The Philosopher CEO | Clay Co-Founder Kareem Amin

频道: Sequoia Capital
视频: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xoE_pE26yDQ
原文语言: en
统计: 共 415 轮

`[0:00]`

I was like, I'm doing what I think is interesting and I hope that is aligned with what makes Clay successful. I'm interested in that, but actually I want to make these people successful. And they felt that genuiness and we did really crazy, you know, Verun, I think he was talking to someone on WhatsApp and the person was having trouble fixing something on Clint. He was like, I'm coming over to your house right now. And

我当时想的是，我在做我觉得有意思的事，我希望这件事和「让 Clay 成功」是一致的。我对那个感兴趣，但其实我更想让这些用户成功。他们能感受到那份真诚。我们做过一些特别疯狂的事，比如 Varun，他当时在 WhatsApp 上和一个人聊，那人有个 Clay 上的问题怎么都解决不了。他就说，我现在就去你家。

`[0:22]`

the guy was like, don't come. He was like, no, I'm coming. and he they became really good friends and we were just kind of on that journey with them. Uh truly everybody we have Kareem the founder CEO of Clay on today. Clay is ripping. He's doing a nice job there. He is a very interesting cat. You're about to find out. He's kind of a philosopher monklike CEO and he's coloring way outside the lines. I think you're going

对方说，别来别来。他说，不行，我这就过来。后来他俩成了非常好的朋友，我们就这样一路陪着这些用户走过来。今天我们请到的是 Clay 的创始人兼 CEO Kareem。Clay 现在势头非常猛，他做得很棒。他是个特别有意思的人，你们马上就会发现。他有点像个哲学家、像个修行者式的 CEO，而且完全不按常理出牌。我想你们会喜欢的。

`[1:07]`

to like it. I did a bunch of work to prep, but the the best prep was I got a little chance to engage with Verun, your head of go to market, and he said he talked about your Padell game that you guys play a lot of Padell. and he says he absolutely crushes you.

我为这次访谈做了不少功课，但最好的功课是我有机会和你们的 GTM 负责人 Varun 聊了聊。他说到你们打 Padel（板式网球），说你们经常打。他说他把你打得落花流水。

`[1:24]`

He loses quite a bit.

他输的次数可不少。

`[1:26]`

And he said, "You're relentless and positive and no one tries harder." Where does that come from?

他还说：「你这个人特别不服输，特别正能量，没人比你更拼。」这股劲儿是从哪来的？

`[1:35]`

Um I just want to correct the record before we move on.

呃，在往下聊之前，我得先纠正一下事实。

`[1:39]`

I'm going to call BS on his behalf.

我要替他说句公道话——他这是在吹牛。

`[1:41]`

Yeah. I I have a video of him lying on the floor literally with his ankle uh almost broken because he thought the ball was going one way and it went the other. and it just messed with his mind. And

对。我这儿有段视频，他整个人躺在地上，脚踝差点断了，因为他以为球要往那边走，结果球往另一边去了，直接把他脑子搞乱了。

`[1:53]`

he said you guys wager and the wagers increase and that you're like, "Let's go again. Let's go again."

他说你们会下赌注，而且赌注越来越大，你总是「再来一局，再来一局」。

`[1:58]`

Well, I think Yeah, I think maybe what he's talking about is that I like, you know, especially in sports or things like that, when someone beats me in something, um, I automatically get charged up rather than charged down. Sometimes I'm playing actually with Verun against someone else and if we lose, he wants to change teams, which really baffles me. Okay.

嗯，我想他说的可能是这个意思：尤其是在运动这类事情上，有人赢了我，我不会泄气，反而会一下子被点燃。有时候我和 Varun 组队打别人，如果我们输了，他就想换队友，这真的让我很不理解。

`[2:18]`

It actually that actually really gets to me because when I lose I'm like here's the here, you know, especially in a game where you're losing by just one or two points and you can almost see it going your way. I can see that difference and how close we were and how we can kind of get there next time. Whereas he want he thinks it's less it's less fun and like we should switch teams.

这一点其实挺让我受不了的。因为我输的时候会想，尤其是那种只输一两分的比赛，你几乎能看到胜利在向你招手。我能看清那个差距有多小，我们离赢有多近，下次怎么就能赢。而他觉得这样不好玩，觉得我们应该换队。

`[2:40]`

Where does that come from little Kareem? Where did where did you get so competitive? Where does the drive come from?

这股劲儿是从哪来的呢，小时候的 Kareem？你这么强的胜负欲是哪来的？这份内驱力从何而来？

`[2:48]`

Wow, that's a deep cut. Yeah, let's go. You really went there.

哇，一上来就挖这么深。行，那就聊。你是真敢问。

`[2:51]`

Yeah.

是的。

`[2:52]`

Um

嗯……

`[2:53]`

I'm kind of studying CEOs and I kind of want to see like what are the patterns?

我一直在研究 CEO 这个群体，想看看里面有什么共同的规律。

`[2:57]`

Yeah,

嗯。

`[2:57]`

a lot of CEOs are immigrants. Is it sort of an immigrant edge?

很多 CEO 都是移民。这算是一种「移民优势」吗？

`[3:01]`

I'll tell you kind of like where I've gotten to after thinking about that or analyzing it. Um it's it sounds a bit benal, but I I think I had a um unusual childhood. Let's just say just like parents divorced both really great parents just big divorce and you know traveling across like different countries very loud lots of things happening and like my introspection is that

我可以说说我思考、复盘之后得出的结论。听起来可能有点老套，但我觉得我的童年不太寻常。这么说吧，父母离婚了，两个人都是很好的父母，只是离得很激烈。然后就是在不同国家之间搬来搬去，非常吵闹，各种事情不断发生。我自省下来的结论是——

`[3:29]`

the ambition comes from you know the if you like a really simple thing right like if you can do something really big then you'll be loved right um and a big part actually of while building the company that I feel like I've um come to understand but also resolve and calm down is that um one thing that I I've like actually told people at work is that a lot of people think you should build from a place of lack uh or like

野心其实来自一个很简单的东西，对吧：如果你能做成一件特别大的事，你就会被爱。而在建公司的过程中，很大一部分是我逐渐理解、也逐渐化解和平息的东西。我在公司里跟同事说过，很多人觉得你应该从「匮乏感」出发去创造，或者说

`[3:59]`

you know you have a chip on your shoulder you need to prove something and you can definitely build great things that way but I think you create a lot of damage along the way um and to me I've decided to create from a place of wholeness so I'm like I don't need anything I'm not trying to prove anything I'm already loved uh by myself and others and I don't need to prove anything. So to me it's actually more of a game. Um and that's

带着一股不服气、要证明点什么的劲头。你确实可以那样做出很了不起的东西，但我觉得沿途会造成很多伤害。对我来说，我选择从「完整」的状态出发去创造。就是说，我什么都不缺，我不需要证明什么，我已经被自己和别人爱着了，我不需要证明任何事。所以对我来说，这更像是一场游戏。

`[4:23]`

why I like often kind of talk about having fun or just like how to enjoy the process because it's actually your life. Um and otherwise you're in this like you know just nightmare scenario in your head trying to prove something and doing so many things in the world.

这也是为什么我经常聊要玩得开心，或者说怎么享受这个过程，因为这就是你的人生啊。否则你就活在脑子里那种噩梦一样的剧本里，拼命想证明什么，在世界上做一大堆事情。

`[4:37]`

How did you get over that?

你是怎么跨过那道坎的？

`[4:39]`

Um there are many insights. sound like people I know who go to Hoffman.

嗯，有很多层的领悟。（你）听起来很像我认识的那些上过 Hoffman 课程的人。

`[4:44]`

Yeah.

是啊。

`[4:45]`

Did you go to Hoffman? No.

你上过 Hoffman 吗？没有。

`[4:46]`

Okay. You sound like a a Hoffman alum.

好吧，你听起来就像个 Hoffman 毕业生。

`[4:48]`

Yeah. Well, I I think it's just if you investigate that over and over again and you see Okay. You know, I remember raising funding the first time like the first large um round of funding that we raised and I started to imagine kind of what that would look like in the future.

对。我觉得就是你一遍又一遍地去审视这件事，然后你就看明白了。我记得第一次融资，就是我们融的第一笔比较大的钱，那时我开始想象未来会是什么样子。

`[5:05]`

Well, let's say now the company is really successful, right? or I have, you know, hundreds of millions of dollars. How does it feel? And I think it felt empty. So I kind of realized that at the end there there's nothing at the end of success. There's nothing on that other side that um I'm chasing and that it actually is just right now. Like how do I feel right now? Why am I doing you know every step of the way if I wasn't

比如说，现在公司特别成功，对吧？或者我有了几亿美元。那感觉如何？我想象出来的感觉是——空。所以我意识到，终点那里其实什么都没有。我追逐的那一头，什么也没有。真正存在的只有当下。我现在感觉怎么样？如果一路上的每一步我都不享受，

`[5:31]`

enjoying it at the end you get to the end and you didn't enjoy it right? And so just playing that forward I realized okay what if I decide to enjoy myself right now and um and also I took the risk of saying that may end up leading to the ambition disappearing or you know not doing whatever I wanted to but I was willing to take that risk because it felt more honest to me. Um I think my top commitment is to reality which I

那等你走到终点，你就是没享受过，对吧？把这条线往前推演一遍，我就想明白了：那如果我决定从现在这一刻就开始享受呢？而且我也冒了个风险——这可能会导致我的野心消失，或者我不再去做那些原本想做的事。但我愿意承担这个风险，因为这对我来说更诚实。我觉得我最高的承诺是对「真实」的承诺，

`[5:56]`

think is a helpful commitment if you're an entrepreneur. You need to see what life is actually like and what is actually happening. Um, and I committed to that and I was like, I'll go wherever that path goes. Just a small note actually on the reality thing because I often talk to people and they're like,

而我认为如果你是创业者，这是一个很有用的承诺。你必须看清生活真实的样子，看清真正在发生什么。我认定了这一点，然后我说，这条路通向哪里我就走到哪里。顺便说一句关于「真实」这件事，因为我经常和人聊，他们会说，

`[6:12]`

"Hey, I'm not getting any feedback." And I'm like, "Life is feedback. You're constantly getting an unbelievable amount of feedback. I can just help you tweak it, understand it, but if I'm the one who's giving you feedback all the time, it's not going to work. You know,

「哎，我怎么都得不到反馈。」我就说，生活本身就是反馈。你无时无刻不在接收海量的反馈。我最多帮你调一调、帮你理解一下，但如果始终得由我来给你反馈，那是行不通的。

`[6:25]`

you're you're this is the feedback. I feel like humans either live in the past, live in the present, live in the future. Founders tend to live in the future and they're anxious about it,

你自己就是……这就是反馈。我觉得人要么活在过去，要么活在当下，要么活在未来。创始人往往活在未来，并且为此焦虑，

`[6:35]`

right?

对吧？

`[6:36]`

I think most founders are probably anxious anxious folks.

我觉得大多数创始人大概都是焦虑型的人。

`[6:40]`

Very anxious right now.

现在特别焦虑。

`[6:41]`

Um, you're not.

呃，你并不焦虑吧。

`[6:44]`

Um, I'm not. No, I at least not in this particular way. My anxiousness is more existential.

呃，我不焦虑。不，至少不是这种意义上的焦虑。我的焦虑更偏存在层面的。

`[6:52]`

Tell me about that. Um, but I'll give you like an insight that I had about living in the future. Um, I was on the silent retreat and on like, you know, crazy things happened and I had these like big realizations and then on day seven out of 10, I was like, "Oh, I can't wait to go back home and tell everybody about all these things that I realized and I was just imagining it and just completely letting go of the place

跟我说说这个。呃，我先讲一个我关于「活在未来」的领悟吧。我当时在参加止语静修，中间发生了很多不可思议的事，我有了一些很大的顿悟。然后到第七天——总共十天——我心想：「哦，我等不及要回家，把这些领悟全讲给大家听了。」我就一直在脑子里想象那个画面，完全脱离了我当下所在的地方。

`[7:14]`

that I was at." And then I realized every time you're picturing the future or living in the future, you're just accelerating

然后我意识到，每一次你在设想未来、活在未来的时候，你其实都是在加速消耗

`[7:21]`

your own time that you've got here and you're accelerating towards death. So to me that kind of feels like the Freudian death wish where you're just like imagining something that is not here that is going to happen in the future and you're always there.

你在这里所拥有的时间，你是在加速奔向死亡。所以对我来说，这有点像弗洛伊德说的「死亡冲动」（Freudian death wish）——你总在想象一个此刻并不存在、要到未来才会发生的东西，然后你的人一直在那边。

`[7:35]`

Um and then I instantly kind of had this felt experience of

呃，然后我立刻就有了一种切身的体验——

`[7:39]`

it's a very Buddhist thought living. It

这是个非常佛教的念头，活在——

`[7:41]`

is a very it is a very Buddhist thought. be calm with yourself

确实，这是个非常非常佛教的念头。跟自己相处得平静一点，

`[7:44]`

and it it but I actually

而且它——但其实我

`[7:45]`

I bet no CEOs are like that except for you.

我敢打赌，除了你，没有哪个 CEO 是这样的。

`[7:48]`

I actually think so. The funny thing

我其实觉得有。有意思的是——

`[7:49]`

Jack Dorsey probably

Jack Dorsey 大概算一个。

`[7:50]`

yeah there's a lot of CEOs that have the or like come to these thoughts at different moments. It's I think it just depends when do they come to it by the way. Sometimes people come to it after they sell their company or you know you have a lot of star athletes who are Olympic athletes who are like after they're done they come back and recognize this but I do think a lot of people actually have some forms of these thoughts. It

对，其实有不少 CEO 都有这种想法，或者说在不同的时刻会想到这些。我觉得区别只在于，他们是什么时候想明白的。有的人是把公司卖掉之后才想通的；或者你看很多明星运动员、奥运选手，他们退役之后回过头来才认识到这一点。但我确实觉得，很多人其实都会有类似的念头。

`[8:14]`

doesn't mean you it means you have clarity of mind for the ambition for the future thinking. But what I experienced then was a felt experience of what it's like to actually be there and then being really grateful for the boredom where I'm like, "Oh, wow. I'm so grateful to be bored because I'm here." And then I try to carry that with me. Um I I think it actually leads you to make better decisions that are less rushed, less

这并不意味着你——它意味着你在思考未来、思考野心的时候，头脑是清明的。但我当时体验到的，是一种真正身处此地的切身感受，然后我会对「无聊」心怀感激，我会想：「哇，我太感激自己现在很无聊了，因为我人就在这儿。」然后我试着把这种感觉一直带在身上。呃，我觉得它其实会让你做出更好的决定——不那么仓促，也不那么

`[8:42]`

confused about like the nature of like what's happening.

会搞不清眼下正在发生的事情究竟是怎么回事。

`[8:45]`

Do you dip back into this? Do you meditate? You have a practice every day?

你还会时不时回到这种状态吗？你冥想吗？每天都有固定的练习？

`[8:48]`

No. So that's the interesting thing. I used to have a practice every day when things were more challenging. Um

没有。这就是有意思的地方。以前情况更艰难的时候，我每天都会练。呃——

`[8:54]`

we'll get into that.

这个我们等会儿细聊。

`[8:55]`

Yeah.

