Bill Ackman: Investment Strategy, What the Market is Missing, How AI Breaks Businesses

频道: All-In with Chamath, Jason, Sacks & Friedberg
视频: https://allinchamathjason.libsyn.com/bill-ackman-investment-strategy-what-the-market-is-missing-how-ai-breaks-businesses
原文语言: en
统计: 共 51 轮 · Bill Ackman 44 · 主持人 6

[0:00]

One of the most provocative and interesting investors in the country.A legendary activist investor.Pershing Square CEO and founder, Bill Ackman.Taking a short position and going public with it is a pretty serious business.Interestingly, some of the best businesses in the world are trading at the lowest multiples.We're kind of the rebirth of the closed-end investment company universe.What did you think of Zara, the CEO of OpenAI?

全美最有争议、也最有意思的投资人之一。传奇的激进投资者（activist investor，指买入大量股份后主动推动公司变革的投资人）。潘兴广场（Pershing Square）的创始人兼 CEO，比尔·阿克曼（Bill Ackman）。建立一个做空头寸、还公开把它讲出来，是件相当严肃的事。有意思的是，世界上一些最好的生意，现在的估值倍数（multiples）反而是最低的。我们某种意义上是封闭式投资公司（closed-end investment company）这个物种的重生。你怎么看 Sarah——OpenAI 的 CEO？

[0:25] Bill Ackman

I'm sorry, CFO. Felt like the CEO.Yeah, I was...Stop with that stuff.Actually, I was super impressed.Made me a lot more bullish on OpenAI.And I thought...Right?I thought she should be CEO of OpenAI.That's what I thought.I think Sam should be chair.I think he's much better.There was a question I wanted to ask her that we didn't get time, which was, what's it like working with Sam?

抱歉，是 CFO。感觉像是 CEO。 是啊，我当时…… ——别扯这个了。 说真的，我印象极深。她让我对 OpenAI 看多了很多。而且我觉得…… ——是吧？ 我觉得她应该当 OpenAI 的 CEO。这就是我的想法。我觉得 Sam 应该当董事长，他更适合那个位置。有个问题我一直想问她、但时间不够——就是：跟 Sam 一起工作是什么体验？

[0:47] Bill Ackman

I mean, that could have been like three hours in a documentary.I wanted to kick this off.So thank you so much for being here.We've tried a number of times to get you to all in, and it's great to finally have you.You obviously are a legend that doesn't need much of an introduction.Lately, in the last number of, call it years or months or quarters or what have you, it seems like your investment philosophy may be changing.Your model, where you've been activist and you've entered positions and exited positions, and lately you've talked a lot about more kind of permanent long-term holdings.We'd love to hear a little bit about if that is actually a change and how your evolution and your investment model has kind of changed over time.Sure.So I would say the biggest change over time is an appreciation for the importance of what we call business quality.Long-term, durable, protected, non-disruptible growth.I would say early days, you're a smaller, more liquid investor.You don't have to think as long-term as you become a bigger, concentrated investor.And over time, you learn the importance of durable kind of growth.That's the most important factor.I would say I'm as activist as I've ever been, but more of it's on Twitter than I would say in the corporate context.

光这个问题就能拍一部三小时的纪录片。我想用这个开场。 所以非常感谢你能来。我们试了好多次想请你上 All-In，今天终于成了。你显然是个传奇，不需要什么介绍。 最近这些年——或者说这几个月、这几个季度——你的投资哲学好像在变。你原来的模式是做激进投资者：建仓、退出；而最近你更多在谈那种偏永久的长期持有。我们想听听这到底算不算一个转变，以及你的投资模式这些年是怎么演化的。 当然。我会说最大的变化，是我越来越看重我们所说的「生意质量」（business quality）——长期的、可持续的、有保护的、不容易被颠覆的增长。早期你规模小、流动性好，你不需要想那么长远；等你变成一个规模大、持仓集中的投资者，你就必须想。时间久了你就明白，那种可持续的增长才是最重要的因子。 至于激进不激进——我觉得我和过去一样激进，只不过现在更多发生在 Twitter 上，而不是在公司治理的场合里。

[2:04] Bill Ackman

And the reason for that is when I started at Pershing Square, no one sort of knew who we were.And so, actually, one of our first investments was Wendy's International.Wendy's owned Tim Hortons, the Canadian coffee and donut chain.And the value of Tim Hortons was more than the entire value of Wendy's.So we had this very simple idea, buy Wendy's, spin off Tim Hortons, double our money.And we bought 10% of the company, and I called the CEO, and he didn't return my call.And I called him again, he didn't return my call.I literally couldn't get a return phone call from the beginning.So we actually called a friend who worked at Blackstone, and Steve Schwartzman agreed to write a fairness opinionon what Wendy's would be worth if we spun off Tim Hortons.We kind of mailed it in and filed it publicly, and six weeks later, they spun off Tim Hortons.And then the CEO finally called me back.And he thanked me.And he had gotten fired.But he thanked me because he had a huge exit package.And he was very happy.But so in the beginning, we couldn't get a return phone call.So we had to, and we were small.So we had to go to a conference.We had to do presentations and go on CNBC.What happens over time is you join boards of directors.

原因是这样：我刚创立潘兴广场的时候，没人知道我们是谁。我们最早的投资之一是温迪汉堡（Wendy's International）。温迪当时持有蒂姆·霍顿（Tim Hortons），就是加拿大那家咖啡加甜甜圈连锁。而蒂姆·霍顿一家的价值，比整个温迪的价值还高。所以我们有一个非常简单的想法：买温迪，把蒂姆·霍顿分拆（spin off）出去，钱翻一倍。 我们买了这家公司 10% 的股份，然后我给 CEO 打电话，他不回；我再打，还是不回。一开始我根本要不到一个回电。 于是我们找了一个在黑石（Blackstone）工作的朋友，苏世民（Steve Schwarzman）同意出一份公允性意见书（fairness opinion，即由第三方出具的估值合理性判断），测算如果把蒂姆·霍顿分拆出去，温迪值多少钱。我们把它寄过去、并公开备案，六周之后他们就把蒂姆·霍顿分拆了。 然后那位 CEO 终于给我回电话了。他还谢了我。他被炒了。但他谢我，因为他拿到了一大笔离职补偿，他很开心。 所以一开始，我们连个回电都要不到，而且我们又小，只能去参加会议、做路演、上 CNBC。而随着时间推移，你会开始进董事会。

[3:12] Bill Ackman

You become known as an investor.We're kind of a constructive shareholder.I know pretty much every CEO in the S&P 500, either directly or one person removed.And maybe I've aged a bit.But you build kind of a reputation.And today, we buy a stake in a company.Sometimes they'll put out a tweet saying, we welcome Pershing Square as a shareholder.But they opened the door for us.In the beginning, we had to bang down the door.And today.So we get very deeply involved in our companies if it's needed.Other companies we own, there's nothing for us to do.It would just be to, you know, just clap.So you aren't considered a value-add investor at this point.Yeah, but we only want to add value.The conversation last night was kind of an interesting one.You know, the best investments are one where you don't need to join the board and do anything.Well, that may be in a startup.But in a mature business, it may be.No, I think in the public company context, one of the valuable things we can do,the problem of being a public company today is kind of the very short-term nature of markets,analysts, et cetera.And obviously, to run a business, a business is a good one.It's a forever thing.And you want to make decisions in the context of decades sometimes, or certainly three, five years.

