the Giving Pledge,they wouldn't have guessed me.And the basic idea in my life philosophy is we all have unknown potential.I think we have these stories in our own head about what we're capable of.To go back to John Wooden, somebody once asked him, I think, like, what's the secret to success?

我说，有啊。他说，那这些人是有什么毛病？但他还是相信我。我的投资人，我可以一个一个数下来，他们都相信我。还有 Joe 和 Nate——我当时根本没资格当这个 CEO，但 Joe 不知怎么就是相信我。如果没有这些人相信我、帮我，我不会坐在这里。所以我觉得，我能回馈出去的最大的礼物，就是去相信别人、去帮别人，别自己爬上去之后就把梯子抽走，而是真的把路指给他们看。我后来有幸加入了 Giving Pledge（捐赠誓言）。加入是要写一封信的。我记得我在信里写：如果你去问我高中时候的老师，谁将来会加入 Giving Pledge，他们绝对猜不到是我。我人生哲学里最基本的一条就是：我们每个人都有连自己都不知道的潜力。我们脑子里都装着一套关于我到底能做到什么的故事。说回 John Wooden，有人问过他，成功的秘诀是什么？

[1:12:46] Brian Chesky

And he said, I only ask my players to do their very best.The person goes, oh, wow, that seems weird.That sounds like a parent says to the kid who loses all the time.He goes, here's the catch.I saw potential in people they didn't see in themselves.And that's my management philosophy.When I tell somebody it's not good enough, I'm not saying you're not good enough.I'm saying I see potential and you don't see in yourself.That is the most motivating thing you can do, to say, I believe in you and I believe you can do even more.And people will climb a mountain for that type of thing.And maybe the way to end this whole conversation is the most important person ever that you can believe in is yourself.And I think a lot of us that are entrepreneurs, we're driven by insecurity.We're driven by some hole.Not all of us, but a lot of us.Something in our childhood, something.A lot of us were not the coolest kids or whatever.And there's something in us you wanted to prove.And then you get really successful and you still have imposter syndrome.And a lot of like the path to happiness and salvation is just the path of learning to believe in yourself.For me, I only believe myself long after other people believed in me.

他说，我只要求我的球员尽他们的全力。那人说，哦，这听着挺怪的，像是父母对一个老是输的孩子说的话。他说，关键在这儿：我能看到他们自己都看不到的潜力。这也是我的管理哲学。当我跟一个人说这还不够好，我不是在说你这个人不够好，我是在说，我看到了你自己都没看到的潜力。这是你能做的最能激励人的一件事——告诉对方：我相信你，而且我相信你还能做得更多。为了这种东西，人是愿意去翻一座山的。也许整场对话最好的结尾是：这世上你最需要相信的那个人，是你自己。我觉得我们很多创业者，是被不安全感驱动的，是被心里某个空洞驱动的。不是所有人，但很多人是。童年里的某件事，某个东西。我们很多人小时候都不是最酷的那批孩子，心里憋着一股想证明点什么的劲儿。然后你真的做得很成功了，却还是会有冒名顶替综合征。而通往快乐和自我救赎的路，很大程度上就是学会相信自己这条路。对我来说，是在别人相信我很久很久之后，我才开始相信自己。

[1:13:48] Patrick

Now my gift is to try to give it to others.Beautiful place to close.Thanks, man.Thank you very much.If you enjoyed this episode, visit Colossus.com.You'll find every episode of this podcast complete with hand edited transcripts.You can also subscribe to Colossus, our quarterly print, digital, and private audio publicationfeaturing in-depth profiles of the founders, investors, and companies that we admire most.Learn more at Colossus.com slash subscribe.You know how small advantages compound over time?

（Brian）现在我的礼物，就是试着把这份相信传给别人。（Patrick）很美的收尾。谢谢你，兄弟。（Brian）非常感谢。如果你喜欢这一期节目，欢迎访问 Colossus.com，那里有本播客的每一期，还配有人工精校的文字稿。你也可以订阅 Colossus——我们的季刊，包含纸质版、数字版和会员专属音频，深度报道我们最欣赏的创始人、投资人和公司。详情见 Colossus.com/subscribe。你知道微小的优势是怎么随时间复利的吗？

[1:14:37] Patrick

That's true in investing and just as true in how you run your company.Your spending system is your capital allocation strategy.Ramp makes it smarter by default.Better data, better decisions, better economics over time.See how at ramp.com slash invest.As your business grows, Vanta scales with you.Automating compliance and giving you a single source of truth for security and risk.Learn more at vanta.com slash invest.The best AI and software companies from OpenAI to Cursor to Perplexityuse WorkOS to become enterprise ready overnight, not in months.Visit workos.com to skip the unglamorous infrastructure work and focus on your product.Ridgeline is redefining asset management technology as a true partner, not just a software vendor.They've helped firms 5x in scale, enabling faster growth, smarter operations, and a competitive edge.Visit ridgelineapps.com to see what they can unlock for your firm.Every investment firm is unique and generic AI doesn't understand your process.Rogo does.It's an AI platform built specifically for Wall Street, connected to your data,understanding your process, and producing real outputs.Check them out at rogo.ai slash invest.

这在投资里成立，在你怎么经营公司这件事上同样成立。你的支出体系，就是你的资本配置策略。Ramp 让它默认变得更聪明：更好的数据、更好的决策，随时间累积出更好的经济账。去 ramp.com/invest 看看。随着你的业务成长，Vanta 也会跟着一起扩展——自动化合规，为安全与风险提供唯一可信的数据源。详情见 vanta.com/invest。从 OpenAI 到 Cursor 再到 Perplexity，最好的 AI 和软件公司都在用 WorkOS，一夜之间做到企业级就绪，而不是耗上好几个月。访问 workos.com，跳过那些不体面的基础设施活儿，专注在你的产品上。Ridgeline 正在重新定义资产管理技术——它是真正的合作伙伴，而不只是一个软件供应商。他们帮一些机构把规模做到了 5 倍，带来更快的增长、更聪明的运营和竞争优势。访问 ridgelineapps.com，看看他们能为你的机构解锁什么。每一家投资机构都是独特的，通用 AI 并不理解你的流程，但 Rogo 理解。这是一个专为华尔街打造的 AI 平台，接入你的数据、理解你的流程、产出真正能用的结果。去 rogo.ai/invest 了解他们。