嗯。

`[8:57]`

Um I find that I come in and out of it, but you know, again, like some of the thoughts that I've come to are like the the end goal of that is to really um merge it into your day-to-day life. And so the practice is remembering it when you should be anxious or when something is going wrong. So I'm like, "Okay, I'm practicing it right now." Um, and the goal I really what I really like about some of these traditions is that at the

呃，我发现自己是时进时出的。不过还是那句话，我领悟到的一些东西是——这件事的终极目标，是真正把它融进你的日常生活里。所以真正的练习，是在你本该焦虑的时候、在事情出岔子的时候记起它。我就会想：「好，我现在正在练。」呃，而我特别喜欢这些传统的一点是，它们到最后

`[9:22]`

end they're like, "Here are all these tools." And then at the end they're like, "Drop the tools. There is no there is no path. You know, I can't teach you one way or another. You just have to see what it's like by living."

会说：「这些工具都给你了。」然后到最后又说：「把工具都扔掉吧。没有什么道路可言。我没法教你该走哪条路，你只能靠亲身去活，才知道那是什么样子。」

`[9:31]`

I've met with you a few times, but I was on the Skoya team.

我跟你见过几次面，那时候我在 Sequoia 团队。

`[9:34]`

I'll tell you my reaction.

我跟你说说我当时的反应吧。

`[9:36]`

Yeah, please.

好啊，请讲。

`[9:37]`

I was negative on it. Yeah.

我当时是不看好的。对。

`[9:38]`

And I was like, Kareem's not motivated. He's too laidback. He doesn't have a chip on his shoulder. Um, and Alfred Lyn at Sequoa gives me crap for this still. I had obviously had it wrong. Um, do you think a lot of people read you wrong that way?

我当时想，Kareem 这人没什么干劲，他太松弛了，身上没有那种非要证明自己的劲儿。呃，Sequoia 的 Alfred Lin 到现在还拿这事儿损我。显然我完全看走眼了。呃，你觉得很多人都会这样误读你吗？

`[9:53]`

Um,

呃，

`[9:53]`

you had a narrative that was just like flies in the face of the narrative I had about what a successful tech founder looks like.

你身上的那套叙事，跟我心目中「一个成功的科技创业者该是什么样」的叙事完全相反。

`[10:00]`

I think I'm doing it on purpose. I mean, I'll just say it. It's uh I but it's not not to like rub people the wrong way or to like push it in their face, but um one it's probably just like my nature is a little bit contrarian. Like I find when everybody's doing one thing, it stops being appealing. I'm like an indie person probably versus a pop person. But also but and and and I was worried about that for a while. I'm just like am I

我觉得我是故意的。我就直说吧。这个——但不是为了惹人不快，也不是要把这套硬塞到别人脸上。但第一，可能就是我这人天生有点逆反。我发现当所有人都在做同一件事的时候，那件事对我就不再有吸引力了。我大概算是个独立音乐型的人，而不是流行乐型的。不过——我有一阵子其实还挺担心这一点的。我会想，我是不是

`[10:26]`

just trying to is that just a way of generating being noticed? But um when I when I've been in situations where I feel felt kind of like aligned with what people were saying, I've actually been okay with it. So I've proven to myself that it's not just a bit. Um

只是在——这是不是只是一种博取关注的方式？但呃，当我身处一些我确实认同大家说法的场合时，我发现自己其实也挺自在的。所以我向自己证明了，这不只是在演。呃——

`[10:43]`

there's a little bit of a bit though

不过还是有那么一点表演成分的吧。

`[10:45]`

there for sure. Like it's nothing is one thing or another. There's a little bit of a bit. I

那当然有。就是说，没有什么事情是非此即彼的。确实有那么一点表演成分。我——

`[10:51]`

I try to catch myself when I'm enjoying it too much and rein it back in. Uh but there's a little bit of a part that has fun with it. I think that the dominant narrative around how to build things um one doesn't really appeal to me. I don't think it's the only way. I also think it creates a lot of damage that isn't being seen around and it's just like is this actually better for the world? Is this

我会在自己太享受这件事的时候提醒自己收着点。呃，但确实有一部分的我挺乐在其中的。我觉得，关于「该怎么把东西做起来」的那套主流叙事，第一，我不太感冒。我不认为那是唯一的路。我也觉得它造成了很多没被看见的伤害，我就会想：这真的对这个世界更好吗？这是——

`[11:14]`

what do you mean by that the damage? brought that up twice

你说的「伤害」是指什么？你已经提到两次了。

`[11:17]`

like basically take take something like hey the only way to build is 996 blah blah blah right um and it's like what does that do to people who only see that and and like new people who have no idea what works and what doesn't are just copying whatever other people are saying um and by the way you need to work extremely hard and in fact I've been working extremely hard for extremely long and the I just value consistency

比如说，随便拿一个观点，「嘿，唯一能做成公司的方式就是 996」之类的，对吧。那这对那些只看到这类说法的人会造成什么影响？那些新人根本不知道什么管用、什么不管用，就只会照搬别人说的话。顺便说一句，你确实需要非常拼命地工作，事实上我自己已经非常拼命地干了非常久，我只是更看重「持续性」，

`[11:44]`

for example and what I found is is more useful. And I found that you need to tell a story that is actually like honest to where you're at and what you need to do. And and sometimes you do need to work 996, but to me that was like, well, maybe you don't have a moat or maybe you need to do something so extraordinary, right, that it requires that sacrifice from you and everybody around you. Um, but a lot of the times it's just performative. And what does it

比方说，我发现那才是更有用的。我发现你得讲一个真正诚实的故事，诚实面对你现在所处的位置、以及你需要做的事。有时候你确实需要 996，但在我看来，那往往说明你可能没有护城河，或者你要做的事情实在太非凡了，才值得你和你身边所有人付出那种牺牲。但很多时候，那只是在做戏。那这又会

`[12:10]`

do to the people that are in this situation, right? and what they force their employees to do and then what they you know pass on to the next generation of founders and how they build. I we were just looking at this case study uh and the these are kind of like rough unfiltered thoughts but when you look at a business let's say you look at Apple

对身处其中的人造成什么影响？他们会逼自己的员工做什么？然后这些东西又会怎么传给下一代创始人、影响他们怎么做公司。我们前段时间刚在看一个案例研究——这些还只是我比较粗糙、没经过打磨的想法——但当你去看一门生意，比如说你去看 Apple……

`[12:32]`

I actually think it's interesting you're here in Boston because you're at Harvard Business School for McKenzie two-day deep dive for

我其实觉得挺有意思的，你这次人在波士顿，因为你在哈佛商学院参加麦肯锡那个为期两天的深度研讨，主题是

`[12:39]`

right yeah

对，是的。

`[12:40]`

scaling companies I think it's interesting you took two days out of your schedule to do that

公司规模化。我觉得挺有意思的，你居然从日程里挤出两天来做这件事。

`[12:43]`

yeah I I thought that was interesting too

是啊，我也觉得这事挺有意思的。

`[12:46]`

why it's like you don't have you don't have a lot of [ __ ] going on

为什么呢？搞得好像你没什么破事要忙似的。

`[12:49]`

um

嗯……

`[12:49]`

Verun's doing everything

反正 Varun 把活儿都干了。

`[12:50]`

he's he's amazing yeah Let's make him CEO. Um, everyone. So, I did one at Stanford a couple of years ago with Veroon and uh, initially we were super skeptical, but it was super generative actually for us mainly just taking the time together.

他真的很厉害，是的。干脆让他当 CEO 算了，大家听好啊。几年前我和 Varun 一起在斯坦福上过一次这样的课，一开始我们特别怀疑它到底有没有用，但结果对我们来说特别有启发，主要就是因为能有一段完整的时间待在一起。

`[13:06]`

Um, and occasionally one I roll the dice, but two, um, I find that when I'm in a space alone and being fed information, then I get a lot of like ideas. So, it's it's mainly for me. Um, and it especially like I'm in like a little room alone, you know, there's no distractions and I think it's a important time right now to like think clearly, especially about, you know,

而且，第一，偶尔我也愿意赌一把；第二，我发现当我一个人待在一个空间里、不断被喂入新信息的时候，脑子里会冒出很多想法。所以说到底主要是为了我自己。尤其是我一个人待在一个小房间里，没有任何干扰。我觉得现在这个阶段特别需要把事情想清楚，尤其是想清楚，

`[13:32]`

what is your value prop? Like what are you really doing? Um,

你的价值主张到底是什么？你真正在做的到底是什么事？

`[13:36]`

I think it's it's kind of funny to me that a lot of times what you think you're doing is not actually what you're doing or what customers value. Like for example, take Dualingo,

我觉得挺有意思的一点是，很多时候你以为自己在做的事，其实并不是你真正在做的事，也不是客户真正看重的东西。比如说，拿 Duolingo 来讲，

`[13:47]`

right? Um, is it really teaching you how to learn a language? I don't know many people that have fully learned the language from Dualingo. Or is it kind of like a edutainment game? Or is it maybe a motivational thing that helps you kind of remember that you want to learn this?

对吧？它真的是在教你学会一门语言吗？我认识的人里，几乎没有谁是靠 Duolingo 把一门语言完全学会的。还是说它其实更像一个寓教于乐的游戏？又或者它其实是一种激励工具，帮你时刻记得自己是想学这门语言的？

`[14:02]`

Here's a little bit uh or maybe it like helps you stop being anxious. I've seen a lot of people just needing to do it to calm themselves down. But if your company thinks that they're really teaching a language, then you would make certain choices that are different than if you think it is a tool to kind of get you excited about learning some new material at a basic level. Um, anyway, I think you should be really clear about

多少沾一点吧，或者它其实是帮你缓解焦虑的。我见过很多人就是需要做上几道题来让自己平静下来。但如果你的公司认为自己真的是在教语言，那你做的一系列选择，就会和你认为它只是一个让人对新知识产生兴趣的入门工具时完全不同。总之，我觉得你应该非常清楚地知道，

`[14:24]`

what your company actually is doing versus what you want it to do or think that it should do versus what your customers actually are getting value from. And those things need to align. I'm going to come back to some of this,

你的公司实际上在做的是什么，而不是你希望它做什么、或者你认为它应该做什么，还有你的客户真正从中获得价值的是什么。这几件事必须对齐。这些内容我待会儿还想再回来聊，

`[14:36]`

your philosophies and you're kind of like a CEO monk to me.

聊聊你的这些哲学思考——在我看来，你有点像一个「CEO 僧侣」。

`[14:40]`

Um, but just to give the audience some context, like you've had a it's an unusual journey. It's people call it a seven-year overnight success. You kind of wander through the desert for a long long time and then you found product market fit and it really ripped. There's a lot of founders who are going through that desert. U let's call it you did it for five years.

不过先给听众一点背景。你的经历很不寻常，有人称之为「七年的一夜成名」。你在沙漠里游荡了非常非常久，然后才找到 product-market fit，接着就一路狂飙。现在有很多创始人正走在那片沙漠里。就算你走了五年吧。

`[14:59]`

Yeah.

是的。

`[15:00]`

What was that like? Why didn't you give up? Um, well, you heard earlier I'm incapable of giving up. But

那是种什么感受？你为什么没有放弃？嗯，你刚才也听到了，我这人根本不具备放弃的能力。不过

`[15:06]`

I did, but you you sold businesses before.

但你放弃过啊，你以前是卖掉过公司的。

`[15:09]`

Yeah. Well, I thought I mean that's right, but I was much that was just like my first attempt. And I think I learned one that was a mistake. Wouldn't want to do that.

是的。嗯，我的意思是，你说得对，但那时候我还很嫩，那只是我的第一次尝试。我觉得我学到的第一点是：那是个错误，我不想再那么做了。

`[15:17]`

Okay.

好。

`[15:18]`

Um, and number two, I think you need to keep going at something to really, you know, uh, well, you shouldn't keep repeating the same things. That's usually the door is right next to you. Um, but I I have this issue actually even with people at the company where you know you're doing something for a year or two, suddenly it gets boring for example or you think you've mastered it or you're like I should go to this other company and like lead this

第二点，我觉得你得在一件事上一直做下去，才能真正做出点什么。当然，你不应该一直重复同样的动作，因为通常那扇门就在你旁边。但我在公司里其实也经常碰到这种情况：你做一件事做了一两年，突然觉得无聊了，或者你觉得自己已经掌握它了，或者你想「我应该去另一家公司，去主导那个

`[15:44]`

thing but you're just at the cusp of actually getting to the point where it gets interesting

项目」，但其实你正好就站在那个临界点上，再往前一步，事情才刚要变得有意思。

`[15:49]`

or you're not.

也可能并不是。

`[15:50]`

Or you're not. But the difference between those two things is very hard to tell. Yeah. And you need to often push through that. The hard part is the part where you think you're getting bored or you think, you know, because you you you give yourself a lot of I actually called it like um this is feeds into your monk idea, but like the devil is a shape shifter, you know? So, it's kind of like the thing that's whispering in your ear

也可能并不是。但这两种情况之间的差别非常难分辨。是的。而你往往需要硬扛过去。最难的部分，恰恰就是你觉得自己开始无聊、或者你觉得……因为你会给自己找一堆借口。我其实还给它起过一个名字——这正好呼应你说的僧侣那个比喻——就是「魔鬼是会变形的」，你懂吧。就像有个声音在你耳边低语，

`[16:14]`

like, "Hey, it's it's actually your board or this thing isn't aligned with your interests or you should do this or that." Those are all different ways of procrastinating um and not facing the hard thing. So one you need to give it enough time to tell yourself for sure was it actually

说「嘿，其实问题出在你的董事会」，或者「这件事跟你的利益不一致」，或者「你应该去做这个、去做那个」。这些全都只是拖延的不同形式，是在回避那件真正难的事。所以第一，你得给它足够的时间，才能确定地告诉自己，那到底是不是

`[16:30]`

five years is a long time.

五年是很长的一段时间。

`[16:31]`

Oh yeah. So well back to the five years is not that that there was I think the five years was a combination really of us. It was a spiritual journey. I like that you call it the the long you know the strange long trip. a long strange trip.

是啊。那说回这五年，我觉得这五年其实是几方面因素叠加的结果。那是一段精神上的旅程。我很喜欢你的说法，那个「漫长而奇异的旅程」。

`[16:48]`

You have you've had a very long strange trip.

你确实经历了一段非常漫长而奇异的旅程。

`[16:50]`

Yes. Um it is a very long strange trip, but for me it was actually mostly around um deciding and committing to what we're building. Like we had a lot of really good ideas. We did a little bit of each and a lot of them have actually become companies and I'm friends with the people whose companies they've become and all of our analysis of them was correct. We're like this is what's going to happen. It'll stop at this point

是的。那确实是一段非常漫长而奇异的旅程，但对我来说，它主要还是围绕着「决定并且真正投入到我们要做的东西上」。我们当时有很多非常好的点子，每个都做了一点，其中很多后来真的都变成了公司，而且我跟那些公司的创始人都是朋友。我们当时对这些方向的所有分析都是对的，我们会说：这件事接下来会这样发展，然后会在这个点上停住，

`[17:13]`

because of this. But then you get into a place where you're like, okay, what's Especially with venture capital, you're like, what's the biggest thing that I can do? What is the most impactful thing that I can do? And I think if your ambition is really big, this is one of the pitfalls that you can fall into where my co-founder and I were like, no,

因为这个原因。但接着你会掉进另一种状态：好，那什么才是——尤其是拿了风险投资以后，你会想，我能做的最大的事是什么？我能做的最有影响力的事是什么？我觉得如果你的野心特别大，这恰恰是你可能掉进去的陷阱之一。当时我和我的联合创始人就是这样，我们说：不行，

`[17:29]`

we're trying to do the biggest thing that we can do. And so we would keep changing it to be like, well, if we pointed here, it would be even bigger. Meanwhile, stuff is happening in the market, so technology is changing. So, we keep being like, "Oh, now we could do this even bigger thing." And at some point, I was like, "It doesn't actually matter. I'm not trying to do the biggest thing. I'm just going to do what is

我们要做我们能做的最大的事。于是我们就不停地改方向，心想「如果我们把矛头指向这边，盘子会更大」。与此同时市场上一直在变化，技术也在变。所以我们又会说「哦，现在我们可以做一件更大的事了」。到某个时刻我突然意识到：其实这根本不重要。我不是要去做最大的那件事，我只是要去做那件

`[17:51]`

available right now in front of me and commit regardless of where that goes." Um and so the you know like yes it's five years but really there was like two years of us building two years of us kind of being confused and then we kind of decided and rebuilt a few things and committed and then we started seeing kind of the the results immediately. It just took some time for everybody else to hear about it. Uh but once we

……眼前现有的最好选项，然后不管它通向哪里，都全力投入。」嗯，所以说，是啊，表面上是五年，但其实是我们花了两年在做东西，又花了两年处在一种很迷茫的状态，然后我们才终于做了决定，重建了一些东西，全力投入，接着几乎立刻就看到了结果。只是外界需要一段时间才听说这件事。但一旦我们……

`[18:18]`

committed it almost worked instantaneously. I kind of think of everything as like you're going along, you're making a it's a dip and then you come out the other side, right?