你会慢慢被大家当成一个知名投资人。我们算是建设性的股东。标普 500（S&P 500）里的 CEO，我基本上不是直接认识，就是隔着一个人就能找到。可能我也老了点吧。但你会积累起一种声誉。 今天我们买入一家公司的股份，有时候他们会发推说：我们欢迎潘兴广场成为股东。是他们把门打开的。一开始我们得砸门。 所以今天，如果公司需要，我们会深度介入；有些我们持有的公司则完全没我们的事，我们只需要鼓掌。 ——那你现在还算不算一个「增值型」（value-add）投资人？ 算，但我们只想做加分的事。昨晚那场对话挺有意思的：最好的投资，是那种你根本不需要进董事会、什么都不用干的。 ——那也许在创业公司里成立，但在成熟生意里可能…… 不，我觉得在上市公司这个场景里，我们能做的最有价值的事情之一是这样：今天当一家上市公司，麻烦在于市场、分析师这些都极度短视。而经营一门生意——一门好生意——是一辈子的事。你做决定时得放在几十年的尺度里看，至少也是三年、五年。

[4:21] Bill Ackman

And how can you do that when someone's asking about the tax rate in the second quarter?And having a big shareholder on the board where you can kind of test ideas out with the bigshareholder before you expose them to the public, where the big shareholder can say,I'm supportive of this initiative, even though it's going to hurt earnings in the next few quarters,is a helpful thing.I just want to connect this last conversation with Sarah to this.Are you an investor in the AI complex?

可当有人在问你第二季度的税率是多少时，你怎么做得到？所以，董事会里有一个大股东、你可以在把想法公开之前先跟他试试水，而这个大股东能说「这件事我支持，哪怕它会伤害接下来几个季度的盈利」——这是很有帮助的。 ——我想把刚才和 Sarah 那场对话接到这里。你投 AI 这一整片吗？

[4:44] Bill Ackman

And how do you underwrite business model quality from what you see on the outside in the entire complex?I mean, yes, effectively, we're an investor.Actually, today we own Microsoft.We own Meta.We own Amazon.Actually, I think either directly or indirectly, you're invested in AI.Yeah.Or it's a threat.So you have to understand it.How do I think about AI in a business model context?

你从外部看这整片 AI 版图，是怎么给它们的商业模式质量做判断的？ 是的，实质上我们是 AI 的投资者。我们今天持有微软（Microsoft）、Meta、亚马逊（Amazon）。其实不管直接还是间接，你都在投 AI。 是的。要么它就是你的威胁。所以你必须懂它。那么从商业模式的角度，我怎么想 AI 这件事？

[5:08] Bill Ackman

Yeah, business model quality, yeah.Look, when you're a concentrated investor or investor generally and you're a long-term investor,the most important and most challenging thing to do is determine what's the risk of disruption?

对，就是商业模式质量。 你看，当你是一个持仓集中的投资者、或者说任何长期投资者，最重要也最难的一件事，就是判断：被颠覆（disruption）的风险有多大？

[5:19] Bill Ackman

What's the risk of two guys, two women from Stanford in a garage coming up with something?That risk, I think, has gone up dramatically.This is the greatest era in history just to build a business, right?

斯坦福出来的两个小伙子、两个姑娘，在车库里搞出个东西把你干掉——这个风险有多大？我认为这个风险已经大幅上升了。这是历史上最适合创业的时代，对吧？

[5:31] Bill Ackman

There's unlimited access to compute, certainly for a startup, unlimited access to capital,and a lot of incredible talent, which means that the probability of your being disrupted has gone up enormously.So the hardest thing you have to do as an investor is understand, and that's really where we spend most of our time.What's your tendency in a moment like this then?

算力（compute）几乎无限可得——对创业公司来说尤其如此；资本几乎无限可得；还有一大批极其优秀的人才。这意味着你被颠覆的概率大大提高了。所以作为投资人，你最难的功课就是搞懂这件事——我们绝大部分时间其实都花在这上面。 ——那在这样的时刻，你的倾向是什么？

[5:52] Bill Ackman

Do you swing towards the chaos or do you reposition to things that are maybe more durable and defensible from AI where the disruptability is less?What's interesting about markets is people always bring their eye to the new, new thing.And the new, new thing is sort of chips and semiconductors and energy.And that's where the shorter-term capital is going.What tends to happen is really high-quality things get left behind.And the same thing really happened, I was there in 2000 in that sort of bubble.This is different, I'm not saying this is...But there's some analogies.And the analogies are people got excited about internet stocks,and Berkshire Hathaway traded at the lowest valuation I think had ever traded at its history.People said, okay, that's all old stuff.I think a similar thing is happening today, in a sense, to Amazon and Meta, Microsoft.Those are the ones that are...These are old-fashioned companies in kind of this, you know, the open AI era.So they're undervalued in your mind.Yes.What else is undervalued?

你是扑向这场混乱，还是把仓位挪到那些更耐久、更不容易被 AI 颠覆的东西上？ 市场有意思的地方在于，人的眼睛永远盯着「新的新东西」。而现在这个新东西就是芯片、半导体和能源，短期资金都往那儿去。结果往往是：真正高质量的东西被落在后面。 同样的事真的发生过——2000 年那波泡沫我在场。我不是说这次一样，但确实有相似之处。当时大家都在为互联网股票兴奋，而伯克希尔·哈撒韦（Berkshire Hathaway）的估值跌到了我印象中它历史上的最低点。大家说：那都是老古董了。 我觉得今天在某种意义上也在发生类似的事——发生在亚马逊、Meta、微软身上。在这个「OpenAI 时代」里，它们成了老派公司。 ——所以在你看来它们被低估了？ 是的。 ——还有什么被低估了？

[6:54] Bill Ackman

What about the SaaSpocalypse?So is it oversold at this point?Again, I think it's a careful analysis.I worry more about a sales force than I do about your kind of...I think you've got to do the work.I think it's one company at a time.But I think if you're a software company today, you have to be as AI-enabled as you can.And I think there have been sort of monopolistic type profit taking off of customers.When someone had a kind of a niche software product, they're charging, you know, $30,000a year or something like this.I think those companies are really at risk.You know, Microsoft, when the average customer is paying, I don't know, $50 a seat or somesmall number, that platform is worth a lot more and less at risk.I want to go back to COVID because you had an incredibly viral moment where you were onCNBC at that moment and you pounded the table and you said, this is what's going to happen.And literally the market just ripped and you were...Well, first it went traded massively down.You were right on that side of the trade.And then you were on the right side of the trade when it ripped back up.And then I think it was maybe a month or two ago, I think publicly you basically poundedthe table and said, this market's going way higher.