……真正投入之后，它几乎是瞬间就跑通了。我一直觉得所有事情都是这样：你一路往前走，会遇到一个低谷，然后你从另一头走出来，对吧？

`[18:26]`

But sometimes not a dip. Sometimes it just keeps going, right?

但有时候那不是低谷。有时候它就一直往下走，对吧？

`[18:29]`

Did you have doubts

你当时有过怀疑吗——

`[18:31]`

uh that it might keep going and people and did people around you say like what are you doing? You're really talented. You could be doing any number of things.

——怀疑它会不会就这么一直往下掉？身边的人有没有跟你说，你到底在干嘛？你这么有才华，明明可以去做很多别的事。

`[18:38]`

Uh yeah, tremend tremendous doubt for sure.

嗯，有，绝对有过巨大的怀疑。

`[18:42]`

I think people were Yes, people would say that. But, you know, I would say that people typically, especially like me and my co-founder Nikolai, like were like they thought we were the some of their smarter friends, right? Um, and felt like we should be able to do whatever we want. And so, um, when we were in that loop, it was also like painful because we're like, hey, we know that we should be able to do this.

我觉得大家……是的，大家确实会那么说。但你知道，通常来说，像我和我的联合创始人 Nikolai，在朋友眼里算是比较聪明的那一类人，对吧？大家会觉得我们应该有能力做成任何自己想做的事。所以当我们陷在那个循环里的时候，其实特别难受，因为我们心里想，嘿，我们知道我们本该做得成这件事。

`[19:07]`

Everybody else is telling us that. And in fact, we have a lot of signals like we raised money. we have when we talk to customers they're really impressed so what is the actual problem like why isn't it working um and that took a lot of introspection but I also think that um like at some point I I feel like we identified what the issue is around like commitment and deciding to do something um and I've said it in like other places

所有人也都这么告诉我们。而且事实上我们手里有很多正面信号：我们融到了钱，我们跟客户聊的时候，他们都印象很深。那到底真正的问题出在哪？为什么它就是跑不起来？这需要大量的自省。但我也觉得，我们在某个时刻确实找到了症结所在，就是关于「承诺」和「做出决定」这件事。我在别的场合也说过——

`[19:35]`

like I I think I realized okay there's a lot of stuff that people don't talk about in building a company they just say it's hard. But what is actually hard? Like in this case, what was hard was having the courage for people that are perceived to be a certain way or smart or whatever to be like, "Hey,

——我意识到，好，创业这件事里有很多东西大家其实从来不谈，他们只会说「这很难」。但到底难在哪？在我们这个例子里，难的是：当你被外界视为某种形象、被当成聪明人之类的时候，你要有勇气说，「嘿，

`[19:51]`

we're just going to pick this thing. I don't care how silly it sounds. I don't care about the shame if it fails publicly. I don't care actually what you think about it." Uh, in fact, when when I decided to commit, I stopped listening to everybody. I was like, I'm not listening to you. I'm not listening to my customers, by the way, who are wrong uh about what they want or h how if you listen to the wrong people at the time

我们就选这条路了。我不在乎它听起来多蠢。我不在乎万一公开失败了会多丢脸。我其实也不在乎你怎么看。」事实上，当我决定全力投入的时候，我就不再听任何人的意见了。我就是：我不听你的，顺便说一句，我也不听客户的——因为他们对自己想要什么的判断是错的。或者说，如果你在错的时机去听错的人的意见，

`[20:15]`

when it's like a small idea, you kill it.

当一个想法还很小的时候，你就把它扼杀掉了。

`[20:17]`

We didn't listen to customer like the first seven years. I was the customer. We just blocked out what they wanted. We built what I wanted and then we flipped it and it became a serum company and we're very customercentric now.

我们头七年根本不听客户的。我自己就是那个客户。我们直接屏蔽掉他们想要的东西，我们做的是我想要的东西。后来我们才掉转过来，变成了一家 CRM 公司，现在我们非常以客户为中心。

`[20:28]`

I think companies founders are talking about just focus on the customer.

我觉得现在创始人们一张口就是：专注于客户就对了。

`[20:32]`

I don't think that's right a lot of times in the early days of a startup. Well, I think it's like

在创业公司的早期，我觉得这话很多时候并不对。嗯，我觉得这就像是……

`[20:36]`

because everyone can do that.

……因为那件事人人都能做到。

`[20:38]`

Yeah. Well, let me tell you what I think about this because it's like if you're like, you know, it's like in computer science hill climbing, right? You need to pick the right hill and then listening to customers is kind of fine-tuning it. Yeah.

对。我来讲讲我的看法，因为这就像计算机科学里的爬山算法，对吧？你得先挑对那座山，然后听客户的意见更像是在做微调。是的。

`[20:48]`

But also I think the reason people talk about listening to customers so much my sense is as the company grows you start to have your own kind of like dynamics that and it's a reminder to hey it's not about what you know I tell people it's not about what Kareem wants because I I I don't want you to listen to me. I want you to do the right thing. Right? So and my what I'm telling you is a proxy to what I think is the right thing. But if

但我也觉得，大家之所以那么强调倾听客户，我的感觉是：随着公司变大，你内部会形成自己的一套动力和惯性，所以这句话是一种提醒——嘿，这件事不取决于……我跟同事们说，这不取决于 Kareem 想要什么，因为我不希望你们听我的。我希望你们做正确的事，对吧？我说的话只是我认为正确的事的一个代理指标。但如果……

`[21:16]`

I tell you to build a feature and it's the wrong feature and you think it's the wrong feature you and you know what the right feature is then what I want is Clay to succeed. I don't want you to do what Kareem so you know people had to be reminded you can't use Kareem told me X as an argument to do something unless there's only very few times where I will tell you 100% this is what I need you to do.

……我让你做一个功能，而那是个错的功能，你也觉得它是错的，而且你知道正确的功能是什么，那么我真正想要的是 Clay 成功。我不是想让你去做 Kareem 说的事。所以我得不断提醒大家：你不能拿「Kareem 让我做 X」当作做某件事的理由，除非是那极少数的场合——那时我会 100% 明确地告诉你，这就是我需要你做的。

`[21:37]`

Okay. I went to a presentation that Elon gave once and he did this thing where he drew all these vectors up and they were all different sizes and they were pointing in different directions. He's like, "The magic behind my companies is I just get the darn vectors aligned,

好。我有次去听 Elon 的一个演讲，他在台上画了一堆向量，大小各不相同，方向也全都不一样。他说：「我这些公司背后的魔法，就是我把这些该死的向量对齐了，

`[21:53]`

right? Have the strongest ones I can and when they're perfectly aligned, things hum." How in your world do you get the darn vectors to align or you don't care that much about it? No, I think that you that is the generally right sentiment, but I think there's many many different ways to build a company, right? And it depends on what it is that you're building and the conviction that you have in that, right? So sometimes in a

对吧？让它们尽可能强，而当它们完美对齐时，整个机器就嗡嗡地运转起来了。」在你的世界里，你是怎么让这些该死的向量对齐的？还是说你其实没那么在意这件事？不，我觉得这个大方向的判断总体上是对的，但我认为建一家公司有非常非常多不同的方式，对吧？这取决于你在建的到底是什么，以及你对它有多大的信念，对吧？所以有时候在……

`[22:17]`

lot of these companies there's like a master plan and it's like here's where we're getting to, here's step one, fill in the blanks, right? And this is we're aligned here. Um I think a lot of times you discover things as you're building. So for me, I think there's two different time periods. there's a period where we don't know exactly what's going on and we people closest to the problem might have more of a sense and then when you

……很多这类公司里，是有一个宏伟蓝图的，就是「我们要去的地方在这里，第一步是这个，剩下的填空」，对吧？大家在这一点上是对齐的。但我觉得很多时候，你是在建的过程中才发现那些东西的。所以对我来说，这里有两个不同的阶段：一个阶段是我们并不确切知道到底发生了什么，而离问题最近的人可能感觉更敏锐；然后当你……

`[22:40]`

hear it from them for me I would say one of my like superpowers is when you tell me something that I think is capital T truth I hear it and it sticks you know

……从他们那儿听到的时候——对我来说，我觉得我的一个超能力是：当你跟我说一件我认为是「大写的真理」的事，我一听就听进去了，而且它会留在我脑子里，你知道吗。

`[22:49]`

it's loud

它很响。

`[22:50]`

yeah it's loud and then when I repeat it to other people they remember it we're there so once that happens then we align everything towards that and we're super clear so there's periods of of like total alignment everybody's pushing in the same direction. This is the singular goal. And there's other periods where you need some slack. You need some like ability for people to make choices and you need to know which one you're in.

对，它很响。然后当我把它复述给别人听，他们也会记住，那我们就到位了。一旦这件事发生，我们就把所有资源都朝那个方向对齐，而且我们会非常清晰。所以确实存在那种完全对齐的阶段——所有人都朝同一个方向使劲，这就是唯一的目标。但也有另一些阶段，你需要留出一些余量，你需要让大家有做选择的空间，而你必须知道自己现在处在哪个阶段。

`[23:11]`

Okay, let me just stick on this for a second. Verun talked about how you operate very well in gray situations, ambiguity, uncertainty, and you value that in employees. What I found is when things were very gray inside of HubSpot, things slowed down,

好，我想在这一点上多停留一下。Varun 说过你在灰色地带、在模糊和不确定的状况下运转得非常好，而且你在员工身上也看重这一点。我的体会是，在 HubSpot 内部，当事情变得非常灰的时候，一切都慢下来了，

`[23:29]`

right? And people would say, "You need to clear the fog." They literally say that to me. And I'd be like, "Okay, we have to there's four decisions that need to be made." Or typically there's one big decision we need to make. Like, Brian, you need to make damn decisions so we can break all these ties and move.

对吧？大家会说，「你得把这层雾拨开。」他们真的会这么跟我说。我就说，好吧，我们有四个决定必须做。或者通常是有一个大决定必须做。就像，Brian，你得做几个该做的决定，好让我们打破这些僵局，动起来。

`[23:43]`

So, I was a little bit more I was like, I let it get gray, but man, the black and white really helped us move.

所以我算是稍微偏向另一边：我会允许事情变灰，但说真的，非黑即白的明确性对我们的推进帮助特别大。

`[23:48]`

I actually agree with you. Um, I really value nuance is what I think he's trying to say. And so, you know, sometimes there's a decision and you know the decision but you're not making it and you need the courage to make it or you don't have enough information or sometimes not making a decision is the correct decision.

我其实同意你的看法。嗯，我很看重的其实是「细微差别」，我想他想表达的是这个。所以你知道，有时候是有一个决定摆在那儿，你也知道该怎么决定，但你就是不做，你需要勇气去做；有时候是你掌握的信息不够；还有时候，不做决定本身就是正确的决定。

`[24:05]`

But it's more about the clarity of you if you know what that is and you're just avoiding it or maybe it's a really hard call and you don't want to make tough trade-offs.

但更关键的是你自己是否清晰：如果你知道答案是什么，只是在回避它；或者也许那是个特别难的判断，你不想去做那些痛苦的取舍。

`[24:12]`

Yes, tough trade-offs. You don't want to do it, right?

对，痛苦的取舍。你就是不想做，对吧？

`[24:14]`

So, I think if you know that, then you need clarity and you need to make it happen. This is kind of like what I tell people around this is we all create, we all love startups. they're doing new things and then as it becomes a big company now we hate the big company but the way it becomes a big company is through this you know somewhat of a of like the path of clarity the generative phase is messy so I'd say that like I am

所以我觉得，如果你心里清楚，那你就需要给出清晰的判断，并且把它落地。我常跟大家讲的大概是这样：我们都在创造，我们都喜欢创业公司，因为它们在做新东西；然后等它变成一家大公司，我们又开始讨厌这家大公司。但它之所以能长成大公司，恰恰是通过这条「走向清晰」的路径。而生成性的那个阶段本身是混乱的。所以我会说，我这个人……

`[24:40]`

capable of holding that mess and

……有能力承住那份混乱，

`[24:42]`

two contradictory ideas in your head

能在脑子里同时装下两个相互矛盾的想法。

`[24:44]`

and are not I would ask people to do it and they do it for a little while and be like that I don't want to do that anymore

而别人不行。我会要求大家这么做，他们能坚持一小段时间，然后就说，我不想再这样了。

`[24:50]`

because it because it's extremely painful

因为这实在是太痛苦了。

`[24:52]`

it hurts their Yes, it hurts their head. It's it's difficult. It requires difficult conversations. So, I don't think everybody can do it, but I do think that um the more you trust people with that, some segment of them will value that. And I remember like being an employee and I would have valued that.

会让他们脑子疼——对，很烧脑。这很难，需要一些很艰难的对话。所以我不觉得每个人都能做到，但我确实认为，你越是敢把这些事坦诚地交给员工，其中总会有一部分人非常珍视这一点。我记得我自己当员工的时候，我就会很珍惜这种做法。

`[25:10]`

Yeah. Okay. Just going back to your seven year five years through the desert in your two years at some point you said this one you had a very broad vision and then you're like this one use case going to work.

嗯。好。我们再回到你那七年——前五年在沙漠里跋涉，后两年跑起来。你之前提到，一开始你有一个非常宏大的愿景，然后某个时刻你意识到：就是这一个用例能跑通。

`[25:22]`

Yeah. and you picked it outbound sales marketing whatever you want to call it go to market engineer eventually did that kind of hurt you that you had this big broad platformy thing and then like we're going to really n like narrowing

对，你就选定了它——outbound、销售、市场，随你怎么叫，最后叫 go to market engineer。你本来有一个大而全的平台级构想，然后要这样收窄下来，这个过程会不会让你挺难受的？

`[25:34]`

yeah that was very very difficult and I I'd say that um well I'll say two things so one is that um you know it's interesting that you perceive me as this or like people perceived me as this before my friends actually in the past perceived me as extremely aggressive really intense and people can't even imagine that right now. Um,

对，那非常非常难。我想说两点。第一点，很有意思的是，你现在这样看我，或者说大家现在是这样看我的，但我过去的朋友其实觉得我极度好胜、非常凶猛，现在的人根本想象不出来。

`[25:54]`

I find you intense,

我觉得你挺凶猛的啊。

`[25:55]`

which I still am, but it's like contained um, and directed and hopefully like more, you know, something that I'd like to open up when necessary. Um but on the on the point of like picking so I would say that um it was actually my co-founder Nikolai who identified this segment and use case and I was finding it very challenging to commit to this and I think he was too because I'm like how is this related to like you know we

我现在也还是，只不过那股劲儿被收住了、有了方向，希望在必要的时候我还能把它放出来。回到选定方向这件事：其实是我的联合创始人 Nicolae 找到了这个客户群和这个用例，而我当时很难下决心押上去，我觉得他自己也一样。因为我会想，这跟我们最初想做的事到底有什么关系？我们本来是——

`[26:27]`

wanted to give the power of programming to more people

——想把编程的能力交到更多人手里。

`[26:30]`

and that still lives on in the fact that we called it go to market engineering and to like the idiosyncr ratic way in which like all the features are built to give you that like maximum power and flexibility, but we would yo-yo between kind of like maximum power and flexibility and hey, it should just work out of the box simplicity. And at some point we're like okay, let's just commit um

这个初心其实一直还活着——体现在我们把它命名为 go to market engineering，也体现在我们做每一个功能时那种很特别的方式，就是要给你最大的能力和灵活性。但我们会在两极之间来回摇摆：一边是极致的能力和灵活性，一边是「开箱即用、就该简单好用」。到某个时刻我们说，好，那就定下来吧——

`[26:52]`

power and flexibility

——能力和灵活性。

`[26:53]`

and to the power and flexibility which was the exact opposite of what everybody believed would work and what customers said like I'll give you people everybody has copied this waterfall enrichment concept, right? Um, but you know what? If you talk to customers, they're like,

对，就押在能力和灵活性上。而这恰恰跟所有人认为会成功的方向、跟客户嘴上说的完全相反。举个例子，现在人人都在抄 waterfall enrichment 这个概念，对吧？但你要是真去问客户，他们会说——

`[27:07]`

"Listen, I just want the number of people that work at a company. I don't care where you're getting it from. I just want to wave a magic wand and do that." And my my argument has been like once the technology is there for that, we will do that. But at the moment, the best technology is put everything together, give you transparency, and speed up that process. That's what actually solves the problem. You can say like, "I want to go from New York to

「听着，我就想知道一家公司有多少员工。我不在乎你从哪儿弄来的，我只想挥一下魔法棒，事情就搞定了。」而我一直的回答是：等技术真能做到那一步，我们一定会那么做。但在当下，最好的技术方案就是把所有数据源整合在一起、给你完全的透明度、并且把这个过程提速。这才是真正解决问题的办法。你当然可以说，「我想从纽约去——」

`[27:29]`

London in like one hour, but I can't do that for you. So what's the next best thing?

——伦敦，一个小时到。」但我做不到啊。那退而求其次，最好的方案是什么？

`[27:35]`

Yeah,

嗯。

`[27:35]`

we have a couple things in common between the companies. We very early we said we're going to create this category called MM marketing. It really worked. You've done the same thing with go to market engineer. It appears to be really working.

我们两家公司有几个共同点。我们很早就说，我们要开创一个品类，叫 MM marketing，后来真的做成了。你用 go to market engineer 做了同样的事，看起来也真的跑通了。

`[27:48]`

Yeah.

是啊。

`[27:48]`

Everybody in their brother asked me how to create a category and there's a little bit of magic in it.

所有人都跑来问我怎么创造一个品类，这里面确实有点说不清的玄学成分。

`[27:53]`

Right.

对。

`[27:53]`

Can you talk about how you did it, the decision on the name, how you propagated it? Advice for so many founders who want to do this. You know the common advice about this is don't do it right and it's very challenging which it is. I think

你能讲讲你们是怎么做到的吗？名字是怎么定下来的、又是怎么传播出去的？有太多创始人都想干这件事。关于这个话题，常见的建议是「别干」，对吧，因为太难了——确实很难。我觉得——

`[28:07]`

you I don't think you can create necessarily a category. You can take something that is happening and name it.

我不认为你真的能凭空「创造」一个品类。你能做的，是把一件已经在发生的事，给它起个名字。

`[28:14]`

That's what we did

我们当年就是这么干的。

`[28:15]`

right and then give it uh like put a circle around it. Be like here give it some fuzzy boundaries which is important. Um and then allow something that's already happening. It's kind of like a wave and you're like okay I'm going to name this wave. I'm going to give it uh credibility. But for us, the way you know we did it was uh one we started noticing people use the term GTM instead of sales in the most forward-looking organizations and the

对，然后再给它画一个圈，划出边界——而且这个边界得是模糊的，这一点很重要。让一件本来就在发生的事情被命名。有点像一道浪，你说：好，我来给这道浪起个名字，我来给它背书。具体到我们，做法是：第一，我们注意到，在那些最有前瞻性、也最愿意用我们的组织里，大家开始用 GTM 这个词，而不是 sales。

`[28:42]`

ones that would adopt us. So we decided to use that and then we were like well what are they doing? there. We used to have like a term called customer engineer where it's just like it's kind of like forward deployed engineer and we're like what what if you actually the best categories I think are like two words stuck together right um because I think language is evolving like imagine if you had like uh Roomba what would you

所以我们决定就用这个词。然后我们想：那他们在里头到底在干什么？我们以前有个叫法是 customer engineer，有点像 forward deployed engineer。我们就想，要是……我觉得最好的品类名往往是两个词拼在一起，对吧？因为语言本身是在演化的。你想想 Roomba——假如吸尘器还没被发明出来，你会怎么——

`[29:05]`

call it before you invented like a vacuum you know it would be really hard to name it

——怎么称呼它？那真的会非常难起名字。

`[29:09]`

y

嗯。

`[29:10]`

who came up with the name and when you came up with you're like we're going to create a category around it or did it just sort of started happening?

这个名字是谁想出来的？你们想到的时候，是就打定主意要围绕它做一个品类，还是它自己慢慢就跑起来了？

`[29:15]`

No. So Verun and I were chatting about what we should call our own people who are helping customer fine

不是。当时是 Varun 和我在聊，我们自己那些帮客户落地的人到底该叫什么。

`[29:21]`

and then I was like let's just call them go to market engineers

然后我就说：干脆就叫他们 go to market engineer 吧。

`[29:24]`

as opposed to now they might have called it forward deployment engineer.

而不是现在大家可能会用的 forward deployed engineer。

`[29:27]`

Yeah. Or customer engineer but we wanted it to be unique to our thing and and actually credit to uh Mike Rol who was one of our early investors. I would meet with him and he'd be like we should own a title. And I was like, well, how are we going to do that, you know? And so when we were like talking about this,

对。或者叫 customer engineer。但我们希望这个名字是我们独有的。这里要感谢 Mike Rol，他是我们最早的投资人之一。我每次见他，他都会说：我们应该拥有一个职位名称。我说，这怎么做得到啊？所以当我们聊到这件事的时候——

`[29:43]`

we're like, okay, it's go to market engineer. Let's call our own team go to market engineers because they're helping you think about your go to market in a systematic way. So basically, I think it needs to connect to some of the core assumptions about your product. So if you think about clay, by the way, um most of the decisions are obvious. So this is where the clarity is important.

我们就说：好，那就是 go to market engineer。我们把自己的团队就叫 go to market engineer，因为他们是在帮你系统性地思考你的 go to market。所以我觉得，这个名字必须跟你产品最核心的那几条假设连得上。顺便说一句，你看 Clay，大部分决策其实都是显而易见的——所以「清晰」在这里特别重要。

`[30:03]`

I I think people get really confused when they hear me say like you should live in ambiguity all that stuff. There are certain things that need to be super clear and living in the ambiguity allows you to one day get to the clarity. So for us some of the decisions that we made that are super important are we are going to be for a technical user. We're going to call them the goto market engineer. We're going to be the most

我觉得大家听我说「你要能待在模糊之中」这类话的时候，会特别困惑。有些事情是必须极度清晰的，而恰恰是因为你能在模糊里待得住，才有一天能抵达那种清晰。对我们来说，有几个特别重要的决定：我们要服务的是技术型用户，我们把他们叫做 go to market engineer；我们要做最强大、最——

`[30:25]`

powerful and the most flexible. We're not going to own the data. are going to be a data marketplace and we're going to charge in usage and not seats

——最灵活的产品；我们不自己拥有数据，我们要做一个数据市场；我们采用 usage-based pricing，按用量收费，而不是按 seat 收费。

`[30:33]`

clear

很清晰。

`[30:34]`

right now those decisions do not change and have not changed and actually if you look at the product all the decisions are super clear if you go back to that and we're like hey does it make it more powerful does it make it more flexible over simplicity one of our things is power and flexibility over simplicity not because we don't want it to be simple but when they conflict we give you power because it's a technical user

对，这些决定到今天都没变，也从来没变过。而且你去看产品，所有决策都非常清晰——只要回到这几条上：这会让它更强大吗？会让它更灵活吗？我们有一条原则是「能力和灵活性优先于简单」，不是因为我们不想让它简单，而是当两者冲突的时候，我们优先给你能力，因为我们面向的是技术型用户。

`[30:58]`

Now we can also sell it to you in a particular way. Uh and it was super important for me for it to be PLG by the way. That's another reason why it took so long cuz this is a very difficult product to make it usable use and PLG typically don't fit

同时我们还可以用一种特定的方式把它卖给你。顺便说，对我来说它必须是 PLG，这一点极其重要。这也是为什么花了这么久——因为这是一个非常难做到好用的产品，而这类复杂产品和 PLG 通常是不搭的。

`[31:13]`

right um

对，嗯……

`[31:14]`

or not hard to use but powerful.

或者说不是“难用”，而是“强大”。

`[31:16]`

Powerful. Yeah. And so needed to be a type of customer who can pick it up and hack around with it. And then the usage based meant I really like this thing that I I think I was reading something a long time ago around like Hegel's like idea of like thesis and antithesis and then leads to synthesis. So that's like how it's like a theory of history. And then there was this guy Furbach who's another philosopher who was um also

强大。对。所以我们需要的是那种能自己上手、能折腾它的客户。然后是 usage-based pricing——我特别喜欢这个思路。我很久以前读到过一些东西，大概是关于黑格尔那个正题、反题、然后导向合题的想法。那基本上是一种历史理论。后来还有个叫费尔巴哈的哲学家，他也在……

`[31:42]`

talking he kind of flipped around his whole thesis and was like you know Heggo's thing is like we're going towards God or gist or whatever and Furbach was like actually we're already like the complete thing and we are um projecting like the idea of God is like our own projection of our own misgivings and things like that.

……他基本上把黑格尔整套论述给翻了过来。他说，黑格尔讲的是我们正在走向上帝、走向 Geist（绝对精神）什么的；而费尔巴哈说，其实我们本身就已经是那个完整的东西了，是我们在投射——“上帝”这个观念其实是我们把自己的不足投射出去的结果，诸如此类。

`[32:02]`

Wait, what's this got to do with go to marketing?

等等，这跟 GTM 有什么关系？

`[32:04]`

So let me let me bring it back for you. But this welcome to my mind. Okay, I like it.

我马上把它绕回来。不过嘛——欢迎来到我的脑子里。行，我喜欢。

`[32:08]`

So to me the interesting thing, this is more of a like fact that I think is interesting, but the interesting thing is like taking something and then flipping it on its head is a great technique for innovation and then taking that thing to its natural conclusion. So you can, you know, in philosophy you would like study these two theorists and like look at their ideas, but it's the same thing here. It's like, hey, what if

对我来说有意思的地方——这更多是我觉得有趣的一个事实——有意思的地方在于：把一个东西拿过来，整个倒过来，这是一种极好的创新方法；然后再把倒过来的那个东西推到它自然的终点。所以你在哲学里会去研究这两位理论家、去看他们的观点，但这里是一回事。就像，嘿，如果……

`[32:30]`

we took everybody told me that you should sell to salespeople if you're in go to market um and it needs to be super simple and it's seat based. Flip everything around, you have a new product. Right now, is this a better product than the old generation of products? You have to have a thesis around that as well, which we do. Um,

……所有人都告诉我，做 GTM 就该卖给销售人员，产品必须超级简单，而且要按坐席收费。那就把这些全部反过来，你就有了一个新产品。那现在的问题是：这个产品真的比上一代产品更好吗？这一点你也得有自己的 thesis（判断），而我们有。嗯……

`[32:47]`

but I think that's kind of the approach that I took at the time that helped us make all of the other decisions later easy.

……但我觉得这大致就是我当时采取的思路，正是它让我们后来所有其他决策都变得很容易。

`[32:57]`

Fell out of it.

后面的一切都是顺着它推出来的。

`[32:58]`

Yes. the name how did it propagate?

是的。那这个名字——它是怎么传播开的？

`[33:01]`

Um so you called your folks JTM engineers.

嗯，你把你们自己团队的人叫做 GTM engineers（GTM 工程师）。

`[33:04]`

Yeah. So the go to market engineers this is a I think this is very subtle and very tricky right because if you go out I think you guys did a different thing where you were like we are going to like go out and talk about this and we did something very similar like there was SEO and blogging and all this stuff and we said that's inbound marketing and by the way what was good about it was there was an enemy. No one liked outbound

对，go-to-market engineers。这件事我觉得非常微妙、也非常讲究，因为如果你大张旗鼓地出去说——我觉得你们当年做的是另一种打法，你们是直接站出来到处讲这件事。我们做过很类似的事：当时有 SEO、有写博客这一堆东西，我们就说，这叫 inbound marketing。顺带说一句，这么做的好处是有一个“敌人”。没人喜欢 outbound……

`[33:25]`

marketing and outbound marketing was a word inbound wasn't

……marketing，而且 outbound marketing 本来就是个现成的词，inbound 不是。

`[33:28]`

right.

对。

`[33:29]`

But we just flogged it like we wrote a book, we wrote articles, we did a conference.

但我们就是往死里推它——写了本书，写了一堆文章，还办了个大会。

`[33:32]`

So we took the exact opposite approach and again yeah which is like don't I mean some people don't even know that we came up with this right?

而我们采取的是完全相反的做法。对，就是——别去……我的意思是，有些人甚至都不知道这个词是我们提出来的，对吧？

`[33:40]`

It's kind of like you need to think of concentric circles that it's going to evolve. So we talked to agencies

这有点像是，你得用同心圆的方式去想它的扩散路径。所以我们先去找那些代理公司（agency）……

`[33:45]`

who are already doing this work and uh we started talking about how our own team is called go to market engineers. they started adopting it because it was a cool term and showed up on their LinkedIn and then they uh we we basically empowered them with all the information all the things to make them more successful and look good and because they needed business. So here's a big

……他们本来就在做这类活儿。然后我们开始对外讲，我们自己的团队叫 go-to-market engineers。他们就开始用这个说法了，因为这个词听起来很酷，还能挂到他们的 LinkedIn 上。接着我们基本上就是把所有信息、所有能让他们做得更成功、更有面子的东西都给到他们，因为他们需要生意。所以这里有个很大的……

`[34:10]`

this is the same as us like we educated and we gave them everything they needed. Yes.

这跟我们当年一模一样：我们做教育，把他们需要的一切都给他们。没错。

`[34:14]`

To create an inbound marketing agency.

好让他们能开一家 inbound marketing 代理公司。

`[34:16]`

Exactly. And the only part is that we try to not take credit for it or be involved in the conversation and we leave the conversation open and this may be part of the ambiguity thing. So we're not like here's what a goto market engineer is. We're letting the market evolve and it's actually broadening as it should. You know if you're using claude you're a go to market engineer.