那「SaaS 末日」（SaaSpocalypse，指市场担心 AI 会把订阅制软件公司整片打掉）呢？现在是不是已经被砸过头了？ 还是那句话，得仔细分析。比起你说的那类，我更担心 Salesforce 这种。功课必须做，一家公司一家公司地看。但我认为，今天如果你是一家软件公司，你必须尽可能地把 AI 用起来。 而且我认为过去存在一种近乎垄断式的、从客户身上抽利的做法：某家公司有个细分软件产品，一年就向你收三万美元这种。这类公司真的很危险。反过来，像微软这种，平均每个客户可能每个坐席只付 50 美元这种很小的数字——那个平台的价值高得多，风险也小得多。 ——我想回到新冠那段，因为你当时有一个极其病毒式传播的瞬间：你上 CNBC 拍着桌子说，接下来会发生什么。然后市场真的就那么走了，而你…… 先是暴跌。 你在这一边是对的。然后它反弹回来的时候，你又站在对的一边。然后我记得大概一两个月前，你又公开拍桌子说：这个市场还要涨很多。

[8:08] 主持人

Can you just put us in your head?Like, where does that desire to be so active and, you know, it gives you so much room tobe wrong.But then when you're right, it does add to the lore of Bill Ackman, of which you have alot.So how do you balance that?

你能带我们进你脑子里看看吗？那种想要如此主动发声的冲动是从哪来的？它给了你很大的犯错空间；但当你对的时候，它又给「比尔·阿克曼传奇」再添一笔——而你的传奇已经够多了。你怎么平衡这件事？

[8:27] Bill Ackman

Where does it come from?Like, why in these moments do you just get so convicted that the conviction just has tospill out and then you're just so out there?So I've always been like my high school yearbook epithet was most verbose.Me too.And actually, my friend actually lives around here.His quote that he put next to my name in my yearbook, it says, a closed mouth gathers nofoot.That was his.And so that's kind of what I've lived by.I've always had this sort of desire to speak the truth about things.And, you know, I was just talking with Jake.Actually, we had breakfast this morning and we're talking about my Rhonda post.Do you remember that one?

它从哪儿来？为什么在这些时刻，你的信念强到必须溢出来，你就非得站到台前？ 我一直是这样。我高中毕业纪念册上给我的称号是「最话多」。 ——我也是。 我有个朋友其实就住在这附近。他在我名字旁边写的那句话是：「闭着的嘴不会把脚塞进去」（a closed mouth gathers no foot，源自英文俗语「把脚塞进嘴里」＝说错话，意思是不开口就不会失言）。那是他写的。我基本上就照这句话活着。我一直有一种想把事情的真相说出来的冲动。 我今天早上刚跟 Jake 吃早饭，我们还在聊我那条关于 Rhonda 的帖子。你还记得那条吗？

[9:07] Bill Ackman

So, you know, there's just certain things that need to be shared and discussed.But with respect to markets, actually what happened was I was concerned about the country becauseI felt we needed to have basically a two-week pause.You know, this is March of, or February, I guess it was March of 2020.And I assumed we were going to just do a short-term shutdown, let the virus cool down as hospitalswere kind of getting overwhelmed.And the president hadn't done that yet.I was kind of surprised by this.And so that was what inspired me to go on TV as a way to reach President Trump and say,look, we need to shut down the country just for two weeks.You know, and I said, look, you do this, okay?

所以，有些事就是需要被讲出来、被讨论。 但具体到市场那件事——当时真实的情况是，我为这个国家担心，因为我觉得我们需要来一次大约两周的暂停。那是 2020 年 3 月，或者 2 月，我想是 3 月。我以为我们会做一次短期停摆，让病毒降温，因为医院当时快被挤爆了。而总统还没这么做，我挺意外的。 所以那才是我上电视的动机——那是一种触达特朗普总统的方式，我要说：我们需要把国家关停，就两周。我说：你这么做，行吗？

[9:49] Bill Ackman

The virus will blow over.Stocks are at an incredibly cheap valuation.If we handle this correctly, you're going to make a ton of money.And we're buying.You know, valuation is like a tether on the market, right?

病毒会过去。股票的估值便宜得难以置信。如果我们把这件事处理对了，你会赚很多钱。而且我们正在买。 你知道，估值就像拴住市场的那根绳子，对吧？

[10:00] Bill Ackman

When it gets too high, it's like this rubber band that's stretching.And inevitably, it bounces back.But it works the other way as well.When stocks get too cheap, there's this, you know, the rubber band's actually pulling valuations up.And so there are certain moments where it gets to that place.And sometimes, actually, if you call that out, it causes people to have kind of a psychological reset.What happened recently that caused you to call that out?

当它被拉得太高，就像一根越绷越紧的橡皮筋（rubber band），迟早会弹回来。反过来也一样：当股票变得太便宜，这根橡皮筋是在把估值往上拽。所以确实存在某些时刻，事情会走到那个位置。而有时候，如果你把它喊出来，会让人们的心理发生一次重置。 ——最近发生了什么，让你把它喊了出来？

[10:23] Bill Ackman

Stocks just got crazy cheap.Just incredibly cheap.Of really high-quality companies.Right.I don't know.I don't know why.Define extremely cheap in fundamentals.Fundamentals.Based on, you know, what's the value of a financial asset?

股票就是变得疯狂地便宜。便宜得难以置信。而且是真正高质量的公司。 ——对。 我不知道为什么。 ——用基本面定义一下什么叫「极度便宜」。 基本面。就是说，一项金融资产的价值到底是什么？

[10:35] 主持人

It's the present value of the cash it generates over its life.On that basis, stocks of really high-quality companies are really cheap.Is there any way to underrate?And, you know, I don't want to pick on specific companies.But we have the three that are going public.And then you have like a Palantir, let's say.And these things have become very popular in pop culture, in retard maxing, on subreddit.On, you know, the public's consciousness.High-net-worth individuals wanting to buy into SPVs that are double loaded and then getting wiped off the cap tables.Is there any way to underwrite 100 times revenue, 50 times revenue, 150 times revenue in these companies?

它是这项资产在整个生命周期里产生的现金的现值（present value）。按这个标准，真正高质量公司的股票非常便宜。 ——那有没有办法给（另一类东西）定价？我不想点具体公司的名，但比如现在有三家要上市的，再比如 Palantir 这样的。这些东西已经进入流行文化了：进了各种散户狂欢的梗里，进了 subreddit（Reddit 的子版块），进了公众的意识里。高净值人群抢着买那些被叠了两层费用的 SPV（特殊目的载体），最后被从股权表（cap table）上抹掉。 100 倍收入、50 倍收入、150 倍收入的这些公司，有没有任何办法能给它们定价？

[11:15] Bill Ackman

Or are these just tremendously overvalued because of the demand side?I think you underwrite a SpaceX the way you underwrite a venture capital investment.Interesting.Explain that.Unpack it.So everyone here invests in venture, right?