正是。唯一不同的是，我们尽量不去邀功，也不太介入这场讨论，我们让讨论保持开放——这可能也跟前面说的“保留模糊性”有关。所以我们不会跳出来说“GTM 工程师的定义就是这样”。我们让市场自己去演化，而它确实在变宽，这也是应该的。你想，如果你在用 Claude，那你就是个 GTM 工程师。

`[34:35]`

Go to market engineering and why I think the category is a category is that it's a point of view on the world. It's not a technology. It's like how do you run your go to market team where you build tools where you test hypothesis and then with AI it makes all of that much much easier since code is cheap right so um first the agencies but you needed and again obviously you know this because it's like agencies need the work so

GTM engineering——我之所以认为这是一个真正的品类，是因为它是一种看待世界的视角，而不是一项技术。它讲的是：你怎么运营你的 GTM 团队——你去造工具，你去验证假设。而有了 AI 之后，这一切都变得容易太多了，因为写代码变得很便宜。所以，先是那些代理公司，但你需要——当然你肯定懂这个，因为代理公司是需要活儿的，所以……

`[35:00]`

they're going to be if you were targeting companies no one wants to tell you how they grew in fact you know our new kind of internal tagline for clay is go to market infrastructure to grow in ways your competitors can't. That's the whole point of it. It's like how do you do something that no one can copy,

……他们才愿意讲。而如果你直接去找企业客户，没人愿意告诉你他们是怎么增长起来的。其实我们 Clay 内部现在的新 slogan 就是：GTM infrastructure，让你以竞争对手无法复制的方式实现增长。这就是全部要点。也就是说，你怎么才能做出别人复制不了的东西？

`[35:16]`

right?

对吧。

`[35:17]`

Turns out people are followers,

事实证明，大多数人都是跟风者。

`[35:18]`

right? But the thing is um that's why you need to build a system that you can update quickly because it the just the path to people copying you is going to be fast and you need to understand your business well enough to come up with the next hypothesis or AI needs to understand your business well enough.

对吧？但问题在于，正因如此你才需要搭一套能快速迭代更新的系统。因为别人抄你的速度只会越来越快，你必须足够了解自己的业务，才能提出下一个假设——或者说，AI 必须足够了解你的业务。

`[35:33]`

Okay. So you you come up with a clever name,

好。所以你先想出了一个很聪明的名字，

`[35:36]`

right?

对吧？

`[35:36]`

You called your people that you started educating the agencies on it. They like the name. and they started using it and it just sort of slowly spread. Is that kind of

你先这么称呼自己的团队，然后开始拿它去教育那些代理公司。他们喜欢这个名字，就开始用，然后它就这样慢慢扩散开了。大概就是……

`[35:45]`

it's how you did it?

……你们就是这么做的？

`[35:46]`

I would say it quickly spread in certain areas and then we provided some scaffolding around um like we published a couple of articles but we tried to stay in the background of this.

我会说，它在某些圈子里传得很快，然后我们在外围搭了一些“脚手架”，比如我们发了几篇文章，但我们尽量让自己待在幕后。

`[36:00]`

Yeah.

嗯。

`[36:00]`

Um

嗯……

`[36:01]`

we did not we were competing with content marketing at the time.

我们没有……我们当时是在跟 content marketing 竞争。

`[36:05]`

Yeah.

嗯。

`[36:05]`

And so we were aggressive with it. We didn't want to lose that kind of that makes sense. Yeah.

所以我们在这件事上非常激进。我们不想失去那种……嗯，能理解。是的。

`[36:09]`

Yeah. Um, I think the main thing is that we came up with a I don't know if you guys thought about it as a title or a category. We thought about it as a title and I knew that one day it would be the category.

对。嗯，我觉得关键在于，我们想出了一个……我不知道你们当时是把它当成一个头衔，还是一个品类。我们是把它当成一个头衔的，而我知道总有一天它会变成一个品类。

`[36:21]`

We didn't think of it that way. We thought of it as like a new way to go, a new way to market,

我们当时不是那么想的。我们把它想成一种新的做法，一种新的市场打法，

`[36:26]`

right? So, so that

对吧？所以，所以那个……

`[36:27]`

yours more a title. It was different.

你们的更像是一个头衔。那不太一样。

`[36:28]`

Yeah. So, we thought about it as a title and we wanted the people to call themselves that. And so, we were focused on that. And then the idea was that we earn the right to call it a category. And by the way, I think time really matters in all these things. It's the storytelling. So if you go too early and start telling the story, in fact, people push back against you. Uh so you need to pick the moment where there's so many

对。所以我们是把它当成一个头衔来做的，我们希望大家愿意这么称呼自己。所以我们的重心一直放在这上面。然后思路是，我们要挣得把它叫做一个品类的资格。顺便说一句，我觉得时机在这些事情上真的很关键，这就是讲故事的门道。如果你太早就开始讲这个故事，人们其实反而会抵触你。所以你得挑准那个时刻，那时候已经有非常多的……

`[36:49]`

people who are invested in this. You know, we had our own community round. So there are people who we've proven. And by the way, we have like organic. The other thing that we did that's super important by the way is we have clay clubs in over like 80 places in the world.

……人真正投入到这件事里了。你知道，我们还做过自己的社区轮融资。所以有一批人是我们已经验证过的。另外我们还有很多自发生长的东西。顺便说，我们做的另一件特别重要的事是，我们在全世界 80 多个地方都有 Clay Club。

`[37:04]`

We played these same games. They worked. These things worked. just help them.

我们玩的是同一套打法。它们奏效了。这些东西真的管用。就是去帮他们。

`[37:09]`

Um, but but the key thing around that is like now that people have actually made a lot of money from it and that it's helpful to them,

嗯，但关键点在于，现在大家是真的靠它赚到了很多钱，而且它对他们确实有帮助，

`[37:17]`

you call it the category and it's important that the category is bigger than you. That's I think the last piece that's super clear um and continues to evolve. Right. Another thing you have in common with HubSpot is the whole agency thing was the sec. We started as direct.

这时候你才去把它叫做一个品类。而且很重要的一点是，这个品类要比你自己更大。我觉得这是最后一块，特别清楚，而且还在不断演进。对。你们和 HubSpot 还有一个共同点，就是代理商这整件事是第二条渠道。我们一开始做的是直销。

`[37:33]`

Yes.

是的。

`[37:34]`

And I was the first salesman. Um, and we were quite good at it actually. And then we had this one sales rep named Pete Capuda.

而我就是第一个销售。嗯，其实我们干得还挺不错的。后来我们有一个销售代表，叫 Pete Caputa。

`[37:43]`

And

然后

`[37:44]`

great name.

名字真好。

`[37:44]`

Yeah. And he and we had a lot of agencies interested. And I remember it was like two, three years in I was like the product's not ready for someone else to sell it. It's not mature enough.

是啊。他……当时有很多代理商对我们感兴趣。我记得那大概是做到第二、三年的时候，我心想产品还没准备好让别人来卖，还不够成熟。

`[37:54]`

It's like don't call on them. But we also had like like a weekend you could you could do anything you wanted on the weekends or after hours. It's kind of like Google's 20% done.

我就说别去找他们。但我们当时也有那种规矩：周末或者下班之后，你想做什么都行。有点像 Google 的 20% 时间。

`[38:02]`

Yeah.

嗯。

`[38:03]`

And one weekend he started calling on him and you can just look at the in the histogram of the numbers and it's typically a bell curve but he was like 4x the next month in revenue. I was like I guess Pete was right. And then we started building a whole program. It's like a separate company to engage with these people and take care of them.

结果有一个周末他就自己去找这些代理商了。你去看那组数字的直方图，通常是个钟形曲线，但他下个月的收入直接是别人的 4 倍。我心想，看来 Pete 是对的。于是我们就开始搭一整套项目，几乎像是一家独立的公司，专门去对接和服务这些人。

`[38:22]`

Yeah. How how did that happen to you in advice for people who want to create an alternate? So many people come to me want to create a second channel and it's very hard.

是啊。那你们是怎么走到这一步的？对那些想开辟另一条渠道的人有什么建议？很多人来找我说想做第二条渠道，但这真的非常难。

`[38:30]`

Yeah, it's very hard. I mean and we it's you know I don't know that we've fully cracked that but I think that um

对，非常难。我是说，我们……你知道，我不确定我们是不是已经彻底把它搞明白了，但我觉得，嗯……

`[38:37]`

I would say like a big part of this was Verun as well like we were in WhatsApp groups with people who own agencies. We we I feel like the the the answer that I think people don't really want to know is there's there's no playbook. We were being honest and genuinely authentic.

我会说，这里面很大一部分要归功于 Varun。我们会跟那些开代理公司的人待在同一个 WhatsApp 群里。我觉得，那个大家其实并不太想听到的答案是：根本没有什么现成的打法。我们只是很诚实，是发自内心的真诚。

`[38:54]`

The mission is how do we help companies grow and we're like we're going to help you grow no matter what. Back again to some of my pieces around like how I was operating. I was not operating and maybe you were reading this correctly. I'm not like I am trying to make Clay successful. I was like I'm doing what I think is interesting and I hope that is aligned with what makes Clay successful.

我们的使命是怎么帮助公司成长，我们的态度就是：不管怎样，我们都要帮你把生意做大。这又回到我前面讲的我自己做事的方式。我并不是……也许你之前的判断是对的，我不是那种“我要让 Clay 成功”的心态。我是“我在做我觉得有意思的事，我希望这件事跟让 Clay 成功是一致的”。

`[39:17]`

I'm interested in that. uh but actually I want to make these people successful and they felt that genuiness and we did really crazy you know Verun he's he's uh I think he was talking to someone on WhatsApp and the person was having trouble fixing something on Clayton he was like I'm coming over to your house right now and the guy was like don't come he was like no I'm coming and they became really good friends

我对那个感兴趣。呃，但其实我真正想的是让这些人成功，他们能感受到那份真诚。我们做过一些挺疯狂的事，你知道 Varun 他……我记得有一次他在 WhatsApp 上跟一个人聊，那人在 Clay 里有个东西怎么都弄不好，他就说“我现在就去你家”，对方说“别来了”，他说“不行，我就要来”。后来他们成了特别好的朋友。

`[39:40]`

so we built

所以我们建立起了……

`[39:41]`

genuine authentic friendships with a lot of the people and some people left their job to start cleances Yeah. And we were just kind of on that journey with them. Uh truly.

……跟很多人之间真诚而真实的友谊。有些人甚至辞了工作去开 Clay 代理公司。是的。我们就这样一路陪着他们走。真的是这样。

`[39:54]`

Yeah.

嗯。

`[39:54]`

I think if in our heads

我觉得，如果我们心里

`[39:57]`

we were thinking, hey, we're trying to create this category and we need them to do X, Y, and Z. People are very good people readers, by the way, and they can read your intention. Um similar to VCs, right? That's their top thing is they can read your intention. So if you're going to go there and fake confidence,

想的是“嘿，我们要造一个品类，我们需要他们去做 X、Y、Z”，那就不行了。顺便说，人是很会读人的，他们能看出你的意图。嗯，跟 VC 一样，对吧？他们最厉害的本事就是能看穿你的意图。所以如果你过去装出一副自信的样子，

`[40:14]`

that's not going to work. You need to truly believe that you have the magic sauce.

那是行不通的。你必须真心相信自己手里握着那个独门秘方。

`[40:19]`

Another thing that everyone's coming to me asking about is pricing and you guys announced a pricing change. You caught a bunch of heat for it and you responded in an interesting way. All CEOs seem to go through like getting punched in the face by the market and you just you just kind of got punched. Um I don't actually care that much about the pricing. Talk about the backlash to it and talk about what you did and kind of your philosophy

另一个所有人都来问我的话题是定价。你们宣布了一次定价调整，为此挨了不少骂，而你们的回应方式很有意思。所有 CEO 好像都要经历被市场当面来一拳的时刻，你们最近就刚挨了这么一拳。嗯，我其实没那么在意定价本身。聊聊那次的反弹，聊聊你们做了什么，以及你在这件事上的理念

`[40:42]`

around it. I would say the backlash is minimal or at least we perceive it to be minimal. We did

……吧。我会说那次反弹其实很小，或者至少我们感知到的是很小。我们做了

`[40:47]`

loud to me,

在我看来动静挺大的，

`[40:48]`

right? I think like we did a bunch of like analysis around like sentiment analysis on some of these things and we're like it was like 70% neutral, you know, somewhat some negative people and I think all the people that were quite negative or loud about it had some self-interest. Uh so, you know, they owned something where it would benefit them for this to not work. um we haven't seen kind of that negativity show up in

是吧？我觉得，我们其实做了不少分析，比如对这些反馈做情绪分析，结果大概是 70% 中性，你知道，还有一部分负面的人。而我觉得，那些特别负面、声音特别大的人，多少都有自己的利益在里面。呃，你知道，他们手里有些东西，是这件事做不成才对他们有好处。嗯，我们并没有看到这种负面情绪反映在

`[41:14]`

the numbers. So that's another way in which I know but the the way that we dealt with it

数据上。所以这是我判断的另一个依据。不过我们处理这件事的方式是……

`[41:19]`

I think that's the interesting part.

我觉得那才是有意思的地方。

`[41:21]`

Yeah. And you know I don't know there's like a huge backlash against Ferrari's new like electric thing. And by the way I was reading there was a huge backlash when they had their SUV which they don't call an SUV. It's an FUV or whatever but now it's completely sold out.

对。你知道，法拉利新出的那个电动车好像招来了特别大的反弹。顺便说一句，我看到过，他们当年出 SUV 的时候也是一片骂声——他们不叫它 SUV，叫什么 FUV 之类的，但现在完全卖光了。

`[41:34]`

Okay. Um so anyway that back to like our pricing change the the things that help us withstand something like that is like one what is our conviction in our thinking right so we're like hey we bundled like credits credits cost data and whatever we act what value we provide and we were big enough at this point to and thought that we were well known enough that we can break it up into two axes and then make it so that it's clear where what you're paying

好。嗯，总之回到我们那次定价调整。能让我们扛住那种压力的，第一是我们对自己想法的笃定，对吧。就是说，我们之前把 credits、数据成本这些都打包在一起，跟我们实际提供的价值混在一块儿；到那个时候我们已经足够大、也自认为足够有名，可以把它拆成两个维度，让你清楚地知道自己每一笔钱花在哪儿。

`[42:01]`

where and also make it cheaper

而且还更便宜了。

`[42:03]`

splitting splitting compute and splitting the data.

把算力和数据拆开。

`[42:06]`

Right. Exactly. Got it.

对，没错。明白了。

`[42:07]`

And so now that we have compute and data um and we trusted the sophistication of our like um customers to eventually understand that um and also understand that it's truly in their benefit like we calculated it and we're like this will be cheaper for you on the short term and on the long term we should all make more money, right? But the other thing is that we were absolutely transparent in our document. Um it couldn't be more

所以现在我们有算力和数据两块。嗯，我们也信任客户的成熟度，相信他们最终能理解这一点，也能明白这确实对他们有利——我们算过账，短期内对你更便宜，长期看大家都能赚更多，对吧？但另一件事是，我们那份文档写得绝对透明。透明到不能再透明了。

`[42:31]`

trans. literally was word for word what we were saying internally in our meetings. Um and that's a common thing for us in the way that we operate and I think maybe unusual and surprising to people.

字面意义上，一字一句就是我们内部开会时说的原话。嗯，这对我们来说是很常见的做事方式，但我想对外人来说可能挺不寻常、挺意外的。

`[42:42]`

Yeah. It disarms them.