还是说它们纯粹是因为需求端太热而被严重高估了？ 我认为给 SpaceX 定价的方式，就是用给一笔风险投资（venture capital）定价的方式。 ——有意思，展开讲讲。 在座的各位都投风险投资，对吧？

[11:29] Bill Ackman

You know, you bet on, you know, who's running it, right?The talent is enormous.It's people.They taught me.I had a professor at business school.He said people, opportunity, context, deal.So on people, SpaceX.One of one.Yeah.Opportunity, one of one.Context, incredible.And actually, you know, feel bad for Blue Origin, but not harmful to SpaceX.The fact that, you know, they're biggest way behind.Then you get to deal.Okay?

你赌的是谁在经营它，对吧？人才的分量极大，看的是人。我商学院有位教授教过我一个框架：人（people）、机会（opportunity）、环境（context）、交易条款（deal）。 那么看「人」——SpaceX，独一份。看「机会」，独一份。看「环境」，好得不得了；说实话我为蓝色起源（Blue Origin）感到遗憾，但那对 SpaceX 没坏处——他们最大的对手落后一大截。 然后你就到了「交易条款」。对吧？

[11:58] Bill Ackman

That's the more complicated question for SpaceX.Again, we don't know what the valuation is going to be, but if it's a billion, a trillion,$750 billion, then you say, okay, well, let's think five years out.What does this company look like?

这对 SpaceX 来说是更复杂的问题。我们还不知道最终估值会是多少，但如果是一万亿、7,500 亿美元，那你就得说：好，我们往后看五年，这家公司会长成什么样？

[12:10] Bill Ackman

You know, what is Starlink?What's the trajectory of Starlink?You know, SpaceX is near monopoly in terms of low-cost space launch.That's going to become increasingly important.And even Amazon is going to have to become an even bigger customer because they're notin Blue Origins, you know.And time, I would say, has become increasingly valuable in the AI era, right?

星链（Starlink）是什么？星链的轨迹会怎么走？SpaceX 在低成本太空发射上接近垄断，而这件事会越来越重要。连亚马逊都不得不成为更大的客户，因为蓝色起源那边跟不上。 而我会说，在 AI 时代，时间变得越来越值钱，对吧？

[12:31] Bill Ackman

You delay a model.We were talking, David and I were talking about the administration and his kind of steppingin for the president not to sign that executive order to kind of slow us down.Allegedly.You lose a month.You lose a couple of months today, and it means a lot.So I think the only question I have, and I haven't done the math, you know, I actuallyinvested in X.I invested in XAI.I'm in an SPV.Ron Barron said, Bill, you got to invest in SpaceX.So I'm in.So now I have.So obviously, I'm rooting for kind of a good outcome.I just doesn't.I haven't done the.Yeah.You have to.What about Anthropic, OpenAI, and Palantir?

你把一个模型推迟发布——刚才我和 David 还在聊政府那边的事，聊他怎么去劝总统别签那个会拖慢我们的行政命令。 ——据说是这样。 你就损失一个月。今天损失一两个月，意义就很大。 所以我唯一的问题是——我还没算过这笔账。其实我投了 X，也投了 xAI，我在一个 SPV 里面。罗恩·巴伦（Ron Baron）跟我说：比尔，你必须投 SpaceX。所以我投了。所以现在我有了。所以显然我希望它有个好结局。我只是……我还没做过那份功课。 是的，你得做。 ——那 Anthropic、OpenAI 和 Palantir 呢？

[13:05] Bill Ackman

Okay.I'm sorry.Right.Anthropic, OpenAI, Palantir also fall into this category.Do you underwrite those as venture investments as well?And have you done the work on those?They're venture investments that do.What's helpful is they're not seed or series A, right?

好的。抱歉。对，Anthropic、OpenAI、Palantir 也属于这一类。你也把它们当风险投资来定价吗？你做过这些功课吗？ 它们确实是风险投资。有帮助的一点是，它们不是种子轮或 A 轮，对吧？

[13:19] Bill Ackman

They're, you know, D or E.But they're still like venture investments.These companies have proven they can generate a lot of revenues.And actually, what I was just saying on Sarah, I thought she had a very, very thoughtfulexplanation on how they think about committing capital, right?

它们已经是 D 轮、E 轮了。但它们仍然是风险投资性质的。这些公司已经证明了自己能产生大量收入。 其实我刚才在 Sarah 那场里说的就是这个：我觉得她对「他们怎么思考投入资本（committing capital）」的解释非常非常有条理。

[13:34] Bill Ackman

And that's the thing I haven't heard from on OpenAI, which is why if I were OpenAI, I wouldbe getting that message out.Because, you know, from the outside, you're like, it's a pretty interesting business model.You've got a company that's spending, making capital commitments.They're massively in excess of, you know, revenues.And how do you do that and get, you know, it's a degree of difficulty, I would say is hard.Your perch on the boards of, let's call it these more traditional Fortune 500 type businessesand your conversations with those CEOs, how are they thinking about AI?

而这恰恰是我在 OpenAI 那边没听到过的——所以如果我是 OpenAI，我会努力把这套说法传播出去。因为从外面看，你会觉得：这是个挺有意思的商业模式。你有一家公司在花钱、在做资本承诺，而这些承诺的规模远远超过它的收入。你怎么做到这件事、还能站住脚？我会说难度系数是相当高的。 ——你坐在那些更传统的、财富 500 强类型公司的董事会上，也跟那些 CEO 打交道，他们现在怎么想 AI？

[14:03] 主持人

Is it something that they're tipping into with pilots?Are they doing transformation initiatives?Do they think this doesn't really apply to us?We'll deal with it later.What's your sense of how they're adopting or embracing AI?

是那种做几个试点（pilot）碰一碰？还是在做转型工程？还是觉得这跟我们没什么关系、以后再说？你感觉他们在怎么采用或者拥抱 AI？

[14:16] Bill Ackman

I would say every CEO in America today is like, how do I use AI?How does it apply to my business?How is it a threat?They've got to find an internal champion.They maybe have to recruit someone from the outside.I would say on the hierarchy of things they worry about, it's probably number one as bothan opportunity and a threat.So if you're not paying attention to it, I mean, your board is going to be, you know,asking you the first question every meeting about, you know, how are we dealing with theAI threat?

我会说，今天美国每一个 CEO 都在想：我怎么用 AI？它怎么用在我的生意上？它对我构成什么威胁？他们必须找到一个内部的推动者，可能还得从外面挖人。 在他们担心的事情的排序里，AI 大概是第一位的——既是机会也是威胁。所以如果你不关注它，你的董事会每次开会第一个问题就是：我们怎么应对 AI 的威胁？

[14:42] 主持人

How are we dealing with the AI opportunity?So it's absolutely top of mind.Are you seeing much early success?I mean, through your, you know, again, through your visibility into these companies?I mean, there's a lot of mixed signals that we get.Like McKinsey did a study and said that 95% of enterprise initiatives actually fail.Chamath, you've made this point around 80, 90, that a lot of these enterprises don't reallyknow how to deploy AI.The fanciest title in Silicon Valley these days is a Ford deployed engineer, which isbasically like an IT consultant who can close the gap between the promise of AI and the ROIof it.And I think people are just trying to figure out, like, how do we use this thing?