对，这会让对方卸下防备。

`[42:44]`

Yeah. And it it goes back to this

对。这又回到那句话——

`[42:47]`

equals trust. It's not even correlated with it's like equals it.

透明就等于信任。都不是相关性的问题，是直接等于。

`[42:50]`

It equals trust.

它就等于信任。

`[42:52]`

And in order to do that, you need the right channel. You need to be talking to the right people. Otherwise, the transparency could actually be damaging to you. But I think that's like where the nuance believing in nuance and that even though everybody wants you to speak in bite-sized pieces, we're like, "Hey,

而要做到这一点，你得有合适的渠道，得跟对的人沟通。否则透明反而可能伤到你自己。但我觉得这正是那种「相信细微差别」的地方——虽然所有人都希望你把话说成一口一个的小碎片，我们却说，「嘿，

`[43:06]`

we're going to actually show all of our work even though it's long." Um, and then other people will actually read it and digest it.

我们就是要把全部推演过程摊开给你看，哪怕很长。」嗯，然后真的会有人把它读完、消化掉。

`[43:12]`

Yeah. I I I thought that was very well handled. Um, I want to kind of shift to kind of you as CEO. What's your day like?

对。我我我觉得那件事你们处理得非常漂亮。嗯，我想把话题转到你作为 CEO 这一面。你每天都在干什么？

`[43:21]`

Um, I have like two terms for it. One is I'm a momentum detective, right? And so I just go around the company and I love this.

嗯，我有两个说法。一个是，我是个「势能侦探」，对吧。我就在公司里到处转——我特别喜欢这个说法。

`[43:30]`

Yeah. I find momentum is so hard to get if you lose it. And so anytime you see a area of the company losing momentum, that's where your focus should be because sometimes you just need to grease it and then it keeps

对。我发现势能这东西一旦丢了就特别难再找回来。所以只要你看到公司哪个部分正在失去势能，那就是你该投入注意力的地方，因为有时候你只需要上点润滑油，它就又转起来了。

`[43:41]`

Oh. So you don't hop on where the momentum's hot, you hop on when it's starting to wayne.

哦。所以你不是往势头最旺的地方扑，而是在势头开始衰减的时候切进去。

`[43:45]`

Yes. So well, it's both, right? Um you want to know the places where it's hot, but often those places don't need you. What is the unique thing that you can do as a CEO, right? I'll give you a couple of examples of things that for example I've done that created momentum and then places where I've like kept the momentum going but

对。嗯，其实两者都有，对吧。你想知道哪些地方最火热，但那些地方往往并不需要你。作为 CEO，你能做的独一无二的事情是什么？我给你举几个例子，有些是我做过、创造出势能的，也有些是我把势能维持下去的。

`[44:04]`

you know the go to market engineering right like getting that right and then you know we had Mishi and Verun write that article but like getting that and putting this is what we're doing push through with it and then we came up with this concept of go to market alpha I was talking to a friend of mine and we were like hey this is the term and then I went back and I was talking to a couple people, it resonated with them and we're

比如 GTM engineering 这件事，把它想清楚做对；后来 Mishi 和 Varun 写了那篇文章。但先得把它定下来，然后说「这就是我们要做的」，一路推下去。再后来我们提出了 GTM alpha 这个概念——我跟一个朋友聊天，我们就说，嘿，就用这个词。然后我回去又跟几个人聊，他们都很有共鸣，我们就

`[44:27]`

like this is it. Now we use this in all of our uh like and you know people initially were like alpha that sounds like really nerdy you know

说，就是它了。现在我们所有场合都在用这个词。嗯，你知道，一开始有人说「alpha 听起来太书呆子气了吧」，

`[44:35]`

the customers are nerdy

我们的客户本来就书呆子啊。

`[44:37]`

right but or just like it's too fin and I'm like people will get it from finance you don't even need to know as soon as I say it people oh yeah you need to have some competitive advantage but it's a better word for it

对。或者说「太金融味儿了」。我说，大家从金融那边就能理解它，你甚至都不用特意去了解——我一说出口，别人就「哦对，你得有某种竞争优势」。但这个词表达得更好。

`[44:47]`

so we have a couple of these things where every once in a while there's one idea that generates momentum um I'll give you another idea we needed a feature that we call audiences which you you know, allows you to have like a concept of a company or a person in the product so that you can aggregate signals on it. Um, and it's backed by a CRM. So, we're not building a CRM. It's backed by that. But to get that going in the company was incredibly challenging.

所以这类事情我们有好几个，隔一段时间就会冒出一个能带动势能的想法。嗯，再给你举个例子：我们需要一个叫 audiences 的功能，你知道，它让你在产品里能有「公司」或「人」这样一个概念，这样你就可以把各种 signal 聚合到上面。嗯，它背后由 CRM 支撑——我们不是要做 CRM，是靠它来支撑。但要在公司内部把这件事推动起来，难得不可思议。

`[45:14]`

You know, people are like, "What about our tables?" Well, like we don't want this to have table limits, no row limits, no cell size limit, a lot of the limits that we just remove it. So, I had to motivate it in a different way. um it wasn't getting traction which is kind of interesting uh but it was I had to motivate it by saying okay we need signals which is we already have data we need data changing over time and so

你知道，大家会问，「那我们的表格怎么办？」问题是我们不希望它有表格的限制——没有行数限制、没有单元格大小限制，很多限制我们都直接去掉了。所以我得换一种方式来激发大家。嗯，一开始它推不动，这挺有意思的。后来我换了个说法：好，我们需要 signal，我们已经有数据了，我们需要的是随时间变化的数据，所以

`[45:36]`

let's build signals that was okay people got that and we then were selling signals and we started beating companies that only sold like job changer signals then the team themselves realized well what if you have five signals what are you going to aggregate it of well you need this concept of an audiences which we were talking about before Um and that like you know I think it's kind of again the storytelling I should have been

我们来做 signal 吧。这个大家听懂了，然后我们就开始卖 signal，而且开始打赢那些只卖「跳槽 signal」之类的公司。接着团队自己意识到：那如果你有五个 signal 呢，你要把它们聚合到什么上面？那你就需要 audiences 这个概念——也就是我们之前说的那个。嗯，我觉得这又回到讲故事这件事上，我本来应该

`[46:00]`

telling that story before but like leading the team so that they believe themselves and they have the momentum is very different than me being like you need to build this feature even if so one of the things I think you realize co is that you are sometimes way ahead of everybody else

更早就讲那个故事的。但引导团队让他们自己相信、自己产生势能，跟我直接说「你们得把这个功能做出来」，完全是两回事。所以你作为 CEO 会意识到的一件事是，你有时候确实远远走在所有人前面，

`[46:14]`

because you're getting input from so many places not just because you're smarter or whatever it is but you're just getting your purview is larger and that's all you're thinking about all day and you have an intuition for this that you've built over time because I've made a huge number of mistakes everywhere,

不是因为你更聪明还是什么，而是因为你的输入来自太多地方，你的视野更宽，而且你一整天想的都是这些事，加上你在这上面积累出了直觉——因为我在方方面面犯过数不清的错，

`[46:30]`

but I've also been doing this for so long.

但我也做这件事做了太久了。

`[46:32]`

Yeah. Momentum detective. I love that. Right.

对。势能侦探。我太喜欢这个说法了。

`[46:35]`

You're good at branding, by the way.

顺便说一句，你很擅长做品牌。

`[46:37]`

Apparently,

看来是吧。

`[46:37]`

all your cliences, all that stuff. You're very clever at it. Uh you've got kind of two modes.

你造的那些词啊、那一整套东西。你在这方面非常聪明。呃，你大概有两种模式。

`[46:43]`

Yeah. I I think there's the there's that one and then there's really it really is mainly around like people are in some kind of you know funk and I remove that u

对。我我觉得一种是刚才说的那个，另一种其实主要是——有人陷在某种低气压、某种低落状态里，我要把那个状态给化解掉。嗯，

`[46:57]`

advice on how to do that for other CEOs. Um, so actually my head of people told me that I'm uh the only CEO that she's worked with that has apologized and I would say that that's one very helpful technique. Like someone was telling me for example they had they had like a bunch of problems, right? And it was like there are many there are many problems that seem like they're the problem but often if you listen and apologizing doesn't mean necessarily

关于怎么做到这一点，对其他 CEO 有什么建议？嗯，其实我的 HR 负责人跟我说过，我是她共事过的唯一一个会道歉的 CEO。我会说那是一个非常有用的技巧。比如有人跟我说，他们遇到了一堆问题，对吧？而很多问题看起来像是「那个问题」，但如果你认真去听——而且道歉并不一定意味着

`[47:25]`

that something you know that the whole organization is wrong. It might be that we didn't listen to you or we didn't treat you in the way that made you feel respected. And once that calms down, we can then deal with the actual problem. Um, and people are very sensitive to that.

那种感觉——你知道的，就是觉得整个组织都错了。也可能是我们没听你说，或者我们对待你的方式让你觉得不被尊重。等这种情绪平复下来，我们才能去处理真正的问题。嗯，大家对这个是非常敏感的。

`[47:41]`

Just very tactically like your day, do you leave a lot of open time to momentum surf? Um, are you packed every half hour?

很具体地说，你的一天，你会留出很多空白时间来「顺势冲浪」吗？嗯，还是每半小时都排满了？

`[47:50]`

Um, it goes in phases. So most of my days for a very long time were packed like every 30 minutes, every 20 minutes and it's complete um context switching. So you know it's recruiting product decision making listening to someone removing a problem comp issues um you know talking to partners those

嗯，这是分阶段的。很长一段时间里，我大部分日子都是排得满满的，每 30 分钟一个、每 20 分钟一个，完全就是在不停地切换上下文。所以你知道的，招人、做产品决策、听某个人讲、解决一个问题、薪酬的事、嗯，还有跟合作伙伴谈——所有这些。

`[48:10]`

all the things

什么都有。

`[48:10]`

all the things and then once I do that for some period of time um typically you know typically if that happens too many weeks in a row I need to stop delete everything and leave a ton of space. I prefer like we run the company in um just in time decision- making. So like some unusual things that we do uh which we will eventually introduce but not yet is we don't have an exec team meeting which I think people find bizarre um how

什么都有。然后这样过一段时间之后，嗯，通常来说，如果连着好几周都是这样，我就必须停下来，把日程全删掉，留出大量空白。我更喜欢——我们公司是用「即时决策」的方式在运转的。所以我们有些不太寻常的做法，嗯，以后我们可能会引入，但现在还没有，就是我们没有高管团队例会，我觉得很多人听了会觉得很离谱，嗯。

`[48:41]`

do you stay aligned all that stuff we call we have open space call me whenever um and then we resolve it otherwise people wait for the meeting as you know um but yeah I think that the open space is my preference and the other way where everything is packed works but is typically means things aren't like people don't have the information for them to make distributed decision-m and I need to control everything in order to

那你们怎么保持对齐之类的？我们把它叫做「开放时间」——随时给我打电话，然后我们当场解决。不然的话，大家就会一直等到开会才说，你懂的，嗯。但是，对，我觉得留白是我更偏好的方式。另一种全排满的方式也能跑，但那通常意味着——大家手上没有足够的信息去做分布式决策，我就必须掌控每一件事情，才能。

`[49:08]`

make things work but it's exhausting and you can only do for sometimes it's necessary but you can only do it for you know months at a time

让事情转起来。但这非常耗人，你只能撑一阵子。有时候确实是必要的，但你顶多也就能坚持几个月。

`[49:16]`

and where do you get your think time in or like I want to go really deep on and build an agent for myself like where do you how do you fit that in is that weekends or

那你的思考时间从哪里来？比如「我想深挖某件事，给自己造一个 agent」，这种你怎么塞进日程里？是周末吗，还是？

`[49:26]`

kind that has to be after work weekends etc but I also like I would say I'm unusual in that my thinking like for example I go out dancing with my friends and I'm thinking and I'm also talking to them about it and so I'm I tend to like movement actually and doing things or you're on a hike those are helpful um but again like I I sometimes I actually think again this is maybe counterintuitive but like you don't want to look at something directly to see it

基本上得放在下班后、周末这些时间。但我也觉得自己有点特别，我的思考方式——比如说我跟朋友出去跳舞，我一边跳一边在想，同时也在跟他们聊这些事。所以我其实挺喜欢在动起来、在做事的时候思考，或者去徒步，那些都很有帮助。嗯，但话说回来，我有时候会觉得——这可能有点反直觉——就是你想看清一样东西，反而不该直勾勾地盯着它看。

`[49:55]`

you might want to squint at it because it's too much so I get information through other people um and then process that and then come up with a decision um rather than you you can't just rely on like your firsthand experience of like I you know I built a lot of the initial product uh with my co-founder so I I remember everything about it but I try to make decisions now without needing to you know like if someone tells me

你可能得眯着眼看，因为信息量太大了。所以我是通过其他人来获取信息，嗯，然后再消化，再做出决定。嗯，而不是只依赖你自己的第一手经验。比如说，早期的产品有很大一部分是我和我的联合创始人一起做出来的，所以我对它的每个细节都记得清清楚楚。但我现在尽量做决策的时候不需要依赖这些，比如说，如果有人告诉我。

`[50:24]`

there's an issue with a feature I can simulate it in my head and use I don't need to like play around with and with kind of like let's say playing around with LM there's so many people experimenting and trying to soak that in the firstirhand knowledge is limited.

某个功能有问题，我在脑子里就能模拟出来，不需要自己去上手摆弄。再比如说玩 LLM 这件事，有那么多人在做实验、在尝试，去把这些吸收进来——第一手的知识其实是很有限的。

`[50:39]`

Do you have one-on ones or you're like yeah what do you think about that? How many direct reports do you do one ones?

你做一对一沟通吗？还是说你就「对，你怎么看这个」？你有多少直接下属？你跟他们做一对一吗？

`[50:45]`

Um so the

嗯，所以说——

`[50:46]`

these are just tactical things

这些都是很具体的操作问题。

`[50:48]`

people ask me all the time.

总有人问我这些。

`[50:49]`

So um right now I probably have seven direct reports. I've been limiting I'm actually just so I I've I've gone back and forth. Um and I'm trying to put everybody in the same meeting and have like one-on- ones once a month. But again,

嗯，现在我大概有七个直接下属。我一直在控制这个数量——其实我反反复复调整过好多次。嗯，我现在想把所有人放进同一个会里，然后一对一改成一个月一次。不过话说回来，

`[51:07]`

we did exactly that for our first five years.

我们前五年就是完全这么干的。

`[51:09]`

Yeah. Go back to just in time processing. Just if you need something, come to me is the easiest way. But I did manage the whole engineering team up to six 70 people.

对。还是回到即时处理那套。就是你需要什么，直接来找我，这是最简单的方式。不过我确实是一路把整个工程团队带到了六七十人。

`[51:18]`

I see.

明白了。

`[51:19]`

Um without a head of venge until last September.

嗯，而且到去年九月之前都没有工程负责人。

`[51:22]`

Okay. That was a lot.

好家伙，那量可不小。

`[51:24]`

Yeah. So I tend to and just through the managers, but I had like pretty much a direct relationship with almost all the engineers because I I wanted to keep that

对。所以我倾向于——虽然是通过经理们管，但我基本上跟几乎所有工程师都保持着直接的联系，因为我想保住那种关系。

`[51:35]`

stay close to it.

保持贴近一线。

`[51:36]`

I didn't do one-on- ones for the longest time and then I did one-on- ones every week. I really wish I didn't.

我有很长一段时间完全不做一对一，后来又改成每周都做。现在我真希望当初没那么做。

`[51:40]`

Yes,

是啊，

`[51:41]`

it's a little so they're they can be draining.