我们怎么抓住 AI 的机会？所以它绝对是最优先的事。 ——那你看到多少早期的成功？我是说，通过你对这些公司的可见度来看。我们收到的信号非常混杂：比如麦肯锡（McKinsey）做过一个研究说，95% 的企业级 AI 项目其实是失败的。Chamath，你也讲过 80%、90% 这个数——很多企业根本不知道怎么把 AI 部署下去。 硅谷现在最时髦的头衔叫「前线部署工程师」（forward deployed engineer），本质上就是个 IT 顾问，负责把 AI 的承诺和它的投资回报（ROI）之间那道鸿沟填上。我觉得大家现在就是在琢磨：这东西到底怎么用？

[15:25] Bill Ackman

I mean, have you seen much actual success?Is this the question right now?Is this how do we bridge this gap?So I haven't seen much success other than, I mean, I'll give you the Pershing Square story.You know, we're a tiny little company.How are we using AI today?

我是说，你看到过多少真正的成功？现在的问题是不是就在这儿——怎么把这道鸿沟跨过去？ 除了我们自己，我没看到太多成功。我给你讲讲潘兴广场自己的故事吧：我们是家很小的公司，我们今天是怎么用 AI 的？

[15:40] 主持人

The first use case is really on the legal side.And, you know, kind of almost, almost we call it compliance back office type, you know, functionality.I think we're still super, super early in terms of big companies using AI effectively.Can I ask or test a thesis with you, you know, the venture underwriting model where you thinkabout people, you're underwriting a founder and their capacity to lead and redirect theorganization in a changing environment, in technology environment, market environment,and whatnot.And we have seen repeatedly similar success at scale if the company is still founder-led,where the founder feels like they have the authority to make all the radical decisionsneeded to make sure that that company persists and changes as needed in a changing environment.Have you looked at founder-led companies versus non-founder-led companies where perhaps thefounders really do have an inherent advantage in being able to navigate the changing environmentand actually generate outsized returns over time?

第一个用例其实是在法务上。还有几乎可以叫合规、后台这类职能。我认为在「大公司有效使用 AI」这件事上，我们还处在非常非常早的阶段。 ——我能跟你验证一个论点吗？在风险投资的定价模型里，「人」这一项，你实际上是在给创始人定价——给他领导组织、并在技术环境和市场环境变化时把船调头的能力定价。我们反复看到，规模化之后仍然成功的公司，往往是创始人仍在掌舵的：创始人觉得自己有权做出那些激进的、必要的决定，好让公司在变化的环境里活下去、并跟着变。 你有没有比较过创始人掌舵和非创始人掌舵的公司——是不是创始人在应对环境剧变、并长期创造超额回报上，天然有优势？

[16:37] Bill Ackman

And I ask this particularly as it relates to the SaaSpocalypse.And if you take a look at the companies that are founder-led today versus not, if you'renot founder-led, you have an incentive to not make a mistake and get fired.If you're founder-led, you don't give a shit your job is to make sure the company.Yeah, I think the answer is exactly what you said.I think the problem is that the average life of an S&P 500 CEO is probably, I don't know,four years or three years, three and a half years or something like this.And you're focused on, you know, kind of shorter term compensation.You generally don't have a big economic stake in the business.You're a founder.This is your entire life.It's your entire reputation.It's not like you're going to go get another job.You got to kind of make it work.And also when you're in the boardroom, you have the authority of either being a major voting,you know, voice or you've got a huge economic stake in the company.And when we join a board of a company, we're often the largest or the largest non-index fundtype shareholder.That kind of gives us, you know, a little bit of a disproportionate voice in the boardroom.Imagine if you have that and you're a CEO of the company, right?

我问这个尤其是冲着「SaaS 末日」来的。你看今天那些创始人掌舵的和非创始人掌舵的公司：如果你不是创始人，你的激励是「别犯错、别被炒」；如果你是创始人，你根本不在乎那个，你的工作就是让公司活下去。 是的，我觉得答案就是你说的那样。问题在于，标普 500 公司 CEO 的平均任期大概只有——我不确定——四年、三年、三年半这种。你的注意力放在偏短期的薪酬上，而且你通常在这门生意里没有很大的经济利益。可如果你是创始人，这就是你的整个人生、你的全部声誉，你也不可能再去找一份工作，你必须把它做成。 另外，当你在董事会里，你要么握有很大的投票权，要么在公司里有巨大的经济利益。而我们进入一家公司的董事会时，往往是最大的股东、或者最大的非指数基金股东，这会让我们在董事会里的声音有一点不成比例的分量。想象一下，如果你既有这个分量、又是公司的 CEO，对吧？

[17:33] Bill Ackman

So I think that does give you, and also if you've gotten to be a successful founder overtime, guarantee that you've made a number of very challenging calls over time that turnedout to be right.Otherwise, you wouldn't be there.And so you look at Mark Zuckerberg, right?

所以我觉得这确实给了你优势。而且，如果你已经是一个成功了很久的创始人，那几乎可以保证你一路上做过好几个非常艰难、而后来被证明是对的决定，否则你不会还坐在那个位置上。所以你看马克·扎克伯格（Mark Zuckerberg），对吧？

[17:47] Bill Ackman

When he bought, I don't know, Instagram, everyone's like shocked at the price paid or WhatsApp.You know, they seemed like, you know, sort of outside the, you know, the company onlyhad whatever, 19 employees or something when he paid a billion something.But you make enough of those calls and you can make the other challenging calls.Is this antithetical to a Ben Graham investing model?

当他买下 Instagram、或者 WhatsApp 的时候，所有人都被他付的价格震到了。那些交易看起来很离谱——公司当时才十九个员工什么的，他就付了十亿多美元。但当你做对了足够多这样的决定，你就有底气去做后面那些艰难的决定。 ——这是不是跟本·格雷厄姆（Ben Graham）那套投资模式相悖？

[18:07] Bill Ackman

Like you have to have a different set of skills as an investor to identify this talent?Yes.I mean, Ben Graham is a really important voice for investors in that he said, look, you'vegot to think about a business.A stock certificate is an interest in a business as opposed to just this piece of paper.That's probably one of his most important kind of aphorisms.But he was investing for the most part in liquidations.He was investing, you know, in the days of Ben Graham where there weren't, there's noEdgar system and in order to get a 10K filing, you had to go to the headquarter of the company.There were a lot of stocks trading at, you know, basically the cash on the balance sheet.And his business model was, you know, buying these things at stupidly cheap prices.And eventually, but Ben Graham made most of his money investing in, I don't know, Geicoor something, you know, not.Tell us a little bit about, you know, there's this sort of activist and significant shareholder,but then there's Howard Hughes.And you've talked a little bit about Berkshire Hathaway 2.0 or just being inspired by thatchamombe.You were inspired by it for a long time.Oh, Bill just took Pershing Square Public.Yeah.But with the Howard Hughes Corporation specifically, tell us about that effort because you're operating

你是不是需要一套完全不同的能力，才能识别出这种（创始人）才干？ 是的。我是说，本·格雷厄姆对投资者仍然是非常重要的声音，因为他说：你必须把它当成一门生意来看。一张股票凭证是一门生意里的一份权益，而不只是一张纸。这大概是他最重要的箴言之一。 但他大部分时候投的是清算。他所处的那个年代还没有 Edgar 电子备案系统，你要拿一份 10-K 年报，得亲自跑到公司总部去。当时有大量股票的交易价格基本上就等于资产负债表上的现金。他的模式就是用蠢便宜的价格买这些东西。不过最终，本·格雷厄姆大部分的钱其实是从 GEICO 这类投资里赚的，而不是…… ——跟我们讲讲：你是激进投资者、是重要股东，但还有霍华德·休斯（Howard Hughes）这条线。你聊过「伯克希尔 2.0」，或者说受它启发。 ——Chamath 你也被它启发很久了。 ——哦，比尔刚把潘兴广场上市了。 是的。 ——但具体说说霍华德·休斯公司，讲讲这件事，因为你在亲自经营

[19:12] Bill Ackman

that business.There's a book, I think it's called The Financial History of Berkshire Hathaway.That's for geeks.Basically, this guy went back and read every 10Q, whatever, he actually went through thefilings, looked at every deal that Buffett ever did.And you follow him over a 60-year period of time.And the vast majority of the value he created at Berkshire was through actually the ownershipof an insurance operation.And what's interesting about insurance is that, you know, running an insurance company,you have two jobs.One is you, you know, write business, right?

那门生意。 有一本书，我记得叫《伯克希尔·哈撒韦财务史》。那是给极客看的。基本上作者回过头把每一份 10-Q 季报之类的都读了，他真的把所有备案文件翻了一遍，看了巴菲特做过的每一笔交易，跟了他 60 年。 结论是：他在伯克希尔创造的绝大部分价值，其实来自于拥有一家保险公司。 保险有意思的地方在于，经营一家保险公司你有两份工作。第一份是承保、把业务写进来，对吧？

[19:44] Bill Ackman

You take risk.You collect premiums in exchange for the obligation to pay future claims.And then you get that, you get money up front.And the responsibility is to invest that money.The vast majority of insurance companies focus only on the liability side of the balancesheet.Buffett was really the first to do, focus on, actually more on the asset side of the balancesheet than on the liability side.And over time, on the liability side.If you manage the assets of an insurance company well and the liabilities well, you can buildthis enormously profitable, compounding, tax-efficient machine over time.And the question is, why haven't other people done this?

你承担风险，你收取保费，换来的是未来赔付的义务。于是你先拿到了钱。而你的第二份责任，是把这笔钱投出去。 绝大多数保险公司只盯着资产负债表的负债端。巴菲特真正是第一个更多盯资产端而不是负债端的人——当然，负债端他也管。如果你既把一家保险公司的资产管好、又把负债管好，你就能造出一台极其赚钱、能持续复利、而且税务上很高效的机器。 那么问题是：为什么别人没这么干？

[20:19] Bill Ackman

And the answer is, if you're really good at investing, you go work for a hedge fund,you go work for Fidelity, you go work for Wellington, but you don't go work for an insurancecompany.So the insurance company's ability to recruit investment talent is very limited.Buffett owned half the company.He was really good at investing, which is why it worked.So what we're doing is we're, you know, Buffett started with a crappy textile company,effectively liquidated it over time, reinvested in insurance, and then invested the assetswell.Howard Hughes is actually a really interesting company, but it's a business that Wall Streethas not cared about for a long period of time.We created it out of the bankruptcy of General Growth, who was a spinoff of all the otherassets.And it's a company that owns these small cities.So I bet a lot of people here have heard of Summerlin, because a lot of the tech communityhas moved from California to Las Vegas.But we own this small city, 26,000 acres of land.We own all the commercial land.We own all the residential land.We sell lots of home builders.We build a downtown.We build buildings.It's a bit like the Irvine company.You know, Don Bren created probably $100 billion of personal wealth managing a small city.

答案是：如果你投资真的很厉害，你会去对冲基金，会去富达（Fidelity）、会去惠灵顿（Wellington），你不会去保险公司上班。所以保险公司招募投资人才的能力非常有限。而巴菲特拥有那家公司一半的股份，他自己投资又很厉害——所以它才成立。 我们现在做的事就是：巴菲特当年从一家烂纺织厂起步，逐步把它清算掉，把钱再投进保险，然后把保险的资产投好。 霍华德·休斯其实是家非常有意思的公司，但它是华尔街很长时间以来根本不关心的那种生意。它是我们从 General Growth 的破产重整里造出来的，把其他资产分拆出来形成的。 这是一家拥有若干座小城市的公司。我猜在座不少人听过 Summerlin（夏日岭），因为很多科技圈的人从加州搬到了拉斯维加斯。我们拥有这座小城：2.6 万英亩土地。所有商业用地是我们的，所有住宅用地也是我们的。我们把地块卖给住宅建筑商，我们建市中心，我们盖楼。 这有点像尔湾公司（The Irvine Company）——唐·布伦（Don Bren）靠经营一座小城市，大概创造了 1,000 亿美元的个人财富。

[21:26] Bill Ackman

So super cool company, but the timeframe is decades as opposed to quarters.So Wall Street's never cared.It's always traded a huge discount.So Buffett bought into a textile business at a discount to liquidation value.At $63 a share, you're owning Howard Hughes at a discount to liquidation value.What we're doing is instead of reinvesting all the cash the business generates into realestate, we're going to reinvest all the cash into insurance within the next week or so.You're in the business of building this flywheel.We're going to build this into a compounding machine over the next 50 years.It's something I've always wanted to do.And we have the benefit of understanding both the insurance side of the business, and we canmanage the assets well.And you can buy it at, you know, whatever, 60 cents on the dollar.How do you think about investing the assets of this insurance company?

所以这是家超酷的公司，但它的时间尺度是几十年、而不是几个季度。所以华尔街从来不关心它，它一直以巨大的折价交易。 巴菲特当年是以低于清算价值（liquidation value）的价格买进一家纺织厂；而在 63 美元一股的价位上，你是在以低于清算价值的价格拥有霍华德·休斯。 我们要做的是：不再把这门生意产生的现金全部再投进房地产，而是在大约一周之内，把所有现金再投进保险。 ——你是在造这个飞轮。 我们要把它建成一台未来 50 年的复利机器。这是我一直想做的事。而且我们的优势在于：保险这一侧我们懂，资产这一侧我们也管得好。而你还能用六毛钱买到一块钱的东西。 ——你打算怎么投这家保险公司的资产？

[22:10] Bill Ackman

So what Buffett did is he took 100% of the insurance float and put the money in short-termtreasury.So he took no risk on kind of policyholder funds.And he took 100% of the surplus of the insurer, the equity, and invest in common stocks.And that's what we're going to do.And I think we can build a really profitable insurance company.We're starting at a very small scale.The company's got like a $4 billion market cap.And the goal is to build it into a trillion dollar thing over time.Compounding.The other thing Buffett did well is that he didn't issue any stock, not for a very longtime.So he started with a million shares.And today he has effectively like a million and a half.This is the future for very talented managers like yourself versus the traditional long shortfund.Or do you think they sit side by side?