有点……它们确实挺消耗人的。

`[51:43]`

Very draining.

非常消耗。

`[51:44]`

Where are you on that?

你现在是什么想法？

`[51:45]`

Um I think that it's draining. I've removed one-on ones. I I have one-on- ones with so now actually my new one-on- ones are with people that are not reporting to me where I'm like these are top priorities for the company. So I have a one-on-one with our head of sales because I'm like we need to stay aligned, right? Um if there's an uh a thing where we're like doing some new project, I'd rather have one-on- ones with that person. Um, so it's I'm trying

嗯，我觉得确实很耗人。我把一对一取消掉了。我现在的一对一——其实我新的一对一都是跟那些不向我汇报的人做的，因为我觉得这些是公司最高优先级的事。比如我跟销售负责人有一对一，因为我觉得我们必须保持对齐，对吧？嗯，如果有什么新项目在推进，我宁愿跟那个具体做事的人做一对一。嗯，所以我是在尝试——

`[52:10]`

to do it actually with in places where I feel like the reason I have it with our head of sales is our sales team is growing so tremendously and I'm the person who's the like communicating the culture and I want to make sure we stay aligned and then any issues can be brought up and dealt with quickly. But I don't need that with you standing weekly one ones.

把一对一放在我觉得真正需要的地方。我之所以跟销售负责人保持一对一，是因为我们销售团队增长得太快了，而我是那个传递文化的人，我想确保我们保持对齐，然后任何问题都能被提出来、被快速解决。但我不需要那种雷打不动的每周固定一对一。

`[52:30]`

I'm deleting all of those. You got it.

我要把那些全删了。你懂的。

`[52:32]`

Um, let's just talk about trust. People used to complain to me that I trusted the handful of people and really overindexed on their input and sounds like you're a person that gets a lot of input from a lot of places and then maybe didn't trust my trust circle was small. People complained about that.

嗯，我们聊聊信任吧。以前总有人跟我抱怨，说我只信任那么几个人，而且过度看重他们的意见。听起来你是那种会从很多不同渠道获取输入的人，而我可能……我的信任圈子很小。大家都抱怨过这一点。

`[52:48]`

Interesting. Yeah.

有意思。是啊。

`[52:49]`

Similar.

我也差不多。

`[52:50]`

Um Yeah. So, and did you did you change that as people talked to you about it?

嗯，对。那，当大家跟你提这件事的时候，你有没有改变？

`[52:55]`

I tried to. It didn't. Yeah.

我试过。没成。是啊。

`[52:56]`

Honestly, it didn't really work.

老实说，其实没什么效果。

`[52:58]`

Trust is hard to build with me.

跟我建立信任挺难的。

`[52:59]`

Yeah. Uh I think that I have a similar thing. I'm not um I have like trust issues for sure.

是啊。我觉得我也差不多。我不是……我确实有点信任方面的问题。

`[53:05]`

Yeah.

嗯。

`[53:06]`

Um but it's like different I mean there's different levels of trust. So there's like real trust which I have with a handful of people.

但那个不太一样，我是说信任是分层次的。有一种是真正的信任，这种我只跟少数几个人有。

`[53:13]`

That's what I'm talking about.

我说的就是这个。

`[53:14]`

Yeah. That's what what people have said to me is that I'm too forgiving.

对。别人跟我说的就是，我这人太宽容了。

`[53:19]`

Um so I'd say I have like one one kind of like thing that I'm trying to change is being forgiving, forgiving, forgiving and then explode, right? Because I've been super annoyed. um and feel like I've given too much. So, I'm trying to, you know, give you tons of like I'm I'm actually angry right now. I'm annoyed

所以我会说，我有一个一直想改的毛病，就是一味地宽容、宽容、宽容，然后突然爆发，对吧？因为我其实早就烦得不行了，觉得自己付出太多。所以我现在尽量……我现在就直接告诉你，我现在其实很生气，我很不爽。

`[53:39]`

uh over time.

呃，是慢慢积累起来的。

`[53:40]`

Do you hold on to people too long?

你是不是对人留得太久了？

`[53:42]`

Uh definitely. U but it has worked out sometimes. I I keep hearing, you know, people are like, "It's never worked out." Um I would say that we are as an organization, we believe in you. we want it to work out and we're constantly assuming the best intentions and sometimes because you know it's sometimes the person sometimes the context right so you can get the wrong with the wrong context you get the worst out of someone um so there have been

绝对是。但有时候结果还挺好的。我老听人说："这种事从来就没成过。"我想说的是，作为一个组织，我们相信你，我们希望这事能成，我们也一直默认对方是出于好意。而且有时候……有时候问题出在人身上，有时候出在环境上，对吧？错的环境会把一个人最糟的一面逼出来。所以确实有过一些……

`[54:11]`

situations where something seemed completely off and I like listened to this person did the exact opposite of what everybody you know like um I'll give you an example that's would seem absurd right someone did something wrong Um, and it doesn't matter what the details are, but uh, I gave them an increase in salary.

……有些情况看上去完全不对劲，而我听了这个人的说法，做出了跟所有人都完全相反的决定。我举个例子，听起来会很荒谬，对吧？有人做错了事，细节是什么不重要，然后我给他涨了工资。

`[54:31]`

Why?

为什么？

`[54:31]`

Right now, that seems crazy because I

现在听起来是挺疯狂的，因为我……

`[54:34]`

seems like something a contrarian CEO.

听着像是一个逆向思维的 CEO 才会干的事。

`[54:38]`

Uh, now that person is one of the best performing people in the company, right? And the reason is I realized there was it was out of like

而现在这个人是公司里表现最好的人之一，对吧？原因是我后来意识到，这件事其实是因为……

`[54:46]`

structural things held them back

是一些结构性的东西在拖累他，

`[54:48]`

and it was out of like partially out of the fact that they were not being paid correctly.

而且有一部分原因是，他的薪酬本来就没给对。

`[54:52]`

Okay, fine. So, but it but you could have been like, "Wow, this person is really and you're just like ha you shouldn't reward something when someone does the wrong thing." But actually, sometimes you can fix it. Okay. I heard I've heard you or maybe everyone told me that a company exaggerates a founders's traits. What traits are you happy it's exaggerating of yours? And what traits are you like, I wish it wouldn't.

好吧，行。但你本来完全可以反应成："哇，这人真是……"然后觉得，别人做错了事你不该去奖励他。但实际上，有时候你是可以把问题修好的。好，我听说过——也许是所有人都跟我讲过——公司会放大创始人的特质。有哪些特质被放大了，是你感到高兴的？又有哪些是你希望别被放大的？

`[55:17]`

Right. That's good. Yeah, I told him that. I feel like it's a um

对。这问题不错。是啊，这话是我跟他说的。我觉得这是个……

`[55:21]`

I I by the way I agree

顺便说一句，我同意这个说法。

`[55:23]`

usually it's like where I get surprised by people. So I do feel like people seem really open and enjoy working together and it's very at least that's the feedback that we constantly hear is that it it people are having fun. Um and sometimes they

通常是在那些我被别人惊艳到的地方。所以我确实觉得，大家看起来都很开放，也享受一起共事，至少我们一直听到的反馈是这样：大家在这儿做事很开心。有时候他们……

`[55:41]`

yeah they're like you know there there's an absurdist kind of like feeling to the company. It feels like po I don't know it's like a postmodern painting. you know, there's stuff um and then everything has its counter point. You just need to be conscious of what it is.

对，他们会说，公司里有一种荒诞派的气质。感觉像……我说不好，像一幅后现代主义的画。里面塞了各种东西。然后每样东西都有它的反面，你只需要清楚那个反面是什么。

`[55:54]`

And I do think like I really value patience as can be seen by the five-year thing. And I think sometimes we are too patient with things um that are not right.

还有，我确实非常看重耐心，从那个"五年"的事上就能看出来。但我也觉得，有时候我们对一些本来就不对的事，太有耐心了。

`[56:07]`

It's not a dip. It's going to keep going.

那不是一时的低谷，它会一直这样下去。

`[56:09]`

Yeah. It's not good enough. And I think um like I have very high standards and at the same time I'm very forgiving. Um, and so I think that um,

对，它就是不够好。我觉得，我的标准非常高，但同时我又非常宽容。所以我觉得……

`[56:19]`

where does that come from?

这是从哪儿来的？

`[56:21]`

The very forgiving part,

你是说非常宽容的那部分？

`[56:22]`

high standards, but is that mom? Is that dad? Where's that?

高标准，但这是随妈妈？还是随爸爸？这是从哪儿来的？

`[56:25]`

Um, yeah, I think the I mean the high standards I feel like it's like taste. My parents like have high standards. My but and the forgiving part. Yeah, it probably is like and my my dad is very forgiving, but I think it also is like um back to kind of like why are we doing this, which I don't know that everybody is thinking about

嗯，我觉得高标准这部分，感觉有点像品味。我父母就是高标准的人。至于宽容的部分——对，多半也是，我爸爸就非常宽容。但我觉得这也跟"我们到底为什么做这件事"有关，我不确定每个人都会去想这个问题，

`[56:47]`

until later u the way that I'm interacting with people at work? You know, one of the things I think about is I I've talked about this for example at the company, right? Uh this is like um if you can't forgive your coworker for some infraction or some random thing they said to you or some like small competitive nature thing that you're doing, how are we going to actually forgive people in the world? How are we going to make this work? Um this is a

可能要到很久以后才会想——想我在工作中跟人相处的方式。我常想的一件事是，比如我在公司里就讲过这个：如果你连同事的一点小冒犯、他随口说的一句话、或者你们之间那点小小的争强好胜都没法原谅，那我们又怎么可能真的去原谅这个世界上的人？我们怎么可能把这件事做成？这就是一个……

`[57:15]`

microcosm. Everything that is happening in your personal life as a problem is probably happening at work as well. just at work we can give you feedback and the you know the stakes might be lower in some ways right um and that's why we have like you know we try to cover therapy we try to cover coaching we give coaching to people who are not leaders because often it's IC's who are going through kind of you know sometimes

……缩影。你个人生活里发生的每一个问题，多半在工作里也同样在发生，只不过在工作里我们能给你反馈，而且从某些方面看代价也更低，对吧？所以我们才会——我们尽量报销心理治疗，尽量报销教练服务，我们也给非管理岗的人配教练，因为往往正是 IC 在经历这些，有时候……

`[57:40]`

people are going through crazy cycles of emotional things because I made some random comment passing by or someone said something to them and then it really gets in their head and how much time are we wasting on this versus doing productive work. So on the one hand, you can be like, "Hey, we're a company that is trying to, you know, maximize shareholder value and dominate the world and make as much money as possible."

……有人会陷入疯狂的情绪内耗，就因为我路过时随口说了句什么，或者别人跟他们说了什么，然后这事就在他们脑子里挥之不去。我们到底在这上面浪费了多少本该用来做正事的时间？所以一方面，你可以说："嘿，我们是一家公司，我们要最大化股东价值、统治世界、赚尽可能多的钱。"

`[58:02]`

You're probably wasting a [ __ ] ton of money by not dealing with like people's emotions around very silly things. Um, and also by perpetuating kind of like I actually think what this is a pet theory that I have is that very few people get to this stage of company, right? Um, and it's very when you're in it, it's very,

那你光是不去处理大家在一些特别无聊的小事上的情绪，就已经在浪费一大笔钱了。而且还在延续那种……其实我有个私人理论：能走到公司这个阶段的人非常少，对吧？而且当你身在其中的时候，那感觉非常……

`[58:25]`

you know, you're kind of trying to stay exactly on the line of success. So, you don't want to try too many crazy things. You want to focus on your product and what's unique about you. And so, you get this wisdom from other people who have done it. And it's all kind of like we call it couch wisdom. You know, it's it's not really studied. It's like what this person did before and therefore they'll give you some advice. You will

你懂的，你其实是在努力精准地踩在成功的那条线上。所以你不想去尝试太多疯狂的东西，你想专注在自己的产品上，专注在你独特的地方。于是你就去那些做过这件事的人身上取经。而这些基本上就是我们说的「沙发上的智慧」（couch wisdom），你知道的，它并没有被真正研究过，就是这个人以前这么干过，所以他给你一些建议。你照着做，

`[58:47]`

do it and you'll get the exact same problems that they had. So sometimes we're trying different things. You know, people tell me like, "Hey, you should hire fast, fire fast." Well, that has specific set of problems.

然后你会遇到跟他们一模一样的问题。所以有时候我们会去试一些不一样的做法。比如有人跟我说：「嘿，你应该快速招人、快速开人。」可这套做法有它自己一堆特定的问题。

`[58:56]`

Higher slow, fire fast.

是「慢招人、快开人」。

`[58:57]`

Yeah. Higher slow, fire fast.

对，慢招人、快开人。

`[58:59]`

You don't believe in that.

你不信这一套。

`[59:00]`

I I

我、我……

`[59:01]`

You obviously don't. You just said the fire

你显然不信。你刚才自己说的就是那个「开人」的部分——

`[59:02]`

Yeah. Yeah. I I also think um I think that there's a lot of moments where we should make decisions faster around that, but I just don't believe in these rules of thumb that I think at some point you shut down internally. You stop like thinking about the situation.

对对。我，我也觉得，嗯，我觉得有很多时刻我们确实应该在这类事情上更快地做决定，但我就是不信这些经验法则。因为我觉得到了某个点上，你内心就关闭了，你就不再去思考具体的情境了。

`[59:16]`

You're just following the rule. What other CEOSism do you think are stupid?

你只是在照着规则走。还有哪些 CEO 圈的老生常谈，你觉得是蠢的？

`[59:21]`

A lot.

很多。

`[59:22]`

Like

比如？

`[59:23]`

I think driving people really hard uh without paying attention to like I like for examp I'll give you one example like people come in and they're like AI is going to create ton of productivity. We should lay out fire 20% of the team without knowing what you're actually doing. And that's what makes people like IC's think exacts are dumb, right?

我觉得，一味地往死里逼人，却完全不去留意……比如我举个例子，有人跑来说，AI 会带来巨大的生产力提升，我们应该裁掉团队 20% 的人——可你根本不知道自己到底在干什么。这就是为什么一线员工（IC）会觉得高管很蠢，对吧？

`[59:45]`

Because they're going to meetings together. They hear some other person did this. You just go and do it. And I think there's a huge lack of empathy for like the team. And I feel it sometimes too. It's like management, you know, it's like the principal agent problem,

因为他们凑在一起开会，听说别人这么干了，你就直接照搬。我觉得这里面对团队极度缺乏同理心。我自己有时候也会有这种感觉，就是管理层嘛，你知道的，这就是所谓的「委托—代理问题」（principal agent problem），

`[1:00:00]`

management versus like workers where you're like, why aren't people thinking correctly? Why aren't they, you know, taking action? Why aren't they like owning this? Well, there's incentives aren't aligned for that. Uh anyway, I have I I also think that um thinking of work, this is a big one for me rather like my definition of fun is very broad obviously. So like type two fun is fun for me. Climbing something is fun. But I think motivating

管理层对员工。你会想，为什么这些人不能正确地思考？为什么他们不去行动？为什么他们不把这件事当成自己的事（own it）？可是，激励机制本来就没对齐啊。呃，总之，我还觉得，嗯，把工作看成……这对我来说是件大事，就是我对「乐趣」的定义显然非常宽泛。所以像 type two fun（那种事后回味才觉得爽的乐趣）对我来说也是乐趣，去攀岩就是乐趣。但我觉得，激励人……

`[1:00:28]`

people through either just greed or fear or discipline um is not always the optimal. You need you need the whole toolkit. So like you know another word for discipline could be

只靠贪婪、恐惧或者纪律，并不总是最优解。你需要，你需要一整套工具箱。所以你知道，纪律的另一种说法也可以是——

`[1:00:45]`

the fear and greed thing. That's those are the

恐惧和贪婪那一套。那些都是——

`[1:00:47]`

those are all levers by the way. Yes.