巴菲特的做法是：把 100% 的保险浮存金（float，即先收进来、以后才可能赔出去的保费）放进短期国债，也就是对保单持有人的钱不冒任何风险；然后把保险公司的盈余、也就是权益资本，100% 投进普通股。我们也打算这么做。 我认为我们能建成一家非常赚钱的保险公司。我们起步的规模很小，公司市值大概 40 亿美元，而目标是靠复利把它做成一个万亿美元级别的东西。 巴菲特还有一件事做得很好：他几乎不增发股票，很长时间里一股都不发。他起步时是一百万股，今天实际上也就一百五十万股左右。 ——对你这种非常有才华的管理人来说，这是不是传统多空基金（long/short fund）的未来？还是说两者会并存？

[22:51] Bill Ackman

I think it's hard to do this because you need control of a public company and you haveto be not in a get rich quick mindset.And if you're in the get rich quick, it's easier to go to Citadel or Millennium or oneof these.Why does it have to be public?

我觉得这件事很难做，因为你需要控制一家上市公司，而且你不能有「快速致富」的心态。如果你想快速致富，那去 Citadel、去 Millennium 这些地方更容易。 ——为什么非得是上市公司？

[23:04] Bill Ackman

Why does it have to be public?It doesn't.It doesn't have to be public.Why did you choose to take it?You know, we got here by accident, right?So the most successful equity investment we've ever made is we bought this company calledGeneral Growth.We bought the stock of a company going bankrupt.Sort of the most contrarian investment you can make.Stock went from, you know, $20 billion market cap to $100 million.And we bought basically a third of the company or 27% of the company at $200 billion marketcap.And there was $27 billion of debt.And the bankruptcy emerged.And the strategy we said is, look, the assets are worth more than liabilities.We're going to do the first restructuring where the equity gets to keep theirinvestment in the company.Two years later, we emerged from Chapter 11.The stock went from $0.34 to $34.But part of the restructuring was spinning off this thing called Howard Hughes.And it was really all of the junk that didn't belong in the company that the analysts hated.And so we did it as sort of an inadvertent investment.And, you know, 15 years later, we haven't really created much value with it.So we said, look, we've got to, you know, the market doesn't like this thing.

为什么非得上市？不一定。它不必是上市公司。 ——那你为什么选择上市？ 我们其实是误打误撞到这儿的。我们做过最成功的一笔股权投资，是买了一家叫 General Growth 的公司——我们买的是一家正在破产的公司的股票，可以说是你能做的最逆向的投资。这只股票的市值从 200 亿美元跌到 1 亿美元。我们在 2 亿美元市值（原文如此）的位置上买了大概三分之一、或者说 27% 的股份，而公司当时有 270 亿美元的债务。 后来它从破产里走出来了。我们当时的策略是：资产的价值高于负债，我们要做第一个让股东保住自己权益的重整。两年后我们走出了第 11 章重整（Chapter 11）。股价从 0.34 美元涨到 34 美元。 但重整的一部分，是把一个叫霍华德·休斯的东西分拆出来。那基本上是分析师讨厌的、不该留在公司里的所有垃圾。所以我们是无意中拿到这笔投资的。而 15 年过去，我们并没有用它创造出多少价值。所以我们说：好吧，市场不喜欢这个东西。

[24:07] Bill Ackman

The market, a company has to earn a return in excess of its cost of capital in order fora stock to go up.And, you know, Elon's done an amazing job keeping the cost of capital of his companyis really low.You know, if SpaceX goes public at $1,750 billion, it'll probably be the lowest cost of capital,equity capital transaction in the history of the world.The problem with this company, because it's real estate, because it's development, becauseit's land ownership, the market says the cost of capital is really high.And you can only earn a certain return of real estate.So what we're doing is we're repurposing the real estate assets.We're transforming the company into a much higher returning.So the last few years, you've become incredibly famous.I mean, just to kind of put a fine point on the word, how does that change and influencethe way that markets work?

市场的逻辑是：一家公司必须赚到超过它资本成本（cost of capital）的回报，股票才会涨。而埃隆（Elon）在把自己公司的资本成本压得极低这件事上做得非常出色。如果 SpaceX 以 1.75 万亿美元（原文如此）的估值上市，那可能会是人类历史上成本最低的一笔股权资本交易。 而我们这家公司的问题是：因为它是房地产、是开发、是土地持有，市场认定它的资本成本非常高，而房地产能赚到的回报是有上限的。所以我们要做的，是把这些房地产资产重新用途化，把公司改造成一个回报率高得多的东西。 ——过去这几年你变得极其有名。把话说白一点：这件事怎么改变、怎么影响市场的运作方式？

[24:49] Bill Ackman

Because like, you know, your voice gets amplified now.You also have other places where other voices get heard.Many people whose names you don't even know.You go into Wall Street bets.It's every random Tom, Dick and Harry with an opinion.Tell us the way the markets have changed with notoriety, fame, social media influence, notjust yours, but in general.Yeah.I don't think markets have changed as a result of anything that's happened with me or followergrowth on Twitter.I think the Ryan Cohen guy, you know, the GameStop guy.Yeah.You know, that is a change in markets when, you know, a stock can trade at a valuation wellabove its value simply on the personality and the ability to gather up, you know, armiesof followers.You know, the fascinating thing about liquidity and valuation is the higher a stock price goes,and it's going to sound sort of intuitive, but it's not, the more valuable the companybecomes.You know, there's actually the increase in value of the company increases the value ofthe company, right?

因为你的声音现在被放大了，同时还有很多别的地方也有声音在被听见——很多你根本不知道名字的人。你去看 Wall Street Bets（Reddit 上那个著名的散户炒股版块），随便一个张三李四都有观点。跟我们讲讲，名气、社交媒体影响力把市场变成了什么样——不只是你，是整体上。 是的。我不觉得市场因为我身上发生的任何事、或者我 Twitter 粉丝的增长而改变了。我觉得 Ryan Cohen 那个人——就是 GameStop 那个——对，那才算市场的变化：一只股票可以仅仅因为某个人的个人魅力、以及他召集起大批追随者的能力，就交易在远高于其价值的估值上。 关于流动性和估值，有个很迷人的事实：股价涨得越高——这听起来像是显然的，其实并不是——公司就变得越有价值。公司价值的上涨本身，会进一步增加公司的价值，对吧？

[25:57] Bill Ackman

Because it lowers the cost of capital.It gives you more flexibility.It gives you the ability to issue stock, raise capital, acquire other businesses.And so, you know, getting back to the Elon example, it's really his, I mean, I would sayhe's a better example of this.We've not taken advantage of this at all.Maybe we should, but he builds an army of believers and followers that enabled Teslato be built, you know, in the markets.Let me maybe end as we wrap up with a somewhat of a pointed question.You're an incredible investor.If there are people, if we want to be maximally aligned with Bill Ackman, is the best way tobe an LP in Pershing Square or is it best to go into the market and buy?

因为它降低了资本成本，给了你更多灵活性，让你有能力增发股票、募集资本、收购别的生意。 所以回到埃隆那个例子——其实他才是更好的例子，我们完全没有利用这一点，也许我们该用一下。他造出了一支由信徒和追随者组成的大军，正是这支大军让特斯拉能在资本市场里被建起来。 ——最后我想用一个有点尖锐的问题收尾。你是位了不起的投资人。如果有人想要跟比尔·阿克曼最大程度地绑在一起，最好的方式是当潘兴广场的 LP（有限合伙人），还是直接去市场上买？

[26:39] Bill Ackman

So we have two, I think there are three ways you can invest with us that are all differentand will achieve different things.One is something called Pershing Square, which is the management company of Pershing Square.I think it's one of the most interesting kind of intellectually businesses because it'sa, it's the entity that receives fees on these three permanent capital vehicles we manage.So it's a royalty on the compounding of investments in these entities.And there's no CapEx in the business.So we're going to pay out basically all of our profits and we're going to grow as quicklyas the underlying assets compound.So if you invested a dollar in Pershing Square, you know, 22 years ago, that's, that became,you know, 20, I should know this number.It's like 27 or 28 times net of all fees.Wow.Okay.Over, over 22 years.Had we charged the fees of this public vehicle, uh, that number would have been, um, you know,uh, 37 times.I'm sorry.No, more than something in the mid forties.Okay.What this means is we now have a public vehicle that charges only a 2% fee.We've got one in London that charges an incentive fee.If we compounded the rates we have historically, we'll have 35 times the assets under management

我认为有三种方式可以跟我们一起投资，它们各不相同、达成的目标也不同。 第一种是那个叫「Pershing Square」的东西，也就是潘兴广场的管理公司。我觉得它在智识上是最有意思的生意之一，因为它就是那个收取费用的实体——费用来自我们管理的三个永久资本工具。所以它相当于是架在这些实体投资复利之上的一份特许权收益（royalty）。而且这门生意没有资本开支（capex），所以我们基本上会把利润全部分掉，同时以底层资产复利的速度增长。 如果你 22 年前往潘兴广场投一美元，那一美元现在变成了——我应该记得这个数的——扣除所有费用后大约 27 或 28 倍。 ——哇。好。 是在 22 年里。如果我们当年收的是这个公开工具的费率，这个数字会是——大概 37 倍。抱歉，不对，是四十几倍。 ——好。 这意味着什么？我们现在有一个公开工具，只收 2% 的费用；在伦敦还有一个是收业绩报酬（incentive fee）的。如果我们能维持历史上的复合回报率，那 22 年后我们的管理规模会是现在的 35 倍。

[27:54] Bill Ackman

in 22 years.So we'll go from 25 billion of assets to something approaching a trillion.We don't have to hire another person.Uh, and we don't have to spend another dollar, if you will, on overhead.That's a pretty interesting business.So I like that one.So Pershing Square.If you want to invest with us as an investor, invest in something called PSUS.You own a portfolio of our best ideas and it's trading at an 18% discount to cash.You want to believe that we can build the next Berkshire Hathaway?

所以我们会从 250 亿美元的资产，变成接近一万亿美元。我们不需要多雇一个人，也不需要在管理费用（overhead）上多花一美元。这是门挺有意思的生意，所以我喜欢它——就是 Pershing Square。 如果你想作为投资人跟我们一起投，那就投一个叫 PSUS 的东西。你会拥有一个由我们最好想法组成的组合，而且它现在的交易价是相对现金折价 18%。 ——那如果你想相信我们能建出下一个伯克希尔·哈撒韦呢？

[28:18] 主持人

You own Howard Hughes.We've got three different ways.Yeah, I've got some Howard Hughes.I think following you on Twitter and going, the going direct movement does allow you tocommunicate directly your vision and that actually makes it much easier to place thebet.And so I do think it has a profound impact because prior to your extremely long tweetsthat have been parodied now, there's an incredible meme of a Bill Ackman tweet comingin, which is an extended iPhone that's a foot tall.No, that was my Halloween costume for last year.You would have written something short or you just didn't have the time, yeah?

那就持有霍华德·休斯。我们有三种不同的方式。 ——是的，我持有一些霍华德·休斯。我觉得在 Twitter 上关注你、以及这种「直接对外沟通」（going direct，指绕过媒体直接向公众发声）的做法，确实让你能直接传递你的愿景，而这让别人下注变得容易得多。所以我确实认为它影响深远——因为在你写那些超长推文之前……（那些推文现在已经被玩成梗了，有个特别绝的段子，把比尔·阿克曼发来的推文画成一部一英尺高的加长 iPhone。） 不，那是我去年的万圣节装扮。 ——你以前会写得短一点，还是只是没时间？

[28:57] Bill Ackman

Yeah, I guess.I don't let other people read.Do you have your spouse or anybody read it?On the Rhonda tweet, which had some legal implications, I did have my communications guy and a lawyer,a friend who's a lawyer read it, but I only gave him a few minutes because I was so excited.Once I write something I really like, I just want to push post.Yes, I agree.I agree.And the torpedoes.Tomas does this too.He starts getting a little bit frantic when he's writing something and then he's like,it.And he just hits that.I just hit that?

是啊，大概吧。我不让别人先读。 ——你会让配偶或者别的什么人先读吗？ 关于 Rhonda 那条推文——它有一些法律上的后果——我确实让我的传播负责人、还有一个当律师的朋友看了，但我只给了他们几分钟，因为我太兴奋了。一旦我写出自己特别喜欢的东西，我就只想按发送。 ——是的，我同意，我同意。管它呢（damn the torpedoes，字面是「别管鱼雷了」，意为不顾后果往前冲）。 ——Chamath 也这样。他写东西写着写着就开始有点亢奋，然后就…… 就发了。 我就直接发了？

[29:27] Bill Ackman

By the way, it's a very powerful thing to be able to share your view and push a buttonand reach 2.2 million people.So I'll have to, why don't we just take a picture on stage and I'll send it out.Let's do it.Let's do it.Let's do it.Liquidity.Gone all in.All right.Relax.Thank you.Look at that.

顺便说，能把自己的观点分享出去、按一个按钮就触达 220 万人，这是件非常有力量的事。 ——那我们就在台上拍张照，我发出去。 ——来吧。来吧。来吧。 ——流动性。 ——全押进去了。 ——好了，放松。 ——谢谢。看看这个。