顺便说一句，那些都是可以拉的杠杆。没错。

`[1:00:49]`

How do you think about that?

你是怎么看这件事的？

`[1:00:50]`

Um I'm I'm uh I believe in like the full spectrum of the things. So it's like devotion is as good as discipline. Like you can't just use some of these tools without understanding both motivate your team to win but also create like a place that you actually want to be in. So my point is there's something about business, this is again like some of my own that that feels like you're just trying to take this thing and hand it to

嗯，我，我，呃，我相信要用上全谱系的东西。就是说，热忱和纪律一样好用。你不能只挑其中几样工具用，却不去理解——你既要激励团队去赢，同时也要营造一个你自己真心愿意待着的地方。所以我想说的是，商业里有某种东西——这又是我自己的一些想法——那种感觉就像，你只是想把这个东西接过来，然后再甩给

`[1:01:18]`

someone else. Like it's like a musical chairs thing, right? So like the best businesses I I said this at the beginning like Apple, it's like well who's actually doing all of the stuff? It's like Foxcon like well here's this beautiful business that has all the numbers are going correct but it's because I can squeeze my suppliers in this way. Now, I'm not going to think about that supplier. It's kind of like throwing your rubbish somewhere else and

别人。就像在玩抢椅子游戏，对吧？所以那些最好的生意——我一开始就说过，比如 Apple——你会想，到底是谁在干所有这些活儿？是富士康（Foxconn）。所以这里有一门漂亮的生意，所有数字都很好看，但那是因为我能这样去压榨我的供应商。那我就不去想那个供应商了。这有点像把你的垃圾扔到别的地方去，

`[1:01:40]`

you're like, "That's in China or that's over there." And what I'm like thinking about is like, "Hey, we live in the world together. What happens if I win but you lose?" Um, it's fine. Like, I guess you'll you can just jump off and maybe you'll not get caught and no one will worry about it. But I'm I don't want to do that because I don't want to live with myself in this way.

然后你说：「那是在中国」或者「那是在那边」。而我在想的是：「嘿，我们是共同生活在这个世界上的。如果我赢了但你输了，会怎么样？」嗯，那也没事。我想你可以就这么抽身走人，也许你不会被抓住，也没人会在意。但我不想那么干，因为我不想以那样的方式跟自己相处。

`[1:02:04]`

Okay. I had Jack Dorsey on a few weeks ago. He YouTube rhyme. Um he's an original thinker. He's not central casting for CEOs and he's, you know, he's laid off a big chunk of his employees, but I think he's really retoled the way the company works and,

好。几周前我请 Jack Dorsey 来过。他——你们俩挺合拍的。嗯，他是个有原创性的思考者，他不是那种标准模板里的 CEO；而且你知道，他裁掉了很大一部分员工，但我觉得他真的重塑了公司的运作方式，

`[1:02:22]`

you know, he's put AI in the center and he's delegating a lot of decisions to the center. The people are on the outside. He's rethought his org chart, it's compensation. He's sort of reimagining it.

你知道的，他把 AI 放在中心位置，把大量决策交给中心，人反而在外围。他重新设计了组织架构，也重新设计了薪酬。他等于是在重新想象这一切。

`[1:02:31]`

I assume you're following some of that. What's your take?

我猜你多少在关注这些。你怎么看？

`[1:02:34]`

I think that, you know, it's hard with like public companies too because it's like you what is the narrative versus what's reality. I I do think that sometimes you do need to retool the company. Um and maybe you hire too many people or maybe things are changing. Um and we don't have really good ways in general to say the truth without um co without people again I I really think it is this principal agent problem, right? It's

我觉得，你知道，上市公司这种事也挺难讲的，因为你分不清哪些是叙事、哪些是现实。我确实认为，有时候你是需要给公司做一次「重装」（retool）的。嗯，也许你招了太多人，也许情况在变。嗯，而我们普遍缺少好的方式去把真话说出来，又不会让人……我真的觉得这还是那个委托—代理问题，对吧？就是说

`[1:03:03]`

like whatever you say is being parsed to be like is it what you really said or does it mean something else? Are you covering up something?

不管你说什么，都会被人拿去解析：这是你真正想说的吗？还是另有所指？你是不是在掩盖什么？

`[1:03:10]`

I don't think he was covering it up.

我不觉得他是在掩盖。

`[1:03:11]`

Yeah. So that's what I mean. I'm just like I think that you could take it at face value and be like this is actually what

对，我就是这个意思。我只是觉得，你可以按字面意思去理解，就当这确实是——

`[1:03:16]`

I think he's actually doing the thing.

我觉得他是真的在做这件事。

`[1:03:17]`

Yeah. And I think that's probably right.

对。我觉得这大概率是对的。

`[1:03:20]`

And do you think he's on the right track?

那你觉得他走在正确的路上吗？

`[1:03:22]`

Um

嗯……

`[1:03:23]`

like he's got two layers of like he's a crazy flat. He's got a big team working on his trying to make all his systems legible. Get everything in that legible system. his people are really responsible for making that system as legible as it can be and then building agents on top of it and just turning over a lot more of the decision making over time to he calls it the intelligence.

比如说他只有两层，他的架构极度扁平。他有一个很大的团队专门在做一件事：让他所有的系统变得「可读」（legible），把所有东西都装进那个可读的系统里。他的人真正负责的，就是把那个系统做到尽可能可读，然后在它上面搭 agent，并且随着时间推移，把越来越多的决策权交出去——交给他所说的「the intelligence」，也就是那个智能。

`[1:03:41]`

Yeah, it's a really hard thing for me to comment on just because I haven't actually thought about it deeply enough.

是啊，这件事我真的很难评论，纯粹是因为我还没有真正深入地想过。

`[1:03:48]`

Yeah. Okay. I got a couple more just bringing you back to the philosopher king. You've got a line. There's no elephant in the room. The elephant is in your mind. I can't believe he told you that.

嗯。好。我还有几个问题，把你拉回到「哲学王」那个话题。你有一句话：房间里没有大象，大象在你自己的心里。我真不敢相信他把这句告诉你了。

`[1:04:03]`

How does that apply to being a CEO?

这一点怎么应用到当 CEO 上？

`[1:04:05]`

That was an off-the cuff comment, but I I uh if I remember correctly, I have, you know, like a Q&A

那句话是我随口说的，但我——如果我没记错的话，我们有一个 Q&A 环节，

`[1:04:12]`

every every week. It used to be every week, now it's every other week, and it's optional and people

每周都开。以前是每周，现在改成每两周一次，而且是自愿参加，大家

`[1:04:17]`

um show up and we talk about anything. And I I think my leadership style or communication style in general is to call the thing out that you might be wondering and assume that you are a smart person. Um and not kind of like dance around it. And so typically what we do in these meetings is just be like here are all the things that you might be worried about. Well, every week actually in our in my all hands um I talk to people on the team constantly

来了就随便聊，什么都能聊。我觉得我的领导风格，或者说沟通风格，就是把你心里可能在嘀咕的那件事直接点出来，并且默认你是个聪明人，不绕弯子、不打太极。所以这种会上我们通常就是：来，把你可能担心的所有事都摆到桌面上。其实每周的全员会上我也这样，我一直在跟团队里的人聊天，

`[1:04:46]`

um and I hear various things from them about what's happening in the company, how's the culture changing or not changing and I try to bring these things up um so that we can all be aware of them

从他们那儿听到各种各样的事情——公司里在发生什么，文化在变还是没变。然后我会主动把这些拿到台面上讲，让大家都心里有数。

`[1:04:57]`

you know so one of the things

比如说有一件事……

`[1:04:58]`

calling them out

把它们点破。

`[1:04:59]`

yeah calling them out like hey people feel like um we can't um we we're stepping on each other's toes and I'm like okay let's discuss that how does that how does that manifest. What do we want? What behavior do we want?

对，就是点破。比如：嘿，有人觉得我们在互相踩脚、职责重叠。我就说，好，那我们聊聊，这具体是怎么体现出来的？我们想要什么？我们希望看到什么样的行为？

`[1:05:11]`

Y

嗯。

`[1:05:11]`

um and I think a lot of the times

而且我觉得很多时候……

`[1:05:14]`

um

嗯……

`[1:05:14]`

so you're calling the elf in the room out. What about the elephant in the room?

所以你是在主动点破房间里那头「大象」——那些谁都看见却没人愿意说破的事。

`[1:05:17]`

Right. So So a lot of the times nothing is happening and it's just your in anticipation of the problem

对。所以很多时候其实什么都没发生，只是你自己在提前预设了一个问题。

`[1:05:27]`

or sometimes uh we call this like you're bringing baggage from another company where something happened to you and then you're like hey I don't trust you guys yet. And so you're creating the problem because you're you're seeing this thing in your head that isn't even happening in reality. So I'm just like, tell us what's actually going on so that you don't work based on some perceived reality that isn't even real.

又或者，我们管这个叫「把上一家公司的包袱带过来了」——你在别处被坑过，于是就想：嘿，我还没法信任你们。结果你反倒把问题制造出来了，因为你脑子里看到的那个东西，在现实里根本没发生。所以我就说：把真实情况讲出来，别基于一个压根不存在的假想现实去工作。

`[1:05:48]`

What do you want to do when you're old and gray like me? What's next for you?

等你老了、头发白了，像我这样的时候，你想干什么？你的下一步是什么？

`[1:05:53]`

It's hard to think about the future.

想未来的事挺难的。

`[1:05:56]`

But I happen to be an electrical engineer by training and I have also

不过我科班出身是电气工程，而且我最近……

`[1:06:01]`

uh been playing more music recently. Um, so I want to be doing a lot of like generative ambient music. Uh, I've been doing a bunch of stuff like that already. Okay.

最近玩音乐比较多。所以我想做很多那种生成式的氛围音乐。这类东西我已经在捣鼓不少了。好。

`[1:06:14]`

I don't know. There's something around like creating soundsscapes and getting into uh like that place where you know you can't really I music is all about predicting kind of the next sound. But I've really been enjoying this idea of like if you can't predict it but it's still like good. What does you're expanding kind of like your sound vocabulary. Okay.

说不好。就是那种创造声景、进入某种状态的感觉——音乐本质上是在预测下一个声音会是什么。但我特别享受这样一种想法：如果你预测不出来，但它听起来依然很好，那说明什么？说明你在拓展自己的声音词汇。好。

`[1:06:35]`

Yeah.

是啊。

`[1:06:35]`

I appreciate you coming on. It was a wonderful conversation. Congrats on all your success.

谢谢你来上节目，这是一次非常精彩的对话。恭喜你取得的这一切成绩。

`[1:06:39]`

Thank you. Thank you.

谢谢，谢谢。

`[1:06:41]`

Hey everybody, I hope you like that episode with Kareem. I really enjoyed the conversation. I have a lot of takeaways. I'm going to give you my three and I'm going to give you a couple stories of my own that tie in. Uh two nights ago I had dinner with Kareem and David Solomon from Goldman Sachs and TK,

大家好，希望你们喜欢这期和 Kareem 的对话。我自己特别享受这次交流，收获了很多。我挑三点分享给你们，再讲几个我自己的、能对上的故事。两天前的晚上，我和 Kareem、高盛的 David Solomon，还有 TK 一起吃了晚饭——

`[1:06:57]`

the CEO of Kshi. And my takeaway from the dinner was, "Holy crap, are these three homo sapiens different and holy crap is their CEO playbook different." And it reminds me of an old quote, you know, I think it goes, "Be yourself. Everyone else is taken." I think it was Oscar Wild who said it.

就是 Kalshi 的 CEO。那顿饭我最大的感受是：天哪，这三个人怎么可以如此不同；天哪，他们那套 CEO 打法怎么可以如此不同。这让我想起一句老话，大概是：「做你自己吧，别人都已经有人做了。」我记得是奥斯卡·王尔德说的。

`[1:07:19]`

I leave that with you. I hope you can be yourself because everyone else is taken. There's a lot of ways to do this. I'm trying to look for the one way. The truth is there's a lot of ways to be successful as a CEO. Um the second thing he's sort of the a philosopher and he reminded me of something I've I've been working on and people say pe folks who live in the past tend to kind of be depressed and folks who live in the

这句话送给你们。希望你能做你自己，因为别人都已经有人做了。做这件事的路有很多条，我却总想找到那唯一正确的一条。真相是，当一个成功的 CEO，有很多种活法。第二点，他算是个哲学家，他提醒了我一件我一直在琢磨的事：人们常说，活在过去的人容易抑郁，活在——

`[1:07:42]`

future tend to be anxious and folks who live in today tend to be a little bit happier. I myself tend to live in the future and I'm kind of anxious and I remember when my anxiety peaked and this may be happening to you so I relay it. I remember doing a company meeting around 100 150 employees and just looking out and seeing, oh my gosh, there's so many people relying on me to make really good decisions. They're taking care of their

未来的人容易焦虑，而活在当下的人往往会开心一些。我自己就是那种活在未来的人，所以总有点焦虑。我记得我焦虑的峰值是什么时候——这事可能也会发生在你身上，所以我说出来。我记得有一次开公司全员会，大概一百到一百五十个员工，我往台下一看，心想：天哪，这么多人指望我做出真正正确的决定。他们要养——

`[1:08:08]`

kids. They're paying their mortgages. They're taking care of their parents in a lot of cases. It wasn't actually in the tough times at the beginning. It was when we were actually scaling and starting to do pretty well that my anxiety uh increased. Anyway, if that's you, this is just a reminder. Living in the present is a good place to be. Um,

孩子，要还房贷，很多人还要照顾父母。而这个峰值其实并不是在最开始最难熬的时候，反倒是在我们真正开始规模化、势头挺好的时候，我的焦虑才上来了。总之，如果你也是这样，这就当是个提醒：活在当下是个不错的位置。

`[1:08:26]`

I'm trying to do more of that myself. Kareem gave me a really good reminder of that. The third thing is I like his line, devotion versus discipline. It's really hard to scale a startup without, you know, real devotion from your employees. And your your vision and your your story has to be really compelling.

我自己也在努力多做到一些。Kareem 这次给了我一个很好的提醒。第三点，我很喜欢他那句「投入（devotion）而不是纪律（discipline）」。如果员工没有真正的投入，创业公司几乎不可能规模化。而你的愿景、你讲的故事，必须真的足够有感召力。

`[1:08:47]`

And if it's not, you should work on that. You yourself need to be really compelling. You need to inspire followership. You want people to want to kind of walk across broken glass to work for you. And like your company probably has stuff hanging on the walls, you know, slogans and things you come up with your culture code stuff. It's incredibly important that you don't just talk to talk, but actually walk the walk on those slogans on the wall. I'll leave

如果还不够，那你就该在这上面下功夫。你这个人本身就得足够有感召力，你得让人愿意追随你。你希望有人愿意踩着碎玻璃走过来给你干活。还有，你公司墙上大概挂着一堆东西——各种口号、你们自己攒出来的文化准则。极其重要的一点是：别光把话说漂亮，而要真的按墙上那些口号去做。

`[1:09:14]`

you those three. Hope you liked it. I really enjoyed him. See you next time.

就把这三点留给你们。希望你们喜欢这期。我真的很喜欢他这个人。下次